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FOREWORD 
In accordance with its usual practice, the Interscholastic League is 
issuing this bulletin for the help and convenience of students who 
wish to prepare themselves for entry into the debating contests of 
the League. 
In the interest of economy, the League has discontinued furnishing 
free copies, and is thus enabled to reduce the price to 15 cents per 
copy. The large free distribution in former years to many schools 
not participating in debate increased the cost to those schools pur­
chasing extra copies, and hence it seems wise to discontinue the free 
distribution, and reduce the cost to those schools actually using the 
publication. 
The Extension Loan Library, University Station, Austin, Texas, 
will furnish any school official in Texas who applies for the same a 
package library on the present question, which he may keep for a 
period of two weeks. 
The present bulletin was compiled by Thomas A. Rousse, Adjunct 
Professor of Public Speaking, The University of Texas. 
The League endorses and commends to debating coaches and judges 
the following statement of the aims of this contest: 
"The purpose of practice debating is to teach young men [and young 
women] to think, and to speak their thoughts effectively. Debaters 
who are so trained should be given precedence over those who recite 
vigorously memorized speeches. The college or high-school debater 
who declaims, in all probability has not written the speech himself. 
Too much help by the coaches [and commercial bureaus] is doing 
much to bring disrepute upon all debating. If judges have the cour­
age to distinguish between declamation and speaking from the floor, 
they can do much to raise the standard of school debating." 
It will be noted that the current rules provide for county elimina­
tions in debate on a percentage basis which will leave only the two 
strongest teams in each division to compete at the county meet. 
No attempt should be made to prevent "scouting." Indeed, it is de­
sirable for teams and coaches to hear just as many League debates 
as possible. 
Coaches are cautioned to study carefully the "Instruction to Judges" 
which appears in the "Rules for Debate" in the current issue of the 
Constitution and Rules. 
ROY BEDICHEK, 
Chief, Interscholastic League Bureau, 
Extension Division, The University of Texas. 
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"Good argument is a sharp process of 
investigation, leading by mutual criticism 
to some nearer ascertainment of truth." 
J, L. GARVIN. 
"It is easy to say that in every dispute 
we should have no other aim than the ad­
vancement of truth; but before dispute no 
one knows where it is" . . . 
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. 
"The gods have given us speech-the 
power which has civilized human life; and 
shall we not strive to make the best of it?" 
!SOCRATES. 
Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the 
power of the art of contradiction! 
Why do you say so? 
Because I think that many a man falls 
into the practice against his will. When 
he thinks that he is reasoning he is really 
disputing, just because he cannot define and 
divide, and so know that of which he is 
speaking, and he will pursue a mere verbal 
opposition in the spirit of contention and 
not of fair discussion. 
Yes, he replied, such is very often the 
case; but what has that to do with us and 
our argument? 
A great deal; for there is certainly a 
danger of our getting unintentionally into 
a verbal opposition. 
PLATO: The Republic, Book V. 
EXPLANATION 
The Brief and the reading material included in the Bulletin, it is 
believed, cover the essential points on the jury question. The ma­
aterial, however, is not at all inclusive, but merely indicative and should 
be used as a starting point to the study of the subject. Texas 
authorities as well as the Texas Statutes have been quoted, in order 
to give the debater a local as well as a national view of the jury ques­
tion. For a broader and more extensive study, the debater should 
procure, along with other readings, the valuable material collected 
by the Package Loan Library, Extension Division, of The University 
of Texas. 
In preparing the brief, an attempt has been made to cite at least 
one authority for each contention. It should be noted, however, that 
the reference given for each point is not the only one and the debater 
should substantiate his argument with several other equally well­
known authorities. 
Attention should also be called to the fact that the Jury question 
is one based on authorities rather than statistics. The relative impor­
tance, therefore, of the opinions of the different experts should not 
be overlooked. 
Ingenuity in the preparation of the debate is very desirable and 
the debater should construct his own individual case without adher­
ing too closely to the Bulletin or other briefs. At best, the Bulletin 
contains only a general survey of the subject. The debater is left 
to decide for himself the strong and weak points of the subject. 
Quotations from this Bulletin, or other sources, should be properly 
pointed out by the debater, in order to avoid the charge of plagiarism. 
It should be remembered, too, that the word of a well-known authority 
has much more weight with the audience and judges than the mere 
assertion of the speaker. 
It is hoped that this Bulletin will be of aid in the study of the 
Jury question. 
Good luck! 
THOMAS A. ROUSSE. 
The University of Texas, 
September 10, 1930. 

SUGGESTIVE BRIEFS 
Resolved, That a Substitute for Trial by Jury Should be 
Adopted. 
INTRODUCTION 
I. The question of trial by jury is a very important one, because 
A. There has been much discussion for a number of years of 
the efficiency of the judiciary. 
B. The proper and expedient administration of the laws is of 
vital concern to the entire nation. 
II. Definitions: 
A. Jury: "A body of men sworn to give a true answer, or 
verdict, on some matter submitted to them, especially such 
a body legally chosen to inquire into any matter of fact, 
and to render a verdict according to the evidence.''1 
1. Number and Nature of the Jury: The term "Trial by 
Jury" refers to the common-law jury of twelve men, 
"who try questions in issue, and pass finally upon the 
truth of the facts in dispute."2 In short, the common-law 
jury discussed in the Bulletin is one composed of twelve 
men of the community, selected under the law, who 
receive all of the evidence at the trial, and the law from 
the Judge, and then render a verdict.s 
B. By the term "Substitute" we mean a tribunal of one or more 
judges. This tribunal (usually composed of three judges, 
but not necessarily) shall perform the duties of the jury.• 
C. Civil and criminal eases are included in the discussion of 
trial by a jury and in trial by a tribunal of judges. 
III. Admitted Matter. 
A. Both sides will admit the necessity of an adequate system 
for the proper and expedient administration of justice. 
B. Both sides will admit the feasibility of amending the State 
and National Constitutions. 
•Webster's Colleirlate Dictionary, Sd Edition of the Merriam Series. 
"Cyclopedlc Law Dictionary, 2d Edition. 
•Patterson, C. P., "American Government," pp. 705-709. 
•Webster's Colleiriate Dictionary: Substitute: "To put in the place of another 
person or thing ; exchange." 
It should be noted here that the term "Substitute" is not synonymous with the 
term ":Modification." The latter term means "partial alteration"-Webster's; whereu 
by "Substitute" we mean here an exchange of Trial by Jury for Trial by a Tribunal 
of Judges. 
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IV. Irrelevant Matter. 
A. A discussion of the grand jury. 
B. A discussion of the coroner's jury. 
C. A discussion of the justice of the peace court jury. 
V. The Main Issues. 
A. Is trial by jury efficient? 
B. Is trial by jury necessary? 
C. Is the substitute plan (tribunal) practical? 
DISCUSSION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE 
I. Trial by a jury is grossly inefficient as a means of administering 
justice, because 
A. It causes unnecessary delay and expense for the trial of a 
legal suit, for 
1. The process of selection of a jury is lengthy and tedious, 
for 
a. The sheriff must draw the names of prospective jurors 
from the jury wheel and serve each man.1 
b. A large number of prospective jurors are called.2 
c. Time and energy is wasted in the lengthy examination 
and cross-examination of the prospective jurors.a 
2. The actual trial of a suit is slow and cumbersome, for 
a. The lawyers attempt to put on a show and advertise 
themselves.• 
b. The lawyers argue over the admissibility of evidence.a 
c. The lawyers attempt to disqualify witnesses on the 
other side before the jury with tedious and inane ques­
tions.6 
d. The jury must receive instructions at every stage of 
the trial.7 
3. Change of venue is often necessary, for 
a. It is impossible to obtain an unbiased jury to try the 
suit.8 
4. Juries often fail to reach a verdict after several days of 
deliberation and have to be discharged,a for 
•Mathews, J. M., The Jury System, from "American State Government." 
'Ibid. 
1Potts, C. S., "Criminal Law-What's Wrong With It?" 
'Ibid. 
•Ibid. 
"Willoughby, W. F., The Petty Jury System, from "Principles of Judicial Adminis­
tration. 
•Ibid. 
8Mathews, J . M. 
•Ibid. 
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a. A unanimous verdict is required.10 
b. There may be a "sinker" in the jury.11 
5. The court dockets are cluttered with unmeritorious claims, 
for 
a. Unscrupulous litigants and lawyers attempt to win 
verdicts on emotional or prejudicial appeals to the 
jury.12 
B. The average juror is not qualified for the work he is called 
on to perform in the trial of a case, for 
1. The process of selection bars the more intelligent men 
from jury service, for1a 
a. Professional men, such as doctors, lawyers, etc., are 
exempt from service. 
b. The average busy citizen shuns jury service and dis­
qualifies himself whenever possible. 
c. The attorneys disqualify many intelligent veniremen 
through the use of the peremptory challenge. 
d. Prospective jurors must be unfamiliar with current 
events.14 
2. The average juror is partial and prejudiced, for 
a. the decisions of juries show that they read their own 
emotions into the law.1s 
b. The law recognizes the existence for this prejudice, for 
1. The jurors are held practically under arrest during 
the trial of a case.16 
c. It is relatively easy for the lawyers to arouse political 
or religious prejudices in the minds of the juror.11 
d. jurors are sometimes corrupted either through fear, 
or worse motives, and return verdicts in defiance of 
the law.18 
e. The average juror is prejudiced against corporations.19 
3. The average juror is not capable to pa:ss upon the facts 
of a case, for20 
a. The evidence presented in a case is usually of a com­
plicated nature. 
lOWilloughby, W. F. 
11Gossett, Ed L., "A Substitute for Trial by Jury." 
12Jbid. 
llWIJloughby, W. F. 
i<Greer, H. W., "Should Trial by Jury be Abolished?" 
'"Willoughby, W. F. 
18Greer, H. W. 
17Jbid.-also, Gossett. 
lBJbid. 
10Goesett, Ed L. 
'"'Ibid. 
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b. The attorneys present complicated arguments in an 
attempt to cloud the real facts and to raise doubts in 
the minds of the jurors. 
c. The juror is not allowed to take down any of the 
testimony given during the trial and he must trust his 
memory.20b 
d. The surroundings of the courtroom are strange to the 
average juror and he cannot think clearly. 
4. The average juror is not capable of applying the law 
as given by the charge of the court to the facts in the 
case and render a proper verdict, for 
a. The juror is not learned in the law, forz1 
1. Law is a science and proper understanding of it 
may not be had even in a good fifteen-minute lec­
ture by a good judge. 
b. The charge of the judge to the jury on the law is 
complicated and all-inclusive. 
c. The application of the law to the facts requires a 
trained mind.22 
C. Trial by jury has failed to meet the need of today, for 
1. It is largely responsible for the increase in crime, for 
a. Felony cases, such as murder, tried by juries, are in­
creasing. 
b. The crime increase is uniform over the nation and 
the blame cannot be put on municipal authorities, for 
( 1) The criminals are arrested. 
(2) The criminals are tried. 
c. Criminals demand trial before a jury, for 
(1) It is their safest refuge,2s 
(2) The possibilities for a reversal due to errors are 
multiplied. 
d. Trial by jury is found to be administering justice at 
a rate of less than 50 per cent.24 
2. It is being discarded in the majority of civil cases, for 
a. It is cheaper to settle out of court rather than stand 
the expense and uncertainty of justice of the jury trial. 
b. Numerous boards, commissions, etc., have been created 
to expedite the settlement of disputes. 
3. Many states have abolished trial by jury in numerous 
instances in civil cases and in criminal cases.2s 
IOb"Jurors may not take notes of tbe testimonies of witnesses to refresh tbelr 
memories In consultation with tbeir fellow jurors."-Bouvier's Law Dictionary. 
llGreer, H. W. 
llWillonghby, W. F . 
""McWborter, J. C., "Abolish the Jury." 
"'Kavanaugh, M. A., Amer. Law Review, July-August, 1925. 
15Green, Leon, "Why Trial by Jury?" Amer. Mere. XV, No. 67, Sept., 1928. 
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D. The elimination of the many inefficiencies of trial by jury is 
not possible, for 
1. The defects are inherent within the system, for 
a. Educational and intellectual standards cannot be 
changed, for 
(1) The better qualified citizens are in occupations 
that forbid them to spend the time required to 
try a case. 
(2) The citizens would resent any attempt at mental 
discrimination. 
b. Prejudice and emotion cannot be abolished by legis­
lation. 
c. The law of evidence cannot be eliminated, forH 
(1) The jury must be guarded as much as possible 
from inadmissible and and prejudicial evidence. 
II. Trial by jury is not necessary, because 
A. There is no need for political protection today, for 
1. There is no absolute sovereign in the United States. 
2. Officials charged with the administration of the law are 
directly or indirectly responsible to the people, for27 
a. They are either elected by the people, or appointed by 
those who have been elected by and are responsible to 
the people. 
B. There is no need for judicial protection today, for 
1. The judges will be either elected or appointed by those 
responsible to the people.2s 
2. A judge may be removed from his office for misconduct. 
3. The Supreme Court of the State has the power to reverse 
any decision of the lower court. 
4. The veto power of the Governor can be used to guard 
against any act of injustice by the judge. 
C. It has outlived its usefulness, for 
1. It was created to deal with medieval conditions which 
no longer exist, for 
a. Trial by jury was created to guard the people from the 
tyranny of the sovereign. 
b. There is no absolute sovereign in the United States. 
c. There is no ruling "class" in the United States. 
2. It does not meet the demand for expedient justice of the 
modern times, for 
a. Modern business conditions are complicated and de­
mand specialization. 
b. It is an "ox-cart" in an age of airplanes. 
•Jbid. 
l'rW'illoughbY, W. F. 
"'Green, Leon. 
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D. The tendency is already toward discarding trial by jury for 
a more efficient method of administering justice, for 
1. The majority of civil cases are tried without a jury.2s 
2. An increasing number of states are discarding the jury 
in criminal cases.20 
3. Cases in equity, admiralty, and probate are tried without 
a jury. 
4. In England, trial by jury has almost disappeared, for 
a. The right of trial by jury is granted at the discretion 
of the judge.3° 
b. About 95 per cent of the cases are tried without 
juries.31 
5. Trial by jury does not prevail in the Netherlands today, 
and the crime rate there is much lower than that of the 
United States. 
6. In Illinois and Maryland, the right to trial before a judge 
is extended even in the most serious capital cases.112 
III. A tribunal of one or more judges should be substituted for trial 
by jury, because 
A. The judge is better qualified to determine the relative value 
of the facts presented in the trial of a suit, for 
1. The judge is trained in logical thinking and analysis.3a 
2. The judge is better able to understand complicated fact 
situations.34 
3. The judge is experienced in handling, daily, various cases 
and he can better discriminate the value of conflicting 
evidence. 
4. In a judge trial, without a jury, only the vital facts are 
contested.as 
5. The judge is not easily confused on the facts or the law.iis 
6. The judge may take more time to investigate doubtful 
facts.81 
7. The judge does not need to trust to his memory, for 
a. He has all of the minutes of the court and may refer 
to them to refresh his memory.as 
8. Trial before a judge is a thinking process.39 
9. The judge may ask the lawyers and the witnesses ques­
tions in order to ascertain the truth.40 
10. The judge is better able to evaluate the veracity of the 
witnesses.41 
211Potta, C. S. 
sowmoughby, W. F. 
31Ibid. 
..Ibid. 
.....,.Burdine, John Alton (on R. H. Elder) "The American Judge and the Amer­
ican Jury." 
On the above citations. see also, Greer, H . S. ; Gossett, Ed L . ; Willoughby, W. F.; 
Green, Leon. 
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B. The judge is better qualified in the application of the law 
to the facts, for 
1. He is an expert in the legal profession. 
2. He is experienced in the application of the law to the 
facts, for42 
a. The judge tries numerous cases constantly. 
3. He will not be easily led away from the law by oratorical 
speeches.4a 
4. The verdict of the judge is in conformity with the real 
facts of the case. 
5. He is better able to interpret the law and give it the 
meaning the legislators intended. 
C. The judge is responsible for the decisions he renders, for•• 
1. The decision he hands down is usually in writing and 
contains his reasons. The jury does not have to offer 
any reasons for its verdicts. 
2. The people can fix the responsibility of the verdicts on 
the judge, for 
a. He is held accountable for his work. 
b. His tenure of office is set and he is judged by the 
record he makes. 
3. He has professional pride in his chosen profession and 
he will uphold the law of the people. 
4. He is sensitive of the dignity and reputation of the court. 
D. Trial by a tribunal of judges would eliminate costly delay 
and unnecessary expense, for 
1. Time would not be wasted in impaneling a jury.45 
2. Arguments over the admissibility of evidence would be 
eliminated,46 for 
a. The judge is deemed by law to be able to discriminate 
between admissible and inadmissible evidence. 
3. Reversals and numerous appeals due to the complicated 
rules of evidence would be eliminated,47 for 
a. It is not reversable error for a court to hear inadmis­
sible evidence, per se, for he is deemed capable of 
disregarding facts not pertinent to the issue involved 
in the given case. 
4. There would be no long closing arguments before the 
judge, for 
a. The lawyers know that the judge would not be very 
susceptible to prejudiced oratory. 
"'Burdine, John Alton. 
"Gossett, Ed L. 
"Green, Leon. 
'"Potts, C. S. 
"'Green, Leon ; Burdine, John Alton. 
'1-4B-60(;reen, Leon. 
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5. Time would not be wasted giving the jury instructions.48 
E. A tribunal of one or more judge has proven itself practical, 
for49 
1. It is used in equity, admiralty, bankruptcy, and probate 
courts. 
2. Many states use judges in civil cases, trial by jury being 
optional.5o 
3. Illinois and Maryland make the jury optional in capital 
cases.51 
4. Statistics show that only 13 per cent of the cases that 
are subject to (and have the right of) jury trial were 
tried by juries.52 
F. A tribunal of one or more judges is desirable, for 
1. It will speed up justice.6s 
2. It will eliminate hung juries.54 
3. It will minimize the possibility of corruption.Mi 
4. It will decrease the number of mistrials.ss 
5. It will be less expensive to the litigants and to the state.11 
6. Innocent defendants will get quick justice.is 
7. Respect for law and order will be increased, for 
a. The verdicts will be more in accordance with the will 
of the people as expressed in their legislative enact­
ments. 
b. Petty and unsubstantial suits will be eliminated, for 
(1) A tribunal of judges is less likely to be fooled. 69 
c. Attorneys will pay more attention to the proper inter­
pretation of the law and less to inflammatory oratory. 
d. Justice will be made sure, swift, and inexpensive. 
CONCLUSION 
A substitute for trial by jury should be adopted, because 
I. Trial by a jury is grossly inefficient as a means of administering 
justice, for 
A. It causes unnecessary delay and expense for the trial of a 
legal suit. 
B. The average juror is not qualified for the work he is called 
on to perform in the trial of a case. 
C. Trial by jury has failed to meet the need of today. 
D. The elimination of the many inefficiencies of trial by jury 
is not possible. 
"Willoughby, W. F. 
Sl-UGreen, Leon. 
na. M, "'Bird, J. W. from 
os. MilJinoia Bulletin. 
"'-""Gossett, Ed L. : Burdine, John Alton . 
..Gossett, Ed L. 
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II. Trial by a jury is not necessary, for 
A. There is no need for political protection today. 
B. There is no need for judicial protection today. 
C. It has outlived its usefulness. 
D. The tendency is already toward discarding trial by jury for 
a more efficient method of administering justice. 
III. A tribunal of one or more judges should be substituted for trial 
by jury, for 
A. The judge is better qualified to determine the relative value 
of the facts presented in the trial of a suit. 
B. The judge is better qualified in the application of the law 
to the facts. 
C. The judge is responsible for the decisions he renders. 
D. Trial by a tribunal of judges would eliminate costly delay 
and unnecessary expense. 
E. Trial by a tribunal of judges has proven itself practical. 
F. A tribunal of one or more judges is desirable. 
DISCUSSION OF THE NEGATIVE 
I. Trial by jury is inherently sound and efficient as a means of 
administering justice, because 
A. The average juror is well qualified to determine the simple 
facts in a case, for 
1. He is representative of the average layman.1 
2. The facts he deals with are those relating to the experi­
ences of laymen.2 
3. The jurors, since they are a cross section of the entire 
community, represent more experience than one or three 
judges. 
4. The judgment of twelve men is better than that of one 
or three. 
5. The average juror is better educated now.3 
B. The average juror is capable of applying the law to the 
facts and rendering a verdict, for 
1. The judge explains the law involved in the case and points 
out how that law should be applied. 
2. The juror administers justice in the real sense of the 
word, for 
a. Justice is what the people conceive it to be. 
b. The juror interprets the law from the present concep­
tion of justice.~ 
•Bradley, C. S., from the San Antonio Light, July 4, 1930. 
"Umbrelt, A. C., Trial by Jury: An Ineffective Survival. 
'Wnrts, John, The Jury System under Changing Conditions. 
•M:a&'aarden, Theodor, Current Criticism on Trial by Jury. 
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C. The inefficiencies charged to trial by jury are artificial and 
not inherent in the system, for3 
1. The numerous rules regarding the selection and the im­
paneling of a jury have been made by the lawyers and 
judges. 
2. The slow procedure in the trial of a case is due to the 
lawyers and the judges and could be eliminated. 
3. The rules of evidence are the handiwork of judges and 
they can be simplified,6 
4. Crowded dockets and reversals are due to the cumbersome 
procedure of our court system which is the handiwork of 
"experts" in the administration of justice, for 
a. The jury need only determine the facts, under the 
rules prescribed to it. 
D. The inherent faults of trial by jury are only those of human 
nature, for 
1. They are due to our present standards of ideas and ideals 
that control the action of all the people in various degrees. 
2. These faults are present in the judges as well as in the 
jury,7 for 
a. Jurors are not more corrupt than judges.s 
b. Judges, too, are not free from the influence of popular 
opinion.9 
E. Trial by jury has been made efficient in England, for 
1. The system of court procedure has been simplified, for10 
a. The evils of selection have been eliminated.11 
b. The arguments before the jury have been forced more 
to the real points of the case.12 
c. The judge controls and governs the trial rather than 
the contesting attorneys.is 
2. The trial is impersonal and speedy, forl4 
a. The judge aids the jury in the determination of the 
the facts and the application of the law. 
b. The attorneys are not permitted by the court to delay 
the trial or stage a show for the benefit of the popu­
lace. 
F. Trial by jury is the best means available under a democratic 
government for the administration of justice, for 
1. The juries experience with life is broader than that of the 
judge.L5 
"Wigmore, John H., First Aid to Trial by Jury. 
"Baldwin, S. E., The Artificiality of Our Law of Evidence. 
•-•Umbreit, A. C. 
10-uchild, R. W., Justice and Horse Sense, Sat. Eve. Post, June 28, 1930. 
10J. of Am. Jud. Soc., Vol. 10, No. 5, pp. 157- 159. 
1•Biack, J. S ., Eo:parte Milligan. 
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2. The age and record of trial by jury is a recommendation 
for it.16 
3. Impartial students and thinkers praise trial by jury,17 
for 
a. De Tocquerille; Montesquiem; Coke; Blackstone; H. G. 
Wells, all recommend the virtues of trial by jury. 
4. Enlightened states, as they adopt the democratic form 
of government, adopt trial by jury, for 
a. Belgium adopted trial by jury in 1840.18 
5. Attempts by tyrannical officials to discard trial by jury 
because of unsettled conditions have failed, for 
a. Lord Dumore failed to discard trial by jury for trial 
by a military tribuna1.1s 
b. General Gage, in Massachusetts, failed to discard trial 
by jury,20 for 
(1) The people would not tolerate the change. 
6. Outstanding judges and attorneys praise and uphold trial 
by jury,21 
a. Judges: Dillon, Caldwell, W eatherbe; Lord Pengance, 
Lord Russell. 
b. Arthur C. Train, Justice Fuller.22 
G. The present so-called evils in trial by jury could be elimi­
nated, for 
1. England has eradicated practically all of its artificial and 
archaic rules of procedure.2s 
2. Juries could be made to function efficiently, without the 
necessity of locking them up and treating them like 
criminals.24 
3. Juries could be made to function efficiently if the different 
members were allowed to take notes on the evidence and 
use them in their deliberations.ll5 
4. The evils in the method of selecting jurors could be 
eliminated, for26 
a. The educational qualifications of the jurors could be 
increased. 
b. Fewer excuses from jury service could be granted. 
c. The questions asked the venire could be simplified. 
"'Umbreit, A. C. 
17Bagby, A. P .. Should the Jury be Abolished 7 
18-IOBJack, J . S. 
21Magaarden, Theodor. 
22Bagby, A. P. 
""Child, R. W • 
..-..Bradley, C. S. 
""Leighton, K. E., How About the Jury, J. of Am. Jud. Soc., Vol. 8, June, 1924. 
p. 246. 
18 The University of Texas Bulletin 
d. The successful system of selection used by the Federal 
Courts of the United States could be adopted by the 
different states. 
e. The drawing of prospective jurors could be made 
public.27 
5. The arbitrary and artificial rules of evidence could be 
eliminated.28 
6. Prospective jurors could be properly instructed on the 
duties of serving on a jury.2s 
7. The judge could be given the power to aid and assist the 
jury in the determination of the facts.ao 
8. The judge could be given the power to aid and assist the 
jury in the application of the law to the facts. 
9. Petty limitations imposed on the judge by the Legislature 
could be removed. s1 
10. Frequent and unnecessary changes of the rules of evidence 
could be eliminated.32 
11. Reversals by the higher courts on absurd technicalities 
could be corrected.ss 
12. Lengthy examination of witnesses and unlimited number 
of objections by lawyers could be eliminated.a• 
13. The requirement that the jury should return a unanimous 
verdict could be discarded.8~ 
II. Trial by jury is necessary, for 
A. It is a fundamental part of a democratic government, for 
1. Trial by jury is the only means the people have of par­
ticipating directly in the administration of their laws.as 
2. It educates the people in the theory and necessity of regu­
lation of conduct by law,37 
3. The people become a part of the law and order rather 
than fugitives from it. 
4. The right of trial by jury is as important to the citizen 
as the right to vote, for 
a. He controls the administration of the law, for 
(1) Acting as a juror, he renders a verdict on the 
facts and the law of the case. 
b. He controls, and can demand an accounting from, the 
law-enforcing agencies of the state. 
5. It is the real test of a true democracy. as 
"Wurts, John. 
MJf>id. 
•Editoriala of the Month, June 30, 1980, Houston, Texas. 
•Bradle;r, C. S. 
11-115Q1nr and Ray, from "American Government," pp. 818-815. 
"'Umbrelt, A. C. 
1'1Jflid. 
18Editoriala of the Month. 
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6. The revolutionary leaders inserted the right to trial by 
jury in the Constitution, fora9 
a. They desired to protect the people against the tyran­
nical rule of the government. 
B. It serves as a check against a tyrannical judiciary, for 
1. Judges tend to legislate through their decisions.40 
2. Judges are case-hardened and follow archaic laws, for 
a. The old doctrine of "assumed risk" was applied in the 
present "machine age" to the great detriment of the 
workers. 
3. Judges tend to be harsh and unsympathetic, but the jury 
tempers the rigor of the law with mercy.41 
4. Judges are class prejudiced, for 
a. They sympathize with the ruling class rather than 
with the workmen.42 
5. Judges misuse their power of discretion, for 
a. The use of the power to issue injunctions has been used 
for the capitalistic class and against the labor unions. 
6. The people cannot be free when a government can punish 
without restraint.4'a 
C. It serves as a check against any collusion between other 
officials of the government and the judiciary, for 
1. The prosecutor may be in a position to control the judge 
and his decisions, through political power or other 
means." 
2. The sheriff and the police may combine with the judge 
against a defendant. 
3. The judge tends to favor the state, for 
a. He is employed by the state. 
b. He desires to show a good record of convictions. 
D. Serving on a jury is beneficial to the individual and the 
people as a whole, for'5 
1. It brings the juror into closer contact with his fellow 
citizens. 
2. It gives him an active share in the administration of 
public affairs. 
3. It makes the juror's influence felt in local affairs. 
4. It creates respect for law and order. 
5. It creates greater respect for the courts. 
80Black, J . S. 
'°Bagby, A. P. 
"Megaarden, Theodor. 
"Bagby, A. P. 
'"Black, J. S. 
"Miaaouri Crime Survey, from the Journal of A"'6rican Judicature Societ11, Vol. 10, 
No. Ii, February, 1927. 
"'Umbrelt, A. C. 
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III. Trial by a tribunal of one or more judges is impractical, for 
A. The judges are not experts in the determination of facts, as 
is the jury, for 
1. The facts deal with every-day lives of laymen. 
2. The judges are not in close touch, or in harmony, with 
the majority of the people. 
3. Judges may be ignorant.46 
B. Judges are prone to be too legalistic in their application of 
the law to the facts, for 
1. They apply the strict letter of the law rather than the 
essence. 
2. They often apply ancient, outworn law, on a case that 
may be contrary to present-day justice, in the absence of 
direct legislative enactment, for 
a. The judges applied the doctrine of "assumed risk" of 
the old factory days to modern conditions. 
3. The real purpose of constructive legislation is apt to be 
disregarded through the use of fine and minute definitions 
by the judges. 
C. Judges are just as human as is the jury, for 
1. They possess a class prejudice that is worse than that 
of the jury,47 for 
a. It is limited to one group of people--the lawyers. 
2. They are subject to bribery.48 
3. They are subject to the same emotional appeals as is the 
jury, if not more so.49 
D. The judges would be subject to worse evils than the jury, if 
they are elected, for 
1. They would be controlled by the group responsible for 
their election to office.50 
2. They would be controlled by the political boss.51 
3. They may be good politicians but poor judges. 
E. The people would be subject to worse evils with judges, if 
they are appointed to the office for life, for 
1. The judges may misuse their trust. 
2. It would be hard to remove a judge from office for the 
violation of his duties, for 
a. He may only be removed by impeachment proceedings 
in the Legislature. 
3. The judges may do irreparable injury before they are 
removed. 
4. The judges may secure their office through the use of 
undue influence or graft. 
<O-<TUmbreit, A. C. 
"Bagby, A. P. 
'"Bagby A. P . 
'8-•1Umbreit, A. C. 
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F. Much of the present misadministration of justice is due to 
the judges and other state officers, for 
1. The judges are responsible for the rules of evidence and 
all of their refinements, for 
a. Higher courts will reverse a case on slight technical 
grounds.52 
2. The judges consume more time in trying cases, for5 a 
a. The case is usually taken "under advisement" for 
several weeks or even months. 
3. The judges are influenced politically by the attorneys in 
the case. 
4. The judges, with the prosecutors, are responsible for the 
release of a large number of criminals.H 
5. Needless appeals, based on technicalities created by the 
judges, cause misadministration of justice.55 
6. The cumbersome procedure of the grand juries causes 
delay.56 
7. The free use of bail, permitted by judges, is the cause 
of much evil.57 
8. Absence of any unified control of the prosecutors and 
judges results in an uneven enforcement of the criminal 
law over the state.5s 
9. Lengthy examinations of witnesses and unlimited number 
of objections that are permitted to the lawyers by the 
judge obscure the real issues of a case and lead to in­
justice.59 
10. Corrupt police and other state officials (who are under 
the jurisdiction and partial control of the judges) are 
responsible for the deplorable conditions existing in the 
cities.60 
CONCLUSION 
A substitute for trial by jury should not be adopted, because 
I. Trial by jury is inherently sound and efficient as a means of 
administering justice, for 
A. The average juror is well qualified to determine the simple 
facts in a case. 
B. The average juror is capable of applying the law to the facts 
and rendering a verdict. 
C. The inefficiencies charged to trial by jury are artificial and 
not inherent in the system. 
62Wigmore, J. H . 
... ... ""Bagby, A. P. 
"Missouri Crime Survey. 
..._..Ogg and Ray. 
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D. The inherent faults of trial by jury are only those of human 
nature. 
E. Trial by jury has been made efficient in England. 
F. Trial by jury is the best means available under a democratic 
government for the administration of justice. 
G. The present so-called evils in trial by jury could be eliminated. 
II. Trial by jury is necessary, for 
A. It is a fundamental part of a democratic government. 
B. It serves as a check against a tyrannical judiciary. 
C. It serves as a check against any collusion between other offi­
cials of the government and the judiciary. 
D. Serving on a jury is beneficial to the individual and the 
people as a whole. 
III. Trial by a tribunal of one or more judges is impractical, for 
A. The judges are not experts in the determination of facts, 
as is the jury. 
B. Judges are prone to be too legalistic in their application of 
the law to the facts. 
C. Judges are just as human as is the jury. 
D. The judges would be subject to worse evils than the jury, 
if they are elected to office. 
E. The people would be subject to worse evils with judges, if 
they are appointed to the office for life. 
F. Much of the present misadministration of justice is due to 
the judges and other state officers. 
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GENERAL MATERIAL 
THE JURY SYSTEM 
BY C. P. PATTERSON 
(From American Government, pp. 705-709, D. C. Heath and Company, Publishers, 
New York, 1929 
The jury is a fundamental part of the common-law system. The right 
of trial by jury in criminal cases is guaranteed by all the state consti­
tutions and in civil cases by all except those of Louisiana and Utah.1 
There are two types of juries: (1) the grand jury, and (2) the petit 
jury. The grand jury is not a trial jury and is used only in the 
preliminary proceedings of criminal cases. It is required or permitted 
in all the states by either their constitutions or statutes.2 At common 
law it consists of not less than twelve nor more than twenty-three 
members. While the common-law maximum is still observed by the 
states, the minimum has been considerably modified. Its size is deter­
mined by the constitutions in a number of states, and in Montana, 
Oregon, and Utah is fixed at seven, any five of whom may return 
an indictment. In several states the number is fixed at twelve with 
the concurrence of nine necessary for indictment,8 In all the states 
there is some court, commission, or officer of the law whose duty it is 
to make a list or panel of suitable persons to be summoned for jury 
service. This list is called a venire and is delivered by the clerk of 
the court to the sheriff who summons those listed to appear for jury 
service. On the day of opening court, the names of those in the list 
are placed in a box, or a hat, or jury wheel, and as many are drawn 
as there are members in the jury, varying with the state. Those 
selected constitute the grand jury, or as it is sometimes called, the 
grand inquest. Then they elect or the court appoints one of their 
number foreman, and after having been sworn to investigate and 
present all offenses that may have been committed in the county, 
and charged by the court on their duties, they retire to their room 
to prosecute their inquiries in secret.~ 
1. The Petit Jury.-The petit or trial jury is a more serious part 
of judicial machinery, especially in criminal cases. The common law 
trial jury consists of twelve men in criminal cases. This is the rule 
in felony or capital cases, though in Florida eight, and in Utah six, 
constitute a jury for felony cases. Several states permit a jury of 
less than twelve for minor offenses. In civil cases the requisite num­
ber for the jury has been varied more radically. The constitutions 
1Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed., 1927), Il, 864. 
"The constitutions of Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne­
sota, New Hampshire, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin do not require it. 
•Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming are in this group. 
'Constitutional Con11ention Bul/.etina (Illinois, 1920), No. 10, 884. 
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of seven states permit their legislatures to provide for a jury of 
less than twelve.5 The Constitution of Utah fixes the number at 
eight in courts of general jurisdiction. In Florida the number is 
fixed at six by statute. In Virginia the number is fixed by statute 
at seven except in the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, where 
it is five. In several of the states, under certain conditions the parties 
to a case may waive the right of trial by jury in criminal and civil 
cases; and in some jurisdictions in civil cases this right is considered 
waived unless one of the parties demands a jury. In criminal cases 
as a rule this right cannot be waived in felonies.6 
The number necessary to concur in a verdict in either criminal or 
civil cases is by no means uniform throughout the states. A unani­
mous verdict of a jury of twelve is required in all the states in capital 
cases, and also in felonies except in Louisiana.7 Constitutional pro­
vision are made for three-fourths of the jury in Texas and Oklahoma 
and two-thirds in Montana and Idaho to render verdicts in misde­
meanors. In civil cases a less than unanimous verdict is either pro­
vided or permitted in courts of record in eighteen states. 
The selection of the trial jurors is a more tedious matter than that 
of the grand jurors. This is due to a system of challenges whereby 
either party to the suit may object to the jury as a whole or to 
individual jurors. After the clerk of the court has selected by lot 
from the panel or list of jurors the number required, the court directs 
the sheriff to have them take their seats in the jury box. The clerk 
then reads their names in the hearing of the parties, and if there is 
no objection, they are sworn and the trial proceeds. Either party, 
however, may object to the jury as a whole because of some actual 
or alleged irregularity committed in summoning it or to individual 
jurors because of their disqualifications. There are two classes of 
challenges to individual jurors; peremptory and casual. The per­
emptory challenges are absolute, but their number is limited or 
fixed. This number varies with the states and is larger in criminal 
than in civil cases.a The challenges for cause are unlimited in num­
ber, but the validity of the objections to any juror challenged for 
cause is determined by the court, which also passes upon the challenge 
to the array or jury as a whole.9 All challenges are made when the 
jury is sworn. This process is continued until the requisite number 
of qualified jurors is obtained even if another venire has to be sum­
moned. 
"This group includes Michigan, Colorado, Wyaming, South Dakota, New Jersey, 
Florida, and Virginia. 
"The constitutions of Minnesota and Wisconsin provide that the jury may be 
waived in all cases in the manner prescribed by statute. Wisconsin by statute has 
provided that the accused may waive the jury and be tried by Jess than twelve men. 
•1Ui110ia CMtBtitutional Convention Bulletina, 843-844. 
•Three, four, five, and six are the usual numbers allowed to each party in civil 
cases. Callender, ap. cit., 95. 
•Abraham Caruthers, Hiatory of a LawBUit (5th Ed., 1919), 269-273. 
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2. Tke Usual Qualifications of Jurors.-The qualifications of jurors 
in general are that they be citizens,10 twenty-one years of age, and free­
holders or householders; that they be unrelated to either party to 
the case, unprejudiced toward either party, and uninterested in the 
outcome of the trial; and that they possess a sound mind, a good 
hearing, and a clear vision. Their qualifications are a state matter 
and, of course, vary in some respects from state to state. 
The functions of the trial jury are to judge of the facts in the 
case and to render a verdict of guilty or not guilty in criminal cases 
and to assess the damages, if any, in civil cases. Sometimes there 
is no issue of fact to be determined in which case the judge directs 
the verdict of the jury. In some instances specific questions are sub­
mitted to the jury instead of the entire case. The jury deliberates 
in secret under the chairmanship of its foreman, who reports its 
decision in open court. If the requisite number to concur in its ver­
dict is not obtained, the foreman so reports. This means that the 
case must be retried before a new jury. In most state jurisdictions, 
the jury almost controls the action of the courts; the judge has been 
reduced to a mere referee. 
The trial jury has likewise received its share of criticisms. Its 
method of selection is cumbersome and expensive. The parties to the 
case and their lawyers are too influential in this process: Too many 
peremptory challenges are permitted; in fact challenges for cause 
seem entirely adequate.11 The court should be a stronger factor in 
its selection. Jury service should be made difficult to evade as a 
means of securing a more intelligent and competent jury and should 
be extended to women on the same terms as to men.12 Provisions 
should be made for less than a unanimous verdict in both civil and 
criminal cases with possibly a little less emphasis for this change in 
felonies or capital cases. The use of the jury should be optional with 
the parties in civil cases; the complicated character of civil litigation 
makes it exceedingly difficult for the ordinary jury to participate 
intelligently and efficiently in its adjudication. There should be pro­
visions for waiver of jury trial in indictable offenses.n The right 
of jury trial should be extended to punishment for contempt in injunc­
tion cases.14 The judge should be allowed to instruct the jury on 
the evidence as well as the law. This is the practice in both our 
federal courts and the English courts. The task of the modern jury 
is much more difficult than that of its ancient predecessor. The facts 
10Women are eligible to jury service in twenty-one states. See Julia Margaret 
Hicks, Women Juror• (1928), 10. 
11Robert von Waschzisker, Trial b11 Jury (1922), 87-103. 
"'Robert Stewart Sutlitte, lmpreniona of an Average Juryman (1922), 9-18. 
"'Robert H. Elder, "Trial by Jury: Ia It Passing?" 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev., No. 6, 
290-300 (1928). 
"Illinois Constitutional Convention Bulletina (1920), 842-848. 
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involved in modem litigation are more technical and complicated than 
was formerly the case. The jury should welcome the opinion of 
the court on the relative weight and significance of the evidence sub­
mitted to it. The present practice in most states leaves the jury 
to be swayed by advocacy with no judicial corrective and is largely 
responsible.for many retrials to correct the verdicts of previous juries. 
METHOD OF SELECTION OF JUDGES 
BY W. F. WILLOUGHBY 
(From Principles of Judicial Administration. The Brookiniis Institution, 
Washiniiton. 1929, pp. 861--381) 
In the administrative branch, the problem of determining the 
methods to be employed in selecting personnel, the term for which 
they shall hold office, and the conditions under which they may be 
removed is, or should be, controlled by the single consideration of 
securing and retaining the services of capable and upright servants. 
In the case of judges, there is added to this consideration that of 
insuring that these officers will be selected in such a manner, and 
the conditions governing their tenure and removal, so fixed, that they 
will exercise their function independent of all outside influences and 
with sole regard to the facts and law as brought out in the pro­
ceedings before them. It is this factor that makes this problem, 
as it has to do with the judiciary, a special one. 
Addressing ourselves first to the question of the method of select­
ing judges, examination of existing political systems reveals the 
following methods, among which a choice must be made: 
1. Election by the people. 
2. Election by the legislature. 
3. Appointment by the chief justice of the supreme court. 
4. Appointment by the chief executive. 
The arguments in favor of and against each of these methods will 
be considered in turn. 
Popular election.-The controlling argument in favor of the selec­
tion of judges by popular election is that in a popular government 
resting upon the principle of the separation of powers, those in con­
trol of each of the three branches of government should derive their 
offices from, and be responsible directly to, the people, and that a 
system, under which the officers of one branch hold office as the 
result of the choice of one of the other branches, does violence to 
the principle of the separation of powers. Particularly is this argu­
ment held to be strong in a political system in which, as in the 
United States, the judiciary has the important function of passing 
upon the constitutionality of legislative measures of a political and 
social character. To quote one of our ablest students of jurispru­
dence: 
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"Perhaps the most important influence in bringing about a demand 
for a greater popular control of the courts is the increasingly im­
portant position which the courts have come to exercise as political 
organs of the government through their powers to declare laws 
unconstitutional or violations of the guarantees of 'due process of 
law' and 'equal protection of the laws.' These guarantees mean 
whatever the courts in any particular case may decide that they 
mean and furnish a broad foundation upon which the courts may 
base declarations of unconstitutionality. As has been frequently sug­
gested in recent years the courts have become practically legislative 
organs with an absolute power of veto over statutory legislation 
which they may regard as inexpedient; and this power has been used 
most frequently with respect to social and industrial legislation 
enacted to meet new social and economic conditions." 
Though one can appreciate the basis of this position it is difficult 
to hold that it is not mistakenly taken. Judges are not the repre­
sentatives of the people in the same way as those composing the 
legislative and executive branches. As has been pointed out in the 
consideration of an independent judiciary, it is of the essence of a 
function of a judge to oppose the will of the people, as represented 
by a majority, when that will proposes action in violation of con­
stitutional provisions, and especially those for the protection of indi­
vidual rights and liberties. Furthermore, little can be said in favor 
of this method from the standpoint of securing persons best fitted 
for the office. As the dean of one of our leading law schools has 
put it: 
"Obviously a satisfactory selection for any office can be made only 
when the selecting power can acquire some fair knowledge of the 
fitness of individual candidates for the office. When the selecting 
power is the electorate at large such knowledge is difficult to acquire 
in proportion as the members of the electorate increase. Where 
offices are essentially political and their incumbents are charged with 
the duty of framing or of executing some one or more of competing 
policies, then the selective function of the electorate is performed 
under the most favorable circumstances-particularly if the offices 
to be filled are somewhat conspicuous and not too numerous. But 
in proportion as the requirements for office become technical, or the 
offices numerous, does the electorate become an inefficient instrument 
of selection. Now the principal qualities needed in a judge are per­
sonal integrity, adequate legal training, and a judicial temperament. 
The second of these is wholly technical and little reliable information 
about it is likely to be found outside of the members of the bar 
themselves. The other needed qualities can be ascertained by per­
sonal acquaintances, but very few lawyers of the sort that would 
make desirable judges have been able to make themselves known, 
either personally or by reputation, to more than a minute fraction 
of the electorate in any of our good-sized cities or in the judicial 
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districts that fill important judgeships. It is almost impossible for 
a lawyer to obtain a popular following of any size without a large 
expenditure of time and effort in ways altogether likely to make 
him less fitted for judicial office than if he faithfully devoted himself 
to his profession. . . . Indeed the obstacles in the way of any real 
public choice of judges by a numerous electorate are so great that 
in fact what almost invariably happens is that new candidates for 
judgeships are selected by the party leaders with little or no regard 
for the possibilities of any public preference in regard to these offices; 
and when a number of judges must be chosen at once as often hap­
pens in the large cities, the helplessness of the electorate is still 
greater." 
This situation, Mr. Hall points out, is made even worse when use 
is made of the primary system of nomination: 
"In the few states that have tried this, only chaos has resulted. 
Any lawyer being free to place his name in the nominating ballot 
by petition, large numbers have done so; and nearly all of these 
being but little known, a most disgusting campaign of personal adver­
tising for the nomination has in many places ensued, followed to a 
great extent by the same kind of a campaign for election." 
The Cleveland Survey is equally emphatic in condemning the use 
of the primary system for the nomination of judges. Its report reads: 
"Cleveland has now had ten year's experience of the wide-open 
method of selection and, although few would care to return to the 
bossed party convention, it is safe to say there is scarcely a man in 
Cleveland able to weigh the qualifications for the bench who does 
not deplore the present tendencies and fear them. . . . Most serious 
is the present cheapening of the judicial office so that neither the 
bar, the press, nor the judicial incumbents themselves any longer 
respect it. Young lawyers who would have viewed the bench with 
reverence formerly, now give voice to their disrespect and retired 
and even sitting judges are openly cynical. The situation is summed 
up in the universal comment that the judges are generally above the 
suspicion of taking direct money bribes but find it difficult to forget 
the coming election." 
The Survey then goes on to point out that one of the chief evils of 
the elective system, especially in combination with the primary, is 
the pressure upon judges seeking re-election to cater to groups, race, 
religion, labor, etc. "One of the most disturbing features" is the 
intensifying of social and religious appeals. A man is elected or 
appointed because he is a Pole, a Jew, an Irishman, a Mason, a 
Protestant." Labor, it points out, watches the judges to determine 
who are favorable to its side in labor controversies that get into 
court. 
Election by legisla.ture.-The method of selecting judges by election 
by the Legislature is one that, so far as the writer has knowledge, 
is employed by no foreign government. In the United States, it is 
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used by hut four states: Vermont, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Virginia. Whether considered from the standpoint of insuring an 
independent judiciary or of securing men best qualified for the posi­
tion, the system has little to commend it. It is true that, in the 
states where it is used, reports indicate that in general men of good 
character and legal abilities have been selected, and that, with the 
possible exception of Rhode Island, political considerations have not 
exerted a seriously detrimental effect. The system is nevertheless 
one presenting a constant danger. It has a tendency to violate the 
principle of the separation of powers and to prevent the complete 
divorce of the judiciary from politics that is highly desirable. More 
attention to this method is not here given, since its further develop­
ment in the United States is not to be apprehended. 
Appointment by tke kead of tke judicial branck.-A method of 
selection that has much to recommend it is that of having all judges, 
other than the chief justice of the court of last resort, appointed by 
the chief justice. This is the English system under which all judges 
of courts of record are appointed on the recommendation of the Lord 
Chancellor. The same system obtains in New Jersey in respect to 
the Court of Chancery, where the seven vice-chancellors of that court 
are appointed by its head, the Chancellor. In both cases, the system 
has given excellent results. The chief justice is not only outside 
of the field of partisan politics, and thus less likely than the chief 
executive to give consideration to this element in making selections, 
but is in an exceptionally strong position to select men who have 
the special qualifications required of judicial officers. 
Though this system is foreign to the political practices of the 
American people it is possible, that the development of the system of 
a unified state court, with a chief justice exercising the powers and 
duties of a general manager, may carry with it the principle of hav­
ing the associate justices selected in this way. It is certainly a 
step to be welcomed. 
That this method is receiving some attention in the United States 
is evidenced by the recommendations made by a recent committee 
of the Cleveland Bar Association which was appointed to consider 
the subject. Its report recommends that the chief justice of the 
supreme court be elected by the people; that the associate justices 
of the supreme court be appointed by the governor, with the ap­
proval of two-thirds of the senate or by a judicial council selected 
by the senate; that the judges of appellate courts be appointed by 
the chief justice of the supreme court, with the approval of a ma­
jority of the associate justices of the supreme court; and the judges 
of the other courts be appointed by the chief justice of the supreme 
court, with the approval of a majority of the judges of the appellate 
courts for the respective districts within which the appointees are 
to serve. For all judges it recommends that the term of office be 
six or eight years. 
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Appointment by chief executive.-Appointment by the chief execu­
tive is the method usually employed by foreign governments in select­
ing their judges. In the United States it is the one prescribed by 
the Constitution for the selection of all federal judges. If safe­
guarded by the provision that the power of appointment does not 
carry with it the power of removal, by the requirement that removals 
may be effected only by the process of impeachment or joint address 
on the part of the two houses of the Legislature, the system, with 
the possible exception of the method of selection by appointment by 
the head of the judicial branch, more nearly meets the requirements 
of a desirable selective process than any other method. It is one 
where responsibility is definitely located and full opportunity is af­
forded to determine the qualifications of appointees. Certainly, 
experience indicates that under it better selections have been made 
than under the method of election by the people or by the Legislature. 
Present conditions in the United States.-In few features of our 
political system is there a greater diversity of practice than in respect 
to this matter of the method of selecting judges. In the federal judicial 
system selection through appointment by the President is universal. 
In the states, however, many different methods are employed. 
It will be seen from this statement (omitted) that thirty-six or 
three-fourths, of the forty-eight states select their judges by popu­
lar election. Of the remaining twelve, five, Delaware, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, and New Hampshire, select their judges 
through appointment by the governor; five, Connecticut, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia, through appointment by the 
Legislature; and two, Florida and Indiana, by a mixed method. 
Methods of improving system of selection by popular vote.-Having 
stated the several methods of selection of judges and the arguments 
for and against each and described conditions in the United States 
in respect to the employment of these methods, it remains to deter­
mine the extent to which these conditions are satisfactory, and, if not, 
the direction that efforts for their change should take. 
Students approaching the problem of the method of selecting judges 
from the theoretical or general standpoint, are in substantial agree­
ment that the method of selection through appointment by the chief 
executive, or by the head of the judicial system, is best adapted to 
securing the double objective of an independent judiciary and judges 
of assured competence in respect to their technical and personal 
qualifications. To them, the improvement of the judicial systems of 
the states in respect to this feature lies in the abandonment of the 
method of selection by popular election or by the Legislature, and 
the adoption of the federal system of appointment by the chief execu­
tive. With this position the present writer is in thorough accord. 
Unfortunately, however, there is little or no probability that the states 
can be induced, within any reasonable time, to adopt this policy. 
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This being so, the practical problem of improving the judicial system 
of the states in respect to the method of selecting judges is that of 
improving the workings of the election system. In considering the 
problem from this restricted standpoint, one cannot do better than 
follow the arguments on the Committee on Judicial Selection in its 
report to the Conference of Bar Association Delegates, American 
Bar Association, July 7, 1924. 
That report starts with the assumption above made, that efforts 
to improve conditions in the United States in respect to the selection 
of judges, if they are to have a practical character, must be directed 
toward betterment of the method of selection by popular vote rather 
than in seeking to have that method supplanted by one of the other 
methods. As is well-known, electorates do not directly select candi­
dates for office; all that they do is to make a choice between two or 
three candidates who are brought forward by political parties, and 
more rarely by other organizations. The greatest opening for im­
proving the popular-vote system, therefore, lies in the development 
of practices and traditions to ensure that the candidates will be of 
a high character. 
The most effective means for securing this desirable end the com­
mittee finds to be that the organized bar shall play a dominating role 
in the nomination of candidates, or at least in passing upon the 
qualifications of candidates. In order that it may play this part, 
the bar must make definite provision in its constitution for the dis­
charge of this function. In the United States this provision has 
taken three forms: (1) The whole matter of selecting, or passing 
upon the qualifications of, candidates for the bench is in effect turned 
over to a special committee; (2) use is made of a plebiscite vote 
of the entire membership of the bar association for the purpose of 
determining preferences in respect to candidates; and (3) use is 
made of a plebiscite, but the committee is charged with the duty of 
collecting and furnishing to the members information regarding pros­
pective candidates, and in some cases of adding its own recommenda­
tions. 
The contention that remedial efforts should take the form of im­
proving the method of selection by popular vote rather than of 
attempting to abolish the elective system, is supported by the Cleve­
land Crime Survey and also by the conclusions reached by Professor 
Carpenter in his able study from which we have quoted. The Cleve­
land Survey, thus, first states its preference for the method of selec­
tion through appointment by the chief justice in the following words: 
"It is the concensus of opinion of the bar and the unanimous con­
viction of the ablest students of our legal institutions that strong and 
well qualified judges are most certainly secured when they are ap­
pointed by the executive and hold office for life, subject, of course, 
to removal for misconduct. On the evidence, there is every reason 
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to believe that this method of selection, or a modification of it, plus 
long tenure, would do more than anything else to revolutionize the 
present state of affairs. If it be within the field of possibility this 
is unquestionably the goal to be striven for." 
The report goes on to state, however, that in most cases the public 
will not accept this, and consequently the practical problem -is to im­
prove the elective system. 
The secret in obtaining good judges is that back of the 
method-whatever it is-there must be a tradition which 
makes the selecting group (i. e., nominating influence) realize 
that it is a clear public policy to retain judges in office except 
for grave mental, moral, or physical defects. This tradition 
has been built up in New York, Wisconsin, Vermont, Connec­
ticut, and elsewhere. 
Its final conclusions are set forth as follows: 
(1) The appointive method with provision for a retirement elec­
tion whereby a judge runs against his own record. 
(2) A modified appointive method, as, for example, an elective chief 
justice who appoints his associates. 
(3) A modified elective system whereby judges are elected for a 
short first term, but if reelected, then for progressively longer 
terms. Judges standing for reelection should not run against 
other candidates, but only against their own records. The 
single question presented to the electorate should be, "Shall 
this judge be retained?" 
The fact that an elective system can be made to work with satis­
faction, is, however, no conclusive argument in favor of the elective 
system. It will be noted that this system works in Wisconsin pri­
marily because, while the system is elective in theory, it is in fact 
appointive, the real selection being made by the bar. The same or 
even better result could be had if the selection were made by the 
governor through appointment, being guided by the recommendations 
of the bar, as he in fact is in making interim appointments. Under 
existing conditions, the elective process adds nothing, while introduc­
ing an element of uncertainty that can do harm. 
QUALITY OF STATE JUDGES 
BY FRANK G. BATES AND OLIVER P. FIELD 
(From State GoveN<ment, pp. 384-385, Harper and Brothers, Publiehere, 
New York, 1928) 
The salaries paid to judges in the state courts above the grade 
of justice of peace courts vary considerably from one state to another. 
Usually the judges of the supreme courts of the state receive from 
one to several thousand dollars more annually than do the judges 
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of the courts of general trial jurisdiction. But between the amounts 
paid to justices of the supreme courts of the different states there 
is a difference so great that judges of this court in some states are 
paid eight times as much as those of some others. A typical salary 
for judges of the highest state court is from six to eight thousand 
dollars annually. The compensation of judges of the general trial 
courts range more commonly from four to six thousand dollars per 
year. The judges of state courts of record are almost always for­
bidden to accept fees, and must devote their entire time to their 
judicial duties. State judges as a whole have been regarded as 
underpaid, and in comparison with federal judges and those in for­
eign countries they are poorly paid. Few men will now accept ap­
pointments to the bench in the state unless they either have an 
independent income or are mediocre lawyers. However, it would be 
quite incorrect to say that this is true of all the men who accept 
judicial positions in the states, for in almost every state there are 
many judges of ability, and in the judicial history of practically every 
state there are to be found the names of very able and eminent judges. 
These judges have been able to exert great influence upon their 
brethren on the bench, and the result has been that the decisions 
of the courts of which these men have been members have been of a 
quality much superior to that which would otherwise have been ex­
pected from the general make-up of the court. Such judges as Doe 
of New Hampshire, M<itchell of Minnesota, Shaw of Massachusetts, 
Cooley of Michigan, and many others, compare very favorably with 
the men who have graced the federal bench. On the other hand, 
the fact must not be lost sight of that the judges of state courts 
as a group are not highly trained nor always eminently qualified 
for their work. They have sometimes been quite unaware of the 
social, economic, and political implications of their work, and have 
proceeded with the task of deciding cases in a purely mechanical 
manner. The relation of the legal system to society as a whole has 
been too often overlooked by the court in many states, and to this 
fact must be ascribed in some part at least the present current con­
tempt in which the legal and judicial system is held by many 
people in all walks of life. The defective general education of many 
judges has been one cause of this situation, and to the extent that 
state judges are more broadly educated men, the tendency in the 
future will be for the courts to perform more intelligently and effec­
tively their work as one of the agencies of human society. The 
work of state courts in the past should not be too severely criticized, 
however, because the tasks with which tribunals have been confronted 
in recent years have been both numerous and difficult, and the facil­
ities placed at their disposal for effectively dealing with these tasks 
have been quite inadequate. 
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Art. III, Constitution of the United States 
(From Reviaed Civil Statutes of the State of Tea:as) 
Section I 
The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one 
supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme 
and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, 
and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. 
Section II 
1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity 
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and 
treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority; to all 
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to 
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to 
which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between 
two or more states; between a state and a citizen of another state; 
between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state 
claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, 
or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. 
2. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court 
shall have original jurisdiction. In all the others cases before men­
tioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both 
as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations 
as the Congress shall make. 
3. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall 
be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said 
crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within 
any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress 
may by law have directed. 
Art. V, Constitution of the State of Texas 
(From Remed Civil Statute• of the State of Tea:as, pp. 35 and 43, Vol. I, 1925) 
Section 1. The judicial power of this state shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, in Courts of Civil Appeals, in a Court of Criminal 
Appeals, in district courts, in county courts, in commissioners' courts, 
in courts of justices of the peace, and in such other courts as may be 
provided by law. The criminal district court of Galveston and Harris 
Counties shall continue with the district, jurisdiction, and organiza­
tion now existing by law until otherwise provided by law. The 
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Legislature may establish such other courts as it may deem neces­
sary, and prescribe the jurisdiction and organization thereof, and 
may conform the jurisdiction of the district and other inferior courts 
thereto. 
Sec. 26. The state shall have no right of appeal in criminal cases. 
The Jury in Court 
(From Ret1ised Civil Statute• o/ the State of Te111a.a, pp. 578-583, Vol. I, 1925) 
Art. 2123. Right to jury.-The right to trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate, subject to the following rules and regulations. (Const., 
Art. 1, Sec. 15.) 
Art. 2124. Demand and fee.-No jury trial shall be had in any 
civil suit, unless an application therefor be made in open court, and 
a jury fee of five dollars if in the district court, and three dollars 
if in the county court, be deposited by the applicant with the clerk 
to the use of the county. (Acts 1876, p. 171; G. L., Vol. 8, p. 1007.) 
Art. 2125. Time to dem,and.-Any party to a civil suit in the dis­
trict or county court desiring to have the same tried by a jury, shall 
make an application therefor in open court on the first day of the 
term at which the suit is to be tried, unless the same be appearance 
day, in which event the application shall be made on default day. 
(Id.) 
Art. 2126. Call of doc.ket for demand.-On the first day of each 
term, the court shall call over the docket, except appearance cases, 
and shall note therein in each case whether or not a jury trial is 
applied for therein and by which party. On the call of the appear­
ance docket, the court shall in like manner note in each appearance 
case whether or not and by whom a jury trial is applied for. (Id.) 
Art. 2127. Oath of inability.-The deposit for a jury fee shall not 
be required when the party shall within the time for making such 
deposit, file with the clerk his affidavit to the effect that he is unable 
to make such deposit, and that he cannot, by the pledge of property 
or otherwise, obtain the money necessary for that purpose; and the 
court shall then order the clerk to enter the suit on the jury docket. 
(Acts 1876, p. 171; G. L., Vol. 8, p. 1007.) 
Art. 2128. Jury docket.-The clerks of the district and county 
courts shall each keep a docket, styled "The Jury Docket,'' in which 
shall be entered in their order the cases in which jury trials have been 
ordered by the court. (Id.) 
Art. 2129. Jury trial day.-The court shall, by an order entered 
on the minutes, designate any day during the term for the taking up 
of the jury docket and the trial of the cases thereon. Such order 
may be revoked or changed at discretion. (Acts 1876, p. 78; G. L., 
Vol. 8, p. 914.) 
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Art. 2130. Withdrawing demamd for fury.-When one party has 
applied for a jury trial, he shall not be permitted to withdraw such 
application without the consent of the parties adverse1y interested. 
If so permitted, the court in its discretion may by an order permit 
him to withdraw also his jury fee deposit. (Id.) 
Art. 2131. Challenge to the array.-Any party to a suit which is 
to be tried by a jury may, before the jury is drawn, challenge the 
array upon the ground that the offieer summoning the jury has acted 
corruptly, and has wilfully summoned jurors known to be prejudiced 
against the party challenging -0r biased in fav-0r -0f the adverse party. 
All such challenges must be in writing setting forth distinctly the 
grounds of such challenge and supported by the affidavit of the party 
or some other credible person. When such challenge is made, the 
court shall hear evidence and decide without delay whether or not 
the challenge shall be sustained. This article does not apply when 
the jurors summoned have been selected by jury commissioners. (Id.) 
Art. 2132. When challenge is sustained.-If the challenge be sus­
tained, the array of jurors summoned shall be discharged, and the 
court shall order other jurors summoned in their stead, and shall 
direct that the officer who summoned the persons so discharged, and 
on account of whose misconduct the challenge has been sustained, 
shall not summon any other jurors in the case. (Id.) 
Art. 2133. Qualifications.-All men over twenty-one years of age 
are competent jurors, unless disqualified under some provision of this 
chapter. No man shall be qualified to serve as a juror who does not 
possess the following qualifications : 
1. He must be a citizen of the state and of the county in which 
he is to serve, and qualified under the Constitution and laws to vote 
in said county; provided, that his failure to pay poll taxes as required 
by law shall not be held to disqualify him for jury service in any 
instance. 
2. He must be a freeholder within the state, or a householder 
within the county. 
3. He must be of sound mind and good moral character. 
4. He must be able to read and write, except in cases provided for 
in the succeeding article. 
5. He must not have served as a juror for six days during the 
preceding six months in the district court, or during the preceding 
three months in the county court. 
6. He must not have been convicted of felony. 
7. He must not be under indictment or other legal accusation of 
theft -0r of any felony. Whenever it shall be made to appear to the 
court that the requisite number of jurors able to read and write 
cannot be found within the county, the court may dispense with 
the exception provided for in the fourth subdivision and the court 
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may in like manner dispense with the exception provided for in the 
fifth subdivision, when the county is so sparsely populated as to make 
its enforcement seriously inconvenient. (Acts 1905, p. 207; G. L., 
Vol. 8, p. 914.) 
Art. 2134. Disqualification.-The following persons shall be dis­
qualified to serve as jurors in any particular case: 
1. Any witness in the case. 
2. Any person interested, directly or indirectly, in the subject 
matter of the suit. 
3. Any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the third 
degree to either of the parties to the suit. 
4. Any person who has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against 
either of the parties. 
5. Any person who has sat as a petit juror in a former trial of 
the same, or of another case, involving the same questions of fact. 
(Acts 1876, p. 83; G. L., Vol. 8, p. 914.) 
Art. 2135. Jury service.-All competent jurors are liable to jury 
service, except the following persons : 
1. All persons over sixty years of age. 
2. All civil officers of this state and of the United States. 
3. All overseers of roads. 
4. All ministers of the gospel engaged in the active discharge 
of their ministerial duties. 
5. All physicians and attorneys engaged in actual practice. 
6. All publishers of newspapers, school masters, druggists, under­
takers, telegraph operators, railroad station agents, ferrymen, and 
all millers engaged in grist, flouring, and saw mills. 
7. All presidents, vice-presidents, conductors, and engineers of 
railroad companies when engaged in the regular and actual discharge 
of their respective positions. 
8. Any person who has acted as a jury commissioner within 
the preceding twelve months. 
9. All members of the national guard of this state under the pro­
visions of the title "Militia." 
10. ln cities and towns having a population of fifteen hundred 
or more inhabitants, according to the last preceding United States 
census, the active members of organized fire companies, not to exceed 
twenty to each one thousand of such inhabitants. (Id.) 
Art. 2137. Filing of exemptions.-All persons summoned as jurors 
in any court of this state, who are exempt by statutory law from 
jury service, may, if they so desire to claim their exemptions, make 
oath before any officer authorized by law to administer oaths, or 
before the officers summoning such persons, stating their exemptions, 
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and file said affidavit at any time before the convening of said court 
with the clerk of said court, which shall constitute sufficient excuse 
without appearing in person. (Acts 1907, p. 216.) 
Art. 2142. Challenge to juror.-A challenge to a particular juror 
is either a challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge. The court 
shall decide without delay any such challenge, and if sustained, the 
juror shall be discharged from the particular case. Either such 
challenge may be made orally on the formation of a jury to try the 
case. (Id.) 
Art. 2143. Challenge for cause.-When twelve or more jurors, if 
in the district court, or six or more, if in the county court, are drawn, 
and the lists of their names delivered to the parties, if either party 
desires to challenge any juror for cause, the challenge shall now be 
made. The name of a juror challenged and set aside for cause 
shall be erased from such lists. (Id.) 
Art. 2144. "Challenge for cause."-A challenge for cause is an 
objection made to a juror, alleging some fact which by law disqualifies 
him to serve as a juror in the case or in any case, or which in the 
opinion of the court, renders him an unfit person to sit on the jury. 
Upon such challenge the examination is not confined to the answers 
of the juror, but other evidence may be heard for or against the 
challenge. (Id.) 
Art. 2145. Certain questions not to be asked.-In examining a 
juror, he shall not be asked a question the answer to which may 
show that he has been convicted of an offense which disqualifies him, 
or that he stands by some legal accusation with theft or any felony. 
(Id.) 
Art. 2146. Number reduced by challenge.-!! the challenges reduce 
the number of jurors to less than will constitute a legal jury, the 
court shall order other jurors to be drawn or summoned and their 
names written upon the list instead of those set aside for cause. (Id.) 
Art. 2147. Making peremptory challenge.-If there remain on such 
lists not subject to challenge for cause, twelve names, if in the district 
court, or six names if in the county court, the parties shall proceed 
to make their peremptory challenges. A peremptory challenge is 
made to a juror without assigning any reason therefor. (Id.) 
Art. 2148. Number of peremptory challenges.-Each party to a 
civil suit shall be entitled to six peremptory challenges in a case tried 
in the district court, and to three in the county court. (Acts Dec. 1, 
1871, p. 61; G. L., Vol. 7, p. 63.) 
Art. 2149. Li.sts returned to clerk.-When the parties have made 
or declined to make their peremptory challenge, they shall deliver 
their lists to the clerk. The clerk shall, if the case be in the district 
court, call off the first twelve names on the lists that have not been 
erased; and if the case be in the county court, he shall call off the 
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first six names on the lists that have not been erased; those whose 
names are called shall be the jury. (Acts 1876, p. 78; G. L., Vol. 8, 
p. 914.) 
Art. 2150. If jury is incomplete.-When by peremptory challenges 
the jury is left incomplete, the court shall direct other jurors to be 
drawn or summoned to complete the jury; and such other jurors shall 
be impan<!led as in the first instance. (Id.) 
Art. 2151. Swearing jury.-When the jury has been selected, such 
of them as have not been previously sworn for the trial of civil 
cases, shall be sworn by or under the direction of the court. 
The Trial 
(From Revised Civil Sta.tutes of the State of Teo:as, pp. 687-088, Vol. 1, 1926) 
Art. 2180. Order of proceedings on trial by jury.-The trial of 
cases before a jury shall proceed in the following order, unless the 
court should, for good cause, to be stated in the record, otherwise 
direct: 
1. Plaintiff's petition shall be read to the jury. 
2. D~fendant's answer shall be read to the jury. 
3. If there be any intervenor his pleadings shall be read. 
4. The party upon whom rests the burden of proof on the whole 
case under the pleadings, shall be permitted to state to the jury 
briefly the nature of his claim or defense and facts relied upon in 
support thereof. 
5. Such party shall then introduce his evidence. 
6. The adverse party may then state briefly the nature of his 
defense or claim and the facts relied on in support thereof. 
7. He shall then introduce his evidence. 
8. The intervenor may, in like manner, make his statement, and 
shall then introduce his evidence. 
9. The parties shall then be confined to rebutting testimony on 
each side. 
Art. 2181. Additional testimony.-At any time before the conclu­
sion of the argument the court may permit additional evidence to be 
offered to supply an omission where it clearly appears to be neces­
sary to the due administration of justice. 
Art. 2182. Non-suit.-At any time before the jury has retired, 
the plaintiff may take a non-suit, but he shall not thereby prejudice 
the right of an adverse party to be heard on his claim for affirmative 
relief. When the case is tried by the judge, such non-suit may be 
taken at any time before the decision is announced. (Acts 1853, p. 
19; P. D., 1464; G. L., Vol. 3, p. 1302.) 
Art. 2183. Order of argument.-After the evidence is concluded 
and the charge is read, the parties may argue the case to the jury. 
The party having the burden of proof on the whole case shall be 
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entitled to open and conclude the argument; where there are several 
parties having separate claims or defenses, the court shall prescribe 
the order of argument between them. 
Charge of the Court 
(From Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Teo:aa, pp. 588-589, Vol. I, 1926) 
Art. 2184. Charge to J°ury.-Unless expressly waived by the par­
ties, the judge shall prepare and in open court deliver a written 
charge to the jury on the law of the case, or if the case is sub­
mitted on special issues, he shall submit the issues of fact to the 
jury. (Acts 1913, p. 113.) 
Art. 2185. Requisites.-The charge shall be in writing, signed by 
the judge, filed with the clerk, and shall be a part of the record of 
the cause. It shall be prepared after the evidence has been con­
cluded and shall be submitted to the respective parties or their attor­
neys for inspection, and a reasonable time given them in which to 
examine and present objections thereto, which objections shall in 
every instance be presented to the court before the charge is read 
to the jury, and all objections not so made and presented shall be 
considered as waived. Failure of the court to give reasonable time 
to the parties or their attorneys for examination of the charge shall 
be reviewable upon appeal upon proper exception. The judge shall 
so frame his charge as to distinctly separate questions of law from 
questions of fact, and not therein comment on the weight of the 
evidence, and so as to instruct the jury as to the law arising on 
the facts, and shall only submit controverted questions of fact. (Id.) 
Art. 2186. Special charges.-Either party may present to the judge 
such written instructions as he desires to be given to the jury; and 
the judge may give such instructions, or a part thereof, or be may 
refuse to give them, as he may see proper. Such instructions shall 
be prepared and presented to the court and submitted to opposing 
counsel for examination and objection within a reasonable time 
after the charge is given to the parties or their attorneys for exam­
ination. (Id.) 
Art. 2187. Charge read before argument.-Before the argument 
is begun, the judge shall read to the jury, in the precise words in 
which they were written, his charge and all special charges which 
he may give. (Id.) 
Case to Jury 
(From Reviaed Civil Statutes of the State of Teo:aa, pp. 59(}-591, Vol. I, 1925) 
Art. 2191. Number of J°urors.-The jury in the district courts shall 
be composed of twelve men; but the parties may by consent agree, 
in a particular case, to try with a less number. In county courts the 
jury shall be composed of six men. 
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Art. 2192. Foreman of jury.-Each jury shall appoint one of their 
body foreman. 
Art. 2193. Papers taken to jury room.-The jury may take with 
them in their retirement the charges and instructions, general or 
special, which were given and read to them, and any written evi­
dence, except the depositions of witnesses, but shall not take with 
them any special charges which have been refused. Where part only 
of a paper has been read in evidence, the jury shall not take the 
same with them, unless the part so read to them is detached from 
that which was excluded. 
Art. 2194. Jury kept together.-The jury may either decide a case 
in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire, they shall be kept 
together in some convenient place, under the charge of an officer, 
until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged by the court; but 
the court in its discretion may permit them to separate temporarily 
for the night and at their meals, and for other proper purposes. 
Art. 2195. Ojjic.er shall attend jury.-The officer in charge of the 
jury shall not make nor permit any communication to be made to 
them, except to inquiry if they have agreed upon a verdict, unless 
by order of the court; and he shall not before their verdict is ren­
dered communicate to any person the state of their deliberations 
or the verdict agreed upon. 
Art. 2196. Judge to caution jury.-lf permitted to separate, either 
during the trial or after the case is submitted to them, the jury shall 
be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, 
or permit themselves to be addressed by, any other person, on any 
subject connected with the trial. 
Art. 2197. Jury may communicate with court.-The jury may com­
municate with the court by making their wish known to the officer 
in charge, who shall inform the court, and they may then in open 
court, and through their foreman, communicate with the court, either 
verbally or in writing. 
Art. 2198. Jury may ask further instruction.-After having re­
tired, the jury may ask further instructions of the court touching 
any matter of law. For this purpose they shall appear bafore the 
judge in open court in a body and through their foreman state t() 
the court, either verbally or in writing, the particular question of 
law upon which they desire further instruction; and the court shall 
give such instruction in writing, but no instruction shall be given 
except in conformity with the preceding rules and only upon the 
particular question on which it is asked. 
Art. 2199. Disagreement as to evidence.-If the jury disagree as 
to the statement of any witness, they may, upon applying to the 
court, have such witness again brought upon the stand; and the 
judge shall direct him to repeat his testimony to the point in dispute, 
and no other, and as nearly as he can in the language used on the 
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trial; and on their notifying the court that they disagree as to any. 
portion of a deposition or other paper not carried with them in their 
retirement, the court may, in like manner, permit such portion of 
said deposition or paper to be again read to the jury. 
Art. 2200. Discharge of jury.-The jury, after the cause is sub­
mitted to them, may be discharged: 
1. By the court when they cannot agree and both parties consent 
to their discharge, or, when they have been kept together for such 
time as to render it altogether improbable that they can agree. 
2. By the court when any calamity or accident may, in the opinion 
of the court, require it. 
3. By the court when by sickness or other cause their number is 
reduced below the number constituting the jury in such court. 
4. By the final adjournment of the court before they have agreed 
upon the verdict. 
5. Where a jury has been so discharged without having rendered 
a verdict, the cause may be again tried at the same or another term. 
Art. 2201. Court open for jury.-The court during the delibera­
tions of the jury, may proceed with other business or adjourn from 
time to time, but shall be deemed open for all purposes connected with 
the case before the jury. 
Verdict 
(From Re,,U,ed Ci1ril St11tutes of the Sttlte of Tez.u, pp. 692-693, Vol. I, 1926) 
Art. 2202. Definition and substance.-A verdict is a written 
declaration by a jury of its decision of the issues submitted to them 
in the case. 
1. It shall be signed by the foreman of the jury and shall com­
prehend the whole or all the issues submitted to it. 
2. The verdict is either a general or special verdict. 
3. The jury shall render a general or special verdict as the court 
may direct. 
4. A general verdict is one whereby the jury pronounces generally 
in favor of one or more parties to the suit upon all or any of the 
issues submitted to it. 
5. A special verdict is one wherein the jury finds the facts only 
on issues made up and submitted to them under the direction of the 
court. 
6. A special verdict found under the provisions of this article shall, 
as between the parties, be conclusive as to the facts found. (Acts 
1846, p. 363; Acts 1st C.S. 1897, p. 15; Acts 1913, p. 113; G. L., Vol. 
2, p. 1669.) 
Art. 2203. Form of verdict.-No special form of verdict is re­
quired, and the judgment shall not be arrested or reversed for mere 
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want of form therein if there has been substantial compliance with 
the requirements of the law in rendering a verdict. No verdict shall 
be rendered in any cause except upon the concurrence of all members 
of the jury trying the case. (Id.) 
Art. 2204. Verdict by nine jurors.-Pending a trial of a civil case 
in the district court, where one or more jurors may die or be disabled 
from sitting, if there be as many as nine of the jurors remaining, 
those remaining may render and return a verdict; but in such case 
the verdict must be signed by each juror rendering it. (Acts 1876, 
p. 82; G.L. Vol. 8, p. 918.) 
Art. 2205. When jury have agreed.-When the jury agree upon 
a verdict, they shall be brought into court by the proper officer, their 
names shall be called by the clerk, and they shall deliver their verdict 
to the clerk; and if they state that they have agreed, the verdict shall 
be read aloud by the clerk. If in proper form, and no juror dissent 
therefrom, and neither party requests a poll of the jury, the verdict 
shall be entered upon the minutes of the court. 
Art. 2206. Polling the jury.-Either party shall have the right to 
have the jury polled, which is done by calling separately the name of 
each juror and asking him if it is his verdict. If any juror answer 
in the negative, the jury shall be retired for further deliberation. 
Art. 2207. Defective verdict.-If the verdict is informal or de­
fective, the court may direct it to be reformed at the bar. If not 
responsive to the issue submitted, the court shall call their attention 
thereto and send them back for further deliberation. 
Formation of the Jury in Capital Cases 
(From Tlul CO<U of Crimi.....Z Procedure of the State of T~ae. 1925, pp. 93-96) 
Art. 602. Jurors called.-When a capital case is called for trial, 
and the parties have announced ready for trial, the names of those 
summoned as jurors in the case shall be called. Those not present 
may be fined not exceeding fifty dollars. An attachment may issue 
on request of either party for any absent summoned juror to have 
him brought forthwith before the court. (0.C. 555.) 
Art. 603. Sworn to answer questions.-To those present the court 
shall cause to be administered this oath: "You, and each of you, sol­
emnly swear that you will make true answers to such questions as 
may be propounded to you by the court, or under its direction, touch­
ing your service and qualifications as a juror, so help you God." 
Art. 604. Excuses.-The court shall then hear and determine ex­
cuses offered for not serving as a juror, and if he deems the excuse· 
sufficient, he shall discharge the juror. 
Art. 605. Claiming exemption.-Any person summoned as a juror 
who is exempt by law from jury service, may, if he desires to claim 
his exemption, make an affidavit stating his exemption, and file it at 
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any time before the convening of said court with the clerk thereof, 
which shall be sufficient excuse without appearing in person. The 
affidavit may be sworn to before the officer summoning such juror. 
(Acts 1907, p. 216.) 
Art. 606. Excused by consent.-One summoned upon a special 
venire may by consent of both parties be excused from attendance by 
the court at any time before he is impaneled. 
Art. 60'7. Challenge to array first heard.-The court shall hear 
and determine a challenge to the array before trying those summoned 
as to their qualifications. 
Art. 608. Challenge to the array.-Either party may challenge 
the array only on the ground that the officer summoning the jury has 
wilfully summoned jurors with a view to securing a conviction or an 
acquittal. All such challenges must be in writing setting forth dis­
tinctly the grounds for such challenge. When made by the defendant, 
it must be supported by his affidavit or the affidavit of any credible 
person. When such challenge is made, the judge shall hear evidence 
and decide without delay whether or not the challenge shall be sus­
tained. This article does not apply when the jurors summoned have 
been selected by jury commissioners. 
Art. 609. When challenge is sustained.-The array of jurors sum­
moned shall be discharged if the challenge be sustained, and the court 
shall order other jurors to be summoned in their stead, and direct 
that the officer who summoned those so discharged, and on account 
of whose misconduct the challenge has been sustained shall not sum­
mon any other jurors in the case. 
Art. 610. List of new venire.-When a challenge to the array has 
been sustained, the defendant shall be entitled, as in the first instance, 
to service of a copy of the list of names of those summoned by order 
of the court. 
Art. 611. Court to try qualifications.-When no challenge to the 
array has been made, or if made, has been overruled, the court shall 
proceed to try the qualifications of those present who have been 
summoned to serve as jurors. 
Art. 612. Mode of testing.-In testing the qualifications of a juror 
after he has been sworn, he shall be asked by the court, or under 
its direction : 
1. Are you a qualified voter in this county and State, under the 
Constitution and laws of this State? 
2. Are you a householder in the county, or a freeholder in the 
State? 
If he answers both questions in the affirmative, the court shall hold 
him to be a qualified juror until the contrary be shown by further 
examination or other proof. (Acts 1st C.S. 1903, p. 16; Acts 1905; 
p. 207.) 
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Art. 613. Passing juror for challenge.-A juror held to be quali­
fied shall be passed for acceptance or challenge first to the State and 
then to the defendant. Challenges to jurors are either peremptory or 
for cause. 
Art. 614. A peremptory challenge.-A peremptory challenge is 
made to a juror without assigning any reason therefor. (O.C. 571.) 
Art. 615. Number of challenges.-In capital cases, both the State 
and defendant shall be entitled to fifteen peremptory challenges. 
Where two or more defendants are tried together, the State shall 
be entitled to eight peremptory challenges for each defendant; and 
each defendant shall be entitled to eight peremptory challenges. 
(Acts 1897, p. 12.) 
Art. 616. Reasons for challenge for cause.-A challenge for cause 
is an objection made to a particular juror, alleging some fact which 
renders him incapable or unfit to serve on the jury. It may be made 
for any one of the following reasons : 
1. That he is not a qualified voter in the State and county, under 
the Constitution and laws of the State. 
2. That he is neither a householder in the county nor a freeholder 
in the State. 
3. That he has been convicted of theft or any felony. 
4. That he is under indictment or other legal accusation for theft 
or any felony. 
5. That he is insane or has such defect in the organs of seeing, 
feeling, or hearing, or such bodily or mental defect or disease as 
to render him unfit for jury service. 
6. That he is a witness in the case. 
7. That he served on the grand jury which found the indictment. 
8. That he served on a petit jury in a former trial of the same 
case. 
9. That he is related within the third degree of consanguinity or 
affinity to the defendant. 
10. That he is related within the third degree of consanguinity or 
affinity to the person injured by the commission of the offense, or to 
the private prosecutor, if there be one. 
11. That the juror has conscientious scruples in regard to the in­
fliction of the punishment of death for crime. 
12. That he has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the 
defendant. 
13. That from hearsay or otherwise there is established in the 
mind of the juror such a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant as will influence him in his action in finding a verdict. 
To ascertain whether this cause of challenge exists, the juror shall 
first be asked whether, in his opinion, the conclusion so established 
will influence his verdict. If he answers in the affirmative, he shall 
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be discharged; if he answers in the negative, he shall be further ex­
amined as to how his conclusion was formed, and the extent to which 
it will affect his action; and, if it appears to have been formed from 
reading newspaper accounts, communications, statements or reports 
or mere rumor or hearsay, and if the juror states that he feels able, 
notwithstanding such opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon 
the law and the evidence, the court, if satisfied that he is impartial 
and will render such verdict, may, in its discretion, admit him as 
competent to serve in such case. If the court, in its discretion, is 
not satisfied that he is impartial, the juror shall be discharged. 
14. That he cannot read and write. This cause of challenge shall 
not be sustained when it appears to the court that the requisite num­
ber of jurors who are able to read and write cannot be found in 
the county. (0.C. 575; Acts 1st C.S. 1903, p. 16; Acts 1905, p. 207.) 
Art. 617. Other evidence on challenge.-Upon a challenge for 
cause, the examination is not confined to the answers of the juror, 
but other evidence may be heard for or against the challenge. (0.C. 
577.) 
Art. 618. Certain questions not to be asked.-In examining a juror, 
he shall not be asked a question the answer to which may show that 
he has been convicted of an offense which disqualifies him, or that he 
stands charged by some legal accusation with theft or any felony. O.C. 
577.) 
Art. 619. Absolute disqualification.-No juror shall be impaneled 
when it appears that he is subject to the third, fourth or fifth clause 
of challenge in Article 616, though both parties may consent. 
Art. 620. Names called in order.-In selecting the jury from the 
persons summoned, the names of such persons shall be called in the 
order in which they appear upon the list furnished the defendant. 
Each juror shall be tried and passed upon separately. A person who 
has been summoned, but who is not present, may, upon his appearance 
before the jury is completed, be tried as to his qualifications and im­
paneled as a juror, unless challenged; but no cause shall be unreason­
ably delayed on account of such absence. (0.C. 556-558.) 
Art. 621. Judge to decide qualifications.-The court is the judge, 
after proper examination, of the qualifications of a juror, and shall 
decide all challenges without delay and without argument thereupon. 
(O.C. 579.) 
Art. 622. Oath to each juror.-As each juror is selected for the 
trial of the case, the following oath shall be administered to him by 
the court, or under its direction: "You solemnly swear that in the 
case of the State of Texas against the defendant, you will a true 
verdict render, according to the law and the evidence, so help you 
God." (0.C. 563.) 
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Art. 623. Jurors shall not separate.-The court may adjourn 
veniremen to any day of the term; but when jurors have been sworn 
in a case, those so sworn shall be kept together and not permitted to 
separate until a verdict has been rendered or the jury finally dis­
charged, unless by permission of the court, with the consent of each 
party and in charge of an officer. (0.C. 605.) 
Art. 624. Persons not selected.-When a jury of twelve men has 
been completed, the others in attendance under a summons to appear 
as jurors in the case shall be discharged from further attendance 
therein. 
Art. 625. Special pay for veniremen.-All men summoned on spe­
cial venire who have been challenged or excused from service on the 
trial, and who reside more than one mile distant from the courthouse 
of the county, shall be paid, out of the jury fund, one dollar for each 
day that he attends court on said summons. No person shall receive 
pay as a special venireman and regular juror for the same day. No 
per diem shall, in any event, be allowed any venireman under this 
article, who resides within the corporate limits of the county seat, if 
incorporated, nor shall any per diem be allowed any venireman for 
more than one case the same day. (Acts 1907, p. 214.) 
The Trial Before the Jury 
(Fro121 The Codtl of Critmnal Procedure of the State of Teo:iu. 1926, pp. 99, 101-100 
Art. 642. Order of proceeding in trial.-A jury being impaneled in 
any criminal action, the cause shall proceed in the following order: 
1. The indictment or information shall be read to the jury by tne 
attorney prosecuting. 
2. The special pleas, if any, shall be read by the defendant's 
counsel, and if the plea of not guilty is also relied upon, it shall also 
be stated. 
3. The State's attorney shall state to the jury the nature of the 
accusation and the facts which are expected to be proved by the State 
in support thereof. 
4. The testimony on the part of the State shall be offered. 
5. The nature of the defenses relied upon and the facts expected 
to be proved in their support shall be stated by defendant's counsel. 
6. The testimony on the part of the defendant shall be offered. 
7. Rebutting testimony may be offered on the part of each party. 
(0.C. 580.) 
Art. 643. Testimony at any time.-The court shall allow testimony 
to be introduced at any time before the argument of a cause is con­
cluded, if it appear that it is necessary to a due administration of 
justice. (0.C. 581.) 
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Art. 657. Jury are judges of fact.-The jury are the exclusive 
judges of the facts, but they are bound to receive the law from the 
court and be governed thereby. (O.C. 593.) 
Art. 658. Charge of court.-In each felony case the judge shall, 
before the argument begins, deliver to the jury a written charge, 
distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case; not expressing 
any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up the 
testimony, discussing the facts or using any argument in his charge 
calculated to arouse the sypmathy or excite the passions of the jury. 
Before said charge is read to the jury, the defendant or his counsel 
shall have a reasonable time to examine the same and he shall present 
his objections thereto in writing, distinctly specifying each ground of 
objection. (Acts 1913, p. 278.) 
Art. 659. Requested special charges.-Before the court reads his 
charge to the jury, counsel on both sides shall have a reasonable time 
to present written instructions and ask that they be given to the 
jury. The court shall give or refuse these charges with or without 
modification, and certify thereto; and, when the court shall modify a 
charge it shall be done in writing and in such manner as to show 
clearly what the modification is. (Id.) 
Art. 660. Final charge.-After the judge shall have received the 
objections to his main charge, together with any special charges 
offered, he may make such changes in his main charge as he may 
deem proper, and the defendant or his counsel shall have the oppor­
tunity to present their objections thereto and in the same manner as 
is provided in Article 658, and thereupon the judge shall read his 
charge to the jury as finally written, together with any special 
charges given. After the argument begins no further charge shall 
be given to the jury unless required by the improper argument of 
counsel or the request of the jury, or unless the judge shall, in his 
discretion, permit the introduction of other testimony, and in the 
event of such further charge the defendant or his counsel shall have 
the right to present objections in the same manner as is prescribed 
in Article 658. The failure of the court to give the defendant or 
his counsel a reasonable time to examine the charge and specify the 
ground of objection shall be subject to review either in the trial court 
or in the appellate court. (Id.) 
Art. 661. Charge certified by judge.-The general charge given by 
the court and all special charges given or refused shall be certified by 
the judge and filed among the papers in the cause. (0.C. 595.) 
Art. 662. Charge in misdemeanor.-The court is not required to 
charge the jury in a misdemeanor case, except at the request of coun­
sel on either side. When so requested he shall give or refuse such 
charges, with or without modification, as are asked in writing. (0. 
c. 598.) 
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Art. 668. Separation of jury.-After the jury has been sworn and 
impaneled to try any felony case, they shall not be permitted to 
separate until they have returned a verdict, unless by permission of 
the court, with the consent of the attorney representing the State and 
the defendant, and in charge of an officer. (O.C. 605.) 
Art. 674. Written evidence.-The jury may take with them any 
writing used as evidence. (O.C. 610.) 
Art. 675. Foreman of jury.-Each jury shall appoint one of their 
body foreman. (0.C. 611.) 
Art. 676. Jury rrw,y communicate with court.-When the jury wish 
to communicate with the court, they shall so notify the sheriff, who 
shall inform the court thereof; and they may be brought before the 
court, and through their foreman shall state to the court verbally or 
in writing, what they desire to communicate. (0.C. 612, 613.) 
Art. 677. Jury rrw,y ask further instruction.-The jury, after hav­
ing retired, may ask further instruction of the judge as to any matter 
of law. For this purpose the jury shall appear before the judge in 
open court in a body, and through their foreman shall state to the 
court, verbally or in writing, the particular point of law upon which 
they desire further instruction; and the court shall give such instruc­
tion in writing, but no instruction shall be given except upon the 
particular point on which it is asked. ( O.C. 614.) 
Art. 678. Jury rrw,y have witness reexamined.-!£ the jury dis­
agree as to the statement of any witness, they may, upon applying 
to the court, have such witness recalled, and the judge shall direct 
him to repeat his testimony as to the point in dispute, and no other, 
and as nearly as he can in the language he used on the trial. (0.C. 
615.) 
Art. 679. Presence of defendant.-In felony but not in misde­
meanor cases, the defendant shall be present in the court when any 
such proceeding is had as mentioned in the three preceding articles, 
and his counsel shall also be called. 
Art. 680. If a juror becomes sick.-After the retirement of the 
jury in a felony case, if any one of them becomes so sick as to pre­
vent the continuance of his duty, or any accident or circumstance oc­
curs to prevent their being kept together, the jury may be. dis­
charged. (0.C. 618.) 
Art. 681. Discharging jury in misdemeanor.-If nine of the jury 
can be kept together in a misdemeanor case in the district court, they 
shall not be discharged. If more than three of the twelve are dis­
charged, the entire jury shall be discharged. (Acts 1876, p. 82.) 
Art. 682. Disagreement of jury.-After the cause is submitted to 
the jury, they may be discharged when they cannot agree and both 
parties consent to their discharge; or the court may in its discretion 
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discharge them where they have been kept together for such time as 
to render it altogether improbable that they can agree. (0.C. 619.) 
Art. 683. Final adjournment discharges jury.-A final adjourn­
ment of the court before the jury have agreed upon a verdict dis­
charges them. ( O.C. 620.) 
Art. 684. Discharge without verdict.-When a jury has been dis­
charged, as provided in the four preceding articles, without having 
rendered a verdict, the cause may be again tried at the same or an­
other term. (0.C. 621.) 
Art. 685. Court open for jury.-The court during the deliberations 
of the jury may proceed with other business or adjourn from time to 
time, but shall be deemed open for all purposes connected with the 
case before the jury. 
The Verdict 
(From Th6 Code of Crimi714l Pf'oceduf'e of tke Sto.te of Teo:o.B, 1926, pp. 104-106) 
Art. 686. "Verdict."-A verdict is a written declaration by a jury 
of their decision of the issues submitted to them in the case. 
Art. 687. Verdict in felony.-Not less than twelve jurors can 
render and return a verdict in a felony case. It must be concurred 
in by each juror and signed by the foreman. 
Art. 691. Polling the jury.-The State or the defendant shall have 
the right to have the jury polled, which is done by calling separately 
the name of each juror and asking him if it is his verdict. If all, 
when asked, answer in the affirmative, the verdict shall be entered 
upon the minutes; but, if any juror answer in the negative, the jury 
shall retire again to consider of their verdict. (0.C. 624.) 
Art. 692. Presence of defendant.-In felony cases the defendant 
must be present when the verdict is read unless his absence is wilful 
or voluntary: A verdict in a misdemeanor case may be received and 
read in the absence of the defendant. (Acts 1907, p. 31.) 
Art. 693. Verdict must be general.-The verdict in every criminal 
action must be general. Where there are special pleas upon which 
the jury are to find, they must say in their verdict that the allegations 
in such pleas are true or untrue. If the plea is not guilty, they must 
find that the defendant is either "guilty" or "not guilty," and they 
shall assess the punishment in all cases where the same is not abso­
lutely fixed by law to some particular penalty. (0.C. 626.) 
Art. 694. Offenses of different degree charged.-In a prosecution 
for an offense including lower offenses, the jury may find the de­
fendant not guilty of the higher offense, but guilty of any lower 
offense included. (0.C. 630.) 
Art. 695. Offenses consisting of degrees.-The following offenses 
include different degrees: 
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1. Murder, which includes all the lesser degrees of culpable homi­
cide, and also an assault with intent to commit murder. 
2. An assault with intent to commit any felony, which includes all 
assaults of an inferior degree. 
3. Maiming, which includes aggravated and simple assault and 
battery. 
4. Burglary, which includes every species of house breaking and 
theft or other felony when charged in the indictment in connection 
with the burglary. 
5. Riot, which includes unlawful assembly. 
6. Kidnapping or abduction, which includes false imprisonment. 
7. Every offense against the person includes within it assaults 
with intent to commit said offense, when such attempt is a violation 
of the penal law. (O.C. 631.) 
Art. 696. Informal verdict.-If the verdict of the jury is informal, 
their attention shall be called to it, and, with their consent the verdict 
may, under the direction of the court, be reduced to the proper form. 
If the jury refuse to have the verdict altered, they shall again retire 
to their room to deliberate, unless it manifestly appear that the 
verdict is intended as an acquittal; and, in that case, the judgment 
shall be rendered accordingly, discharging the defendant. 
Evidence in Criminal Actions 
(From The Ca<U of Crimi..al Proud•r• of tAe State of Tee,.., 1926, p. 107) 
Art. 706. Jury are judges of facts.-The jury, in all cases, are the 
exclusive judges of the facts proved, and of the weight to be given to 
the testimony, except where it is provided by law that proof of any 
particular fact is to be taken as either conclusive or presumptive 
proof of the existence of another fact, or where the law directs that 
a certain degree of weight is to be attached to a certain species of 
evidence. (0.C. 643.) 
Art. 707. Judge shall not discuss evidence.-In ruling upon the 
admissibility of evidence, the judge shall not discuss or comment 
upon the weight of the same or its bearing in the case, but shall 
simply decide whether or not it is admissible; nor shall he, at any 
stage of the proceedings previous to the return of a verdict, make 
any remark calculated to convey to the jury his opinion of the case. 
AFFIRMATIVE MATERIAL 
I. Inefficiency of Trial by Jury 
THE PETTY JURY 
BY W. F. WILLOUGHBY 
(From Principles of J1'dicial Administra.tion. pp. 488-494, 497-511, The Crookinp 
Institution, Washington, 1929) 
Adaptation of the petty jury system to modern conditions.-It is 
one thing to recognize the merits of a political institution as repre­
senting an advance over those which have preceded it and as meeting 
the conditions that prevailed at the the time of its rise and develop­
ment, and quite another to justify its continued maintenance after 
those conditions have passed away and new ones quite dissimilar 
have taken their place. The maintenance of the jury system at the 
present time must be justified, therefore, not on historical grounds, 
but upon its positive merits as an institution adapted to present con­
ditions. 
In considering this question from this purely utilitarian or practical 
standpoint, certain distinctions should be made. These may be stated 
in the form of questions: Is the system as viewed in its fundamental 
aspects one that should be retained in its substantial integrity, or 
should it be entirely abolished? Or, second, if retained, should sub­
stantial modifications be made in it; and if so, what form should these 
modifications take? In considering both of these questions the further 
distinction should be made between the retention, abolition, or modi­
fication of the system as employed in the administration of civil 
justice and the administration of criminal justice. It may well be 
that the system can continue to prove an efficient instrument in the 
one case and not in the other, or that the modifications found desirable 
will apply in one and not the other. The order in which these ques­
tions will be considered is that of their statement. An evaluation 
of the system as a whole should first be sought before an attempt is 
made to consider the features in respect to which it may with ad­
vantage be modified. 
Retention or abolition of the petty jury in civil cases.-As an his­
torical institution which has rendered valuable service, the burden of 
proof rests upon those advocating the abolition of the jury system. 
Viewed from the standpoint of its technical character, it is fair to say 
that the reverse is the case. If a people were starting anew, unin­
fluenced by historical attachments and sentimental considerations, 
free to devise that system for the administration of justice which it 
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believed would give the best results in practice, it is hardly conceivable 
that it would deliberately create such an institution. Stated baldly, 
the use of the petty jury means that matters requiring adjudication, 
instead of being submitted to professional experts, trained in the per­
formance of their duties and acting under a continuing responsibility, 
are handed over to a body of laymen, selected almost at random, re­
garding whose ability to perform the delicate function of weighing 
evidence free from sentimental and emotional influences nothing is 
known, and who perform their duties under no sense of continuing 
responsibility. It is, furthermore, a system which complicates and 
renders more difficult the process of adjudication, entails great ex­
pense to the government, and imposes a heavy burden upon the citizen 
body. A system which represents such a radical departure from 
normal or accepted methods of handling public business and presents 
such disadvantages, is surely one the use of which should be supported 
by affirmative proof of merits that more than offset its failings. It is 
believed that it is difficult to produce such proof. 
A cold analysis of the problem of the administration of justice 
reveals certain essential considerations that must be met if the sys­
tem for securing it is to be satisfactory. 
The first is that the proper adjudication of controversies requires 
the exercise of a very special faculty, usually described as the ju­
dicial temperament. By this is meant the ability to disentangle the 
essential from the unessential, to discover the real issue that is pre­
sented, to weigh the evidence presented in a detached way, to elimi­
nate matters of sentiment, to be impervious to mere emotional 
appeals, and to make decisions conforming to the law and the facts as 
developed and their bearing on the controversy ascertained. It does 
not need the studies of psychologists to establish the fact that this 
faculty is not a common possession, that it is one that is acquired only 
as a result of experience and by persistent self-drill in making action 
conform to such requirements. The decision of controversies is thus 
a task requiring specially selected and specially trained experts. 
Secondly, persons entrusted with such responsibility as that of 
determining individual rights should be required to perform their 
duties under a system of continuing responsibility, where their stand­
ing in the community and in their profession, if not their continuance 
in office, is dependent upon the honesty and ability with which they 
discharge their duties. 
A third consideration is that the work of adjudication should be 
performed with dispatch, involve the minimum of technicalities, and 
entail as little burden of expense upon the government, the litigants, 
and the general public as is consistent with certainty and justice to 
all parties concerned. 
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No one of these requirements is met, even in measurable degree, by 
the jury system. The defects of the ordinary jury from the stand­
point of intellectual attainments, ability to disentangle complicated 
issues, capacity to weigh evidence of varying degrees of credibility, 
and power to resist appeals to their emotions are appreciated by all, 
and find express recognition in the numerous technical rules deter­
mining the competency of witnesses and evidence that may be produced. 
Only in the most general and temporary way is the factor of respon­
sibility present. And it would be difficult to devise a system that 
would be more productive of trouble, expense, and delay. 
Technically considered, therefore, the jury system is defective, and 
all the arguments from this standpoint are in favor of the alternative 
system where complete responsibility for the determination of mat­
ters both of fact and the law and the rendering of the decision is 
vested in a permanent trained bench. As Mr. Charles A. Boston puts 
it, in his excellent article on "Some Practical Remedies for Existing 
Defects in the Administration of Justice": 
"We train recruits to bear arms, we license lawyers, physicians, 
dentists, midwives, veterinarians, horseshoers, and chauffeurs, but so 
long as a man speaks any sort of English, can hear, is on the jury 
list and has not formed an opinion, he is deemed a competent man 
to decide disputes in a court of justice. He would not be accepted to 
run a street car, nor to perform any number of ordinary duties for 
a private employer, but he is legally a fit juryman if he has these 
qualifications. 
"The true, but not the legal essentials of a competent juryman 
considering his actual functions, are the ability to listen attentively, 
to remember testimony, to weigh evidence, to understand instructions 
upon the law, to argue and give heed to argument, and to unite in 
pronouncing a reasoned verdict, applying law as instructed to facts 
as ascertained. In any other vocation, this would be deemed to call 
for training and experience; these demands require for their efficient 
exercise, a high degree of mental development, involving attention, 
memory, observation, reflection, apprehension, understanding, judg­
ment, and reason; but we find no such requirement upon any statute 
book or in any decision.... In short, we recognize in every imagina­
ble way that the jury is the weakest element in our judicial system 
and yet we pander to it as a sacred institution. It causes more mis­
carriages of justice and is the occasion of more appeals, reversals and 
delays than any other element in our system. . .. 
"One of the prime elements of an efficient judicial tribunal is 
impartiality and freedom from prejudices and yet it is proverbially 
admitted that before an average jury in a negligence case a corpora­
tion stands less chance of judgment on the merits than an individual, 
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an employer than an employee, a religious opponent than a co­
religionist, a member of a different race from a member of the same 
race.... 
"We hear much of the technicalities of the law defeating justice; 
the most of these technicalities have grown up and exist in a vain 
endeavor to prevent juries from defeating justice." 
In the foregoing no attempt has been made to set forth and employ 
as arguments against the jury system the many evils which charac­
terize this system in its practical operation. These relate to the 
extent to which there is what amounts to a process of adverse selec­
tion in the selection of men for jury service, with the result that the 
ordinary jury is composed of men relatively low in order of intelli­
gence and with meagre capacity to exercise a discriminating judg­
ment; the extent to which juries are deliberately "packed" in the 
interest of one of the parties; the extent to which use is made of 
"professional" jurors; the extent to which juries are "tampered" 
with; the extent to which jurors are not only unconsciously influenced 
by race, religion, class, and other prejudices, but deliberately allow 
such factors to influence their verdicts; the intolerable delay that 
often occurs in the selection of juries, etc. All of these evils are not 
inherent in the system and conceivably may be abated, if not entirely 
removed, by appropriate provisions to govern the jury system in 
operation. All that will be sought in the paragraphs that follow will 
be to determine whether the jury system, even if operating with 
maximum efficiency, is one that represents a desirable feature of a 
system of judicial administration under political and social conditions 
now obtaining. 
It should not escape notice that those in favor of the retention of 
the jury system must hold as a part of their argument that the sys­
tem of trial by the judge alone is one that will not give satisfactory 
results from the standpoint of the protection of the individual in his 
rights and the promotion of the public welfare. This it is difficult to 
do in the light of the fact that this non-jury system is in successful 
operation as regards many classes of litigation in this country, and 
is being employed to an increasing extent in those countries, such as 
England and her Dominions, which have had experience with both 
systems. As Chief Justice William H. Taft has said in his commence­
ment address on "Criminal Law," at Yale University, in 1905: 
"In suits in equity the judge hears and decides the issues of fact. 
The issues may be, and often are, very similar to those arising in 
suits at common law, the genuineness of a signature, the existence of 
fraudulent motive, the identity of an individual, damages to business 
by violation of patents, trade marks or contract rights, and all the 
variety of issues presented in civil litigation. Now the federal con­
stitution requires that such issues arising at common law shall be 
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tried by a jury, but if an equity suit the court may try them. Since 
the abolition of the distinction between law and equity in civil actions 
in our codes of procedure, it requires a lawyer to tell whether a suit 
brought is in equity or law. Certainly a constitutional mandate that 
requires a jury in less than half the civil issues, and only in those 
when in a certain form of action, distinguishable only by a lawyer, 
can hardly be said to rest on any very broad and sound principles. 
Of course, in suits for personal injury against corporations, the plain­
tiff relies on the supposed sympathy of twelve laymen with the poor 
plaintiff against the rich corporation both to find the facts in favor 
of the plaintiff and also to swell the damages to a large sum. But 
this hardly constitutes a reason for maintaining the jury in a system 
which is supposed to dispense justice to all whether rich or poor­
impartially. The abolition of the jury in civil cases would relieve the 
public of a great burden of expense, would facilitate the hearing of 
all civil suits and would not, I think, with proper appeal deprive any 
litigant of all he is entitled to, an impartial hearing." 
In England, the home of the petty jury, its use has greatly declined 
in recent years; and all parties, the bench, the bar, and the public are 
in accord that in nowise have the safeguards of individual rights been 
weakened or the due administration of the law suffered. 
In Ontario, where the judicial system is modelled. on that of 
England, large discretionary powers are exercised by the judge in 
determining whether a civil action shall be tried with a jury. Justice 
W. R. Riddell of the Supreme Court of Ontario gives the following 
interesting account of the conditions governing the use of a jury in 
that province: 
"A party who wishes his case tried by a jury files a jury notice-­
the other side may move to strike it out. It will be struck out in 
chambers if the judge sitting in chambers thinks it is a case that 
ought not to be tried by a jury upon the face of it. Usually, how­
ever, a different course is pursued and the matter is left to the trial 
judge : I go on circuit, say, as I have done many times and hope 
to do again. The records containing the pleadings are laid before 
me; I go through the records one by one and determine which, if any, 
of the cases for which a jury is asked should really be tried with a 
jury. Counsel may be heard; and as a rule, in a very few minutes 
we have determined in which cases a jury is proper. In all the other 
cases the jury notices are struck out and they are placed at the end 
of the list with the cases to be tried without a jury (this applies only 
to civil cases) .... 
"The percentage of cases tried by a jury is constantly diminishing 
-the last time I had occasion to look into the matter at all closely, 
I found that about twenty per cent were so tried in the Supreme 
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Court, about fifteen per cent in the County Court, and not one-fifth of 
one per cent in the Division Court. 
"While technically there is an appeal from the action of a trial 
judge in striking out the jury, I have, in more than thirty years ex­
perience known of only two appeals being actually taken on this 
ground, both of them unsuccessful-I know of one case, however, in 
which an appeal taken on other grounds succeeded and the Appellate 
Court directed the jury notice to be restored. 
"In an address before the Illinois Bar Association, May 28, 1914, 
I used the following language in reference to our practice: 
"The saving of time-and wind-is enormous, the opening and 
closing of speeches of counsel to the jury and the charge of the judge 
are done away with; in argument there are very few judges who care 
to be addressed like a public meeting and quite a few who are in­
fluenced by mere oratory-all indeed must ex officio be patient with 
the tedious and suffer fools gladly. Vehement assertion, gross per­
sonal attacks upon witnesses or parties, appeal to the lower part of 
our nature, are all at a discount; and in most cases justice is better 
attained, rights according to law are better ensured. Moreover, dur­
ing the course of a trial a very great deal of time is not uncommonly 
wasted in petty objections to evidence, in dwelling upon minor and 
almost irrelevant matters which may influence the jury, wearisome 
cross-examination and reiteration, etc., all of which are minimized 
before a judge." 
THE JURY SYSTEM 
BY J. M. MATHEWS 
(From American State Government, pp. 466-472, D. Appleton and Company, 
Publishers, New York, 1926) 
Among the most serious difficulties, however, in the way of efficiency 
in the administration of punitive justice are the requirements of in­
dictment by a grand jury and conviction by unanimous verdict of a 
petit jury. Although the grand jury may sometimes be useful in 
compelling the attendance of witnesses and examining them under 
oath, and in supporting the public prosecutor in proceeding against 
powerful malefactors, it is nevertheless on the whole an inefficient and 
cumbersome body composed of untrained and irresponsible laymen. 
This inefficiency and cumbrousness is shown in the mistakes which 
the grand jury makes in selecting the cases to be tried and in failing 
to examine at all many cases in which true bills should probably be 
returned. It is said that, in 1911, the grand jury in Chicago released 
without a hearing 28 per cent of those held on felony charges. Fur­
thermore, the necessity of waiting for grand jury action is one of the 
most potent causes of delay in criminal proceedings. A remedy for 
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tkis condition of affairs has already been found in some states where 
crimes are prosecuted by means of informations prepared by the 
prosecuting attorney. This increased power of the local prosecuting 
attorney, however, should be accompanied by an increased degree of 
central control over him. 
A more serious obstacle, however, to efficient law enforcement 
through court action is found in the system of trial by jury. The 
difficulties involved in the jury system arise, first, from the method 
of selecting juries, and, secondly, from the extent of the powers 
which they exercise. Juries are still selected from the vicinage, 
though the reason for the rule has long since disappeared. The origi­
nal reason for this rule was in order that the jury should be com­
posed of men having personal knowledge of the facts, but now jurors 
who know the least about the alleged crime are most apt to be selected. 
As already noted, the defendant may, under certain circumstances, 
secure a change of venue, but the trial judge should be empowered 
to allow the same privilege to the prosecution, under equally justifiable 
conditions, in spite of the objection of the defendant. From whatever 
locality the jurors may be selected, partisan political considerations 
should not be allowed to enter into the choice, and, to this end, the 
selection should be taken out of the hands of the sheriff and vested 
in an impartial commissioner appointed by the judges or by central 
authority. Under the system in which the sheriff draws the grand 
and petit juries, men are sometimes selected with a view to the pro­
tection of offenders having political influence, and not to return in­
dictments or verdicts. In order to remedy this state of affairs, jury 
commissioners have been provided in soms states through judicial 
selection or appointment by the governor. Thus Maryland, by an 
act of 1904, vested in jury commissioners appointed by the governor 
the power previously possessed by sheriffs to select jurors. Such acts 
have been held not unconstitutional as an infringement upon the 
prerogatives of the judiciary. 
Even where partisan political considerations have been eliminated, 
however, it does not follow that an intelligent and capable jury will 
be selected. In some states the jury panel is drawn by lot or blind 
chance, and there is no assurance that the least qualified persons in 
the county may not be selected. Even where character and intelli­
gence are taken into account as far as possible in selecting the panel, 
the actual trial jury is apt to be composed of persons of but mediocre 
intelligence and standing in the community. Members of certain 
professions and persons who would be seriously injured financially by 
jury service are frequently exempted from that duty, thus eliminating 
a large proportion of the intelligent and well-to-do residents of the 
community. This process of elimination is carried a step further 
through the practice of challenging jurors, either peremptorily or for 
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cause. Persons who have formed some opinion of the case through 
reading newspaper accounts of it are usually challenged, thus further 
eliminating the most intelligent class. In this connection it may be 
noted that the defendant is specially favored by the provision usually 
found whereby a greater number of challenges are allowed to the 
defense than to the prosecution. 
Not only the method of selecting the jury but also the mode of its 
operation after selection places obstacles in the way of the efficient 
administration of justice. It has frequently been noted that, in our 
state courts as compared with the English courts or even with the 
Federal courts, the powers and functions of the judge are of less im­
portance in determining the course of the trial. The judge should 
not be reduced to a mere figurehead, for presumably his greater ex­
perience and discrimination in weighing evidence than any jury 
possesses should qualify him to serve as a guide and mentor to the 
jury. The exercise of his normal powers to instruct the jury, to 
summarize and comment on the evidence and to direct the trial in 
general should be of great service to the jury in reaching a just 
verdict, and should remain unimpaired. In practice, however, these 
normal powers of the state judge are greatly restricted. The im­
potence of the judge is even further accentuated by the provision 
found in some half a dozen states, to the effect that juries shall be 
judges of the law as well as of the facts in criminal cases. In such 
cases, however, the power of the jury is in practice not always as 
great as this provision might seem to indicate, for it has been held 
that, under this provision of the criminal code, it is not improper for 
the court to tell the jury that "if they can say upon their oaths that 
they know the law better than the court itself, they have the right 
to do so"; but that "before saying this upon their oaths, it is their 
duty to reflect whether from their study and experience they are 
better qualified to judge of the law than the court." 
A relic of former times still embedded in the jury system is the 
rule requiring that the verdict be unanimous. This rule not infre­
quently causes a trial to miscarry through a failure of the jury to 
agree, and thus necessitates a new trial with the attendant expense 
and delay. Except, perhaps, in capital cases, there would seem to 
be no good reason why juries should not be allowed to reach verdicts 
by a majority of three-fourths vote, as is already allowed in some 
states. The unanimity rule makes it especially difficult to enforce 
the law in those portions of the state in which public sentiment is 
opposed to the enforcement of the law. This would doubtless also 
frequently be true so long as the jury system is retained, no matter 
what the vote required to reach a verdict. "A flagrant example of 
the 'lawlessness' of jurors in Illinois and of the impotency of judges 
under such a system to prevent outright nullification of the law was 
recently afforded in Chicago, where thirteen different juries, in the 
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face of incontrovertible evidence, refused to convict saloon-keepers for 
violating the Sunday closing law, thus presenting an example of a 
complete breakdown in the machinery of law enforcement." We 
thus have a system of "jury-made lawlessness, which recognizes rights 
that are forbidden by law and denies rights that are granted by law." 
In homicide cases many defendants are acquitted by the jury in the 
face of overwhelming evidence. It is well known that in lynching 
cases it is often practically impossible to secure convictions by juries. 
It is difficult in the first place to apprehend members of a lynching 
party, even though the affair be perpetrated in broad daylight by un­
masked men. Coroners' juries impaneled to hold an inquest over the 
bodies of persons lynched, frequently bring in a verdict that the 
deceased came to his death at the hands of persons unknown. Often 
this is the end of the matter, as in the celebrated Frank case in 
Georgia in 1915. But even if the persons who perpetrated the deed 
are known and can be apprehended, the attempt to try them by a 
jury of the vicinage is apt to be a farce. "The case of State v. 
Hughes, charged with participating in a lynching, came up in 
DeKalb County, Tennessee, in July, 1902, but it was found impossible 
to get a jury to try the case. The court exhausted a venire of three 
hundred and fifty, and found every man in the lot disqualified-prob­
ably having themselves aided in the affair." In 1912 a negro who 
had killed a special policeman was burned to death by a mob at 
Coatesville, Pennsylvania. Fourteen of the alleged lynchers were 
indicted, seven of them were tried, and the evidence against them 
appeared to be conclusive, but all seven were found not guilty by the 
jury, and the prosecuting attorney thereupon asked for the dismissal 
of the other seven cases. 
The inefficiency of the jury system is thus one of the most serious 
obstacles in the way of enforcement of state law. It is recognized by 
public prosecutors that their success in securing the enforcement of 
state laws that may be obnoxious to public sentiment in their local­
ities depends upon avoiding jury trials as far as possible. One great 
cause of the failure to enforce the laws against disorderly houses 
found on the statute books of nearly every state has been the necessity 
of depending for convictions upon incompetent and even perhaps cor­
rupt juries. In order to avoid this necessity, former Attorney-General 
Cosson of Iowa drew up and in 1909 secured the enactment by the 
legislature of that state of a law which has become known as the 
Iowa Injunction and Abatement Law, and has since been enacted in 
a number of states. This law avoids the necessity of a jury trial by 
substituting therefor the action of the equity branch of the courts. 
It virtually attempts to secure the enforcement of a criminal law by 
a civil action, permitting proceedings in equity in the name of the 
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state to abate as a nuisance a building used as a disorderly house, and 
has been upheld as constitutional.1 
The action to enjoin and abate the nuisance may be brought by the 
prosecuting attorney or by a citizen or taxpayer. It has already 
been considerably used, particularly in Iowa. Its effectiveness con­
sists principally in that, as an equity proceeding, the trial is before a 
judge instead of a jury, and in that either party has a right of appeal 
instead of the defendant alone, as in criminal cases. "The justifica­
tion," says ex-Attorney-General Cosson, "for doing away with the 
jury system in matters of this nature, and seeking the injunctive 
remedy, a proceeding in equity, is bottomed upon the fundamental 
fact that the state which passes the law inherently has and ought 
to have the power to enforce that law. The injunctive remedy gives 
to the state this right, and no other method has yet been devised 
which so effectively gives to the state this power to enforce its own 
statutes, and yet at the same time violates none of the fundamental 
rights of the defendant." 
INEFFICIENCY OF THE JURY 
(From Edit<n'ial.a of tke Momh, Houston, Texas, Jone, 1980, p. 262) 
Source of our trouble.-In the opinion of many Texas editors, our 
trial courts are not going to function properly-that is, as courts of 
justice-until our system of selecting jurors is changed. Judge C. A. 
Pippen, of Dallas, is quoted by several Texas newspapers as saying 
that "it is a curse in the administration of justice the way we get our 
jurors." 
Certain editors have heretofore been quoted as authority for the 
statement that an "intelligent" man can not qualify for jury duty. 
This time the full extent of the "travesty of jury selection" is pictured 
by the editor of the Wichita Times, who said: 
"During the examination of veniremen (in a case at Dallas), one of 
them was asked 'if he had any prejudice against the offense of mur­
der.' The individual who is without such prejudice is certainly unfit 
to be a juror. Yet to admit such prejudice would probably result in 
a challenge by the defense. That is a fair sample of the workings of 
the jury system.'' 
The hopelessness of the jury system is pointed out by the San 
Angelo Standard in this humorous quip: 
"Hanging is obsolete in Texas, but this does not apply to juries. 
They hang up about as often as murder cases come to trial, and there 
are half a dozen such cases in Texas this week." 
1See, for example, State v. Fanning, 47 N.W. 216; State v. Gilbert, 147 N.W. 968, 
relying on 121 Iowa 482, and 196 U.S. 279. 
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It would be amiss, however, to assume that editors hold juries re­
sponsible for all the miscarriages of justice. There are, for instance, 
certain inconsistencies in the law which demand correction. The 
Uvalde L eader calls attention to these defects in the statutes with a 
very pointed quotation: 
"If you shoot and kill a man in sudden anger the maximum penalty 
in Texas is five years-but if you MISS him you can be given fifteen 
years." 
Unless Texas lawmakers consider poor marksmanship a greater 
crime than murder, it is quite obvious that a revision of the state's 
criminal statutes would be very much in order. In this connection, 
it is interesting to note that a new criminal code will be offered Texas' 
next Legislature. Such a code, according to the Dallas News, will be 
available for consideration by the 42d Legislature. The News notes, 
further, that its favorable consideration is urged upon the new legis­
lature by judges, lawyers, and "the long suffering public." 
The influence upon young people is already apparent, according to 
the Albany News, which says: 
"Just a few years ago it was a very rare thing to see a boy or girl 
brought into court, and a very rare occurrence for a woman to be 
dragged into court. But today the court dockets are jammed with 
criminal cases...." 
So long as jurors are selected because they hold no intelligent 
opinions, and so long as judges are permitted to disregard their 
solemn responsibilities, conditions such as those painted by the Al­
bany N ews will prevail. That, in short, appears to be the consensus 
of newspaper opinion-that, and the fact it is high time something 
should be done about it. 
(From Editorials of the Mimth, Houston, Texas, June, 1930, 'P· 2691 
As might be expected, Sherman's resort to mob law again brought 
forth discussion of the causes which lie back of mob formations. 
Various shades of editorial opinion upon this subject were presented 
in the January number of Editorials of the Month (see pp. 15-16). 
The debate there presented was occasioned by the Eastland lynching. 
In the present case, the Wichita Falls Times places responsibility 
upon fear of legal delays in disposition of the prisoner's case, and 
makes an interesting comparison. Witness: 
"Lynch law is never justified. Sometimes, however, there is more 
apparent justification for it than at other times. At Eastland last 
winter, for instance, the victim was a man of whose guilt there was 
no doubt, but whose case had dragged interminably through the 
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courts, and who stood a fair chance of avoiding the just penalty. The 
public's patience had worn to the snapping point. 
"The situation at Sherman last Friday was quite different. The 
prisoner was being brought to trial in exceptionally quick time. There 
was no reason to doubt that justice would expeditiously be done. 
"And yet, in both the Eastland and the Sherman cases, there is 
something of the same feeling in the minds of those who formed the 
mobs. It was a feeling of disgust at, and distrust of, the law's 
devious ways. Lack of confidence in the courts was the motivating 
force, in each instance. At Eastland, that lack was due to what the 
mob had read and seen. At Sherman it was due to what the mob 
expected. 
"Probably we shall never again see such a frightful display of the 
mob spirit as was witnessed at Sherman, but that spirit will flare up 
again and again, as long as Texas courts are what they are." 
CRIMINAL LAW-WHAT'S WRONG WITH IT? 
BY CHARLES S. POTTS 
Dean of School of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas 
(From The Dalla.a Morning N ews Re-prints, No. 1 of a series of fifteen art.icles on 
Texas Criminal Procedure, published in the Dallas Morning News, 
Dec. 26, 1928-Jan. 9, 1929, p. 19.) 
As is often the case, however, the pendulum has swung too far. 
The courts have held, not only that the defendant can not be made 
to take the stand and testify, not only that no inference of guilt may 
be drawn from his failure to testify, but that it is reversible error for 
the judge, or the prosecutor, or even the jurors in their deliberations, 
to refer, either directly or indirectly, to the fact that the defendant 
had failed to take the stand in his own behalf. In one case our higher 
court held that it was reversible error for the prosecuting attorney 
in his closing argument to tell the jury that nobody had denied a 
certain line of testimony, because, said the court, such a statement 
would remind the jurors of the fact that the defendant had not taken 
the stand. 
Surely we have gone farther than is necessary to go in our attempt 
to protect the accused from self-incrimination. We are here trying 
to compel the jurors to do the impossible-not to give weight to the 
fact that the defendant, the one person who knows all about his con­
nection with the transaction, if any, sits silent throughout the trial. 
They may not be permitted to speak of the matter with fellow-jurors, 
but doubtless every intelligent man on the jury finds the question 
constantly shaping itself in his mind, "Why did he not testify?" 
On this point Arthur C. Train, author of "The Prisoner at the 
Bar," and himself an experienced lawyer, says: 
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"Three jurors out of five will convict any man who is unwilling to 
offer an explanation of the charge against him. How they reconcile 
this with their oath it would be hard to understand, if they were 
accustomed to obey it literally in other respects. The writer has heard 
more than one talesman say, in discussing a verdict, 'Of course, we 
couldn't take it against him, but we knew he was guilty because he 
was afraid to testify.' " 
TRIAL BY JURY: AN INEFFECTIVE SURVIVAL 
BY BRUCE G. SEBILLE 
(From The American Law Review, Vol. LIX. Jan.-Feb. 1925, pp. 67-73, Review 
Publishing Company, St. Louis, l\lo., 1925) 
NOTE: This article may be borrowed from the Extension Loan 
Library of The University of Texas. 
ABOLISH THE JURY 
BY J. C. McWHORTER 
(From The American Law Review, Vol. LVII, Jan.-Feb., 1923, pp. 46-47; 51-52; 
53-56. Review Publishing Company, St. Louis, lllo.) 
0
Also, see Reference Shelf, Vol. V, No. 6, "Jury System," p. 166, H. W. Wilson 
Company, New York. 
NOTE: The Reference Shelf is loaned to any member-school by the 
Extension Loan Library of The University of Texas. 
II. Necessity of Trial by Jury 
SHOULD TRIAL BY JURY BE ABOLISHED? 
BY HAL W. GREER, Beaumont, Texas 
(From The American Law Review, Vol. XLII, January-February, 1908, pp. 193-199, 
Review Publishing Company, St. Louis, Mo., 1908) 
.... trial by jury in England was not inaugurated for the purpose 
of changing, avoiding or detracting from the law justly and im­
partially administered, but for the purpose of preventing persecution, 
without law, by the sovereign, the peers, and the King's officers. It 
was intended as a relief against oppression, not as an excuse for 
actual crime; the outgrowth of lawful defense against the whims and 
animus of individuals, not as the license to emotional sympathy for 
a red-handed murderer, or a sneaking thief. The system of common 
law grew up in opposition to crown persecutions and tyrannies. At 
first a jury, as officers of the court, traveled with the judge to the 
various "assizes"-subsequently this was changed so as to select "a 
jury of the vicinage." 
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None of these reasons apply to this country, for there never has 
been during the life of the Republic, any sovereign or peer, or 
ruling class, having the desire to oppress individuals among the 
people, without law, and none with power to do so, if they have had 
the desire, because, at the expense of repetition, our law exactly 
defines every crime, and affixes its punishment. 
No necessity for a trial by jury, after our successful revolution 
against England, has ever existed because the reasons for devising, 
or calling the system into practice in that country, have never been 
experienced. England has undergone evolution from an absolute 
monarchy to comparative freedom for its people by gradual processes 
never experienced by us. 
It must be remembered that our forefathers, who framed our 
Constitution had just thrown off the yoke of a King, with the ex­
perienci> and memory of his persecutions fresh upon them, and that 
jury trials were the bulwarks against such persecutions. It must be 
remembered also, that the lawyers who assisted in framing the Con­
stitution, were all students under the English law, having its first 
impressions fa,;tened in their minds. It should be further borne in 
mind, that their new Republic was to them an experiment, which they 
were by no means sure would last; and they could not foresee that the 
people would grow into the characteristics which would never permit 
a bold, adventurous tyrant to use the presidency as a stepping stone 
to monarchy. 
For all these reasons, and many others not necessary to state, they 
incorporated out of superabundant caution, the right of trial by jury 
into the organic law, little dreaming that thereby they were permit­
ting the driving of the entering wedge that would confuse, weaken, 
and ultimately destroy the law itself. 
While a jury trial at law in the Circuit Courts of the United States 
is a right per se, and can only be waived by both parties in writing, 
and while in criminal cases in the United States District Courts, the 
verdict of the jury is conclusive, if the defendant is acquitted; yet 
the judges thoroughly dominate and control them, and the juries are 
more careful, perhaps more conscientious, in applying and preserving 
the law, than in state courts where they have greater latitude and 
are supremely independent in applying their inaccurate understand­
ing of the law to the facts. 
Thirty-five years' practice at the bar convinces me that juries are 
slowly, but surely, losing respect for state courts, as well as the law, 
and are becoming more and more aggressive in placing their own 
interpretation on the law, and less and less attentive to the rulings 
of the Court, as well as the charge of the trial judge, defining the law 
of the case. 
The extreme deference shown them by the judge and subordinate 
officers of the court; the constant effort to consult their wishes, 
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comfort and convenience; the great adulation and flattery shown 
them by shrewd attorneys; these and innumerable other court inci­
dents tend to create in their minds an exaggerated self-importance, 
and a corresponding loss of respect for the trial judge, the officers of 
court, and the attorneys before them. Many lawyers, in rural dis­
tricts, will recall having heard trial judges sometimes submit to a 
vote of the jury the adjourning of court for the day, and the like, 
making his judicial dignity appear ridiculous, though greatly enhanc­
ing his popularity for another election. 
Of course it is their right to be treated with the kindly courtesy 
always due from man to man; but not with sycophantic flattery and 
adulation-that is never due any man or set of men, and always 
works harmfully when practiced; and certainly every judge should 
honorably, justly, fairly, and masterfully preside over his court and 
its proceedings, to uphold respect for the law epitomized in his 
person. 
With this prelude, I state my objections to trial by jury as follows: 
In criminal cases.-First. They do not apply the exact definitions 
of crimes given in charge by the court because: (1 ) they do not 
understand them, for it requires a student of the law itself to do so; 
(2) they do not care to understand them, because the conduct of the 
trial convinces them they are supreme, and have the right to consult 
their own whims, instead of such definitions. 
Second. They read into the law their own emotions, sympathies 
and feelings, giving it: (1) their own interpretation, which will 
"neither excuse nor justify" the crime from a legal point of view; 
(2) "putting themselves in the place of the defendant," a position 
never contemplated by either the law or good morals. 
Third. Sometimes (though this is extraordinarily seldom) they 
are corrupted either through fear, or worse motives, and return a 
verdict in defiance of the law. 
Fourth. Their verdicts are often rendered upon prejudice, though 
they may not be conscious of it at the time; for instance, the "reason­
able doubt" is nearly always disregarded where a tramp or pauper is 
defendant, and they put on him the burden of proving his innocence; 
whereas as against a well-to-do citizen, tried on practically the same 
charge, the "reasonable doubt" is stretched into most unreasonable 
excuses for acquittal. 
Fifth. The method of selecting a jury in criminal cases, particu­
larly those punishable with death, is childish and puerile; for the 
corrupt juror, or one who can be or has already been "influenced" 
improperly, will answer all questions qualifying himself, as he has 
no conscience to stultify; whereas the conscientious juror is sure to 
be inveigled into admitting he "has formed or expressed an opinion," 
or "is biased or prejudiced in favor of or against the defendant," or 
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the like. Now a man who is truthful and honorable enough to admit 
that he has formed or expressed an opinion (unless he is doing so 
falsely to escape unpleasant jury service), or has a prejudice in the 
matter, will most probably be conscientious in observing his oath "to 
try the case according to the evidence submitted under the rulings of 
the court, and the law as given in charge by the court," and no more 
reason can be had for rejecting him on such grounds than for reject­
ing the nisi prius judge, or the judges of appellate courts, who have 
read accounts of the crime in the newspapers. 
Sixth. The whole effort of the defendant's counsel is to keep his 
client from being tried by men known to be in favor of enforcing the 
law, and who cannot be appealed to, t~ violate their oaths and try the 
case upon emotions, feelings or sentiments the law does not recognize. 
Seventh. The law itself is conscious of the fact that jurors can 
be improperly "influenced," in that in felony cases, they are prac­
tically held under arrest during the trial, and not allowed to go to 
their homes or otherwise pursue their normal habits. Imagine a con­
scientious, honest man thus held under surveillance in durance vile! 
Imagine the trial judge so held! 
Eighth. The defendant's attorneys will make statements and argu­
ments ( ?) appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jurors to 
directly violate their oaths and acquit the defendant, which they 
would not dare to make to the trial judge. E.g. Mr. Clarence Dar­
row's speech in defence of Haywood : "To hell with the Constitution 
and statute law," etc., as standing in the way of the laboring man's 
supposed rights. No doubt his speech was widely read by members 
of labor organizations, and created in their minds the belief that such 
organizations were justified in committing murder or any other 
crime to protect and foster their unions. 
Ninth. As the law applied to crime is an exact science intended 
to prevent crime by fairly, justly and reasonably punishing those 
guilty of its infraction, there can be no reason for a jury on the 
theory that they will be more merciful than judges learned in the law 
and capable of deliberately and judiciously analyzing, weighing and 
applying all the facts. 
Knowing they will be tried, not under the law and facts, but upon 
the emotions and sympathies of the jury, which the law itself would 
not permit, murderers and perpetrators of other crimes are encour­
aged and the spirit of anarchy is inculcated. Imagine those guilty of 
violence, intimidation, and destruction of property during "strikes," 
being tried according to the letter and spirit of the law. 
Tenth. But the strongest reason against the system lies in the 
fact that instead of every offence being accurately defined and pun­
ished, juries are continually adding to the definitions and destroying 
the certainty of punishment. The eloquent attorney who proclaims 
that "there is a higher law" is but inviting the jury to do something 
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which the judge rarely ever does-violate their oaths of office. What 
a rich harvest of criticism Mr. Delmas reaped by attempting to read 
into the law a new excuse for crime with his "Dementia-Americana"! 
But he was frankly stating the reason for retaining the jury-to 
avoid punishment for a crime clearly proven under the exact defini­
tion of the law. If it were known to be a fact that every crime would 
be punished according to its definition, there can be no doubt of the 
salutary effect. It is the uncertainty of a jury verdict that breeds 
criminal desire and anarchy. 
In civil cases.-Juries are taken in civil cases to avoid the law. 
This may appear dogmatic, but it is believed the assertion can be 
maintained. "Personal injury" damage suits against railroads and 
other employers of labor in dangerous occupations afford the most 
striking illustration. They are told that the injured party "assumed 
the ordinary risks, incident to the employment," that "the negligent 
acts of the employer must have been the proximate cause of the 
injury," that "the defendant is not the insurer of its employees," etc. 
But scarcely a verdict is reached except upon the general reasoning 
to the effect: "O, well, this man was hurt in the employ of the com­
pany; he can't afford to lose the money and the company can; if we 
are wrong the upper courts will set us right," etc., and thereupon a 
substantial verdict is rendered against the defendant. Not a definition 
of the carefully prepared charge of the court is considered, even if 
understood, and jury sympathy supplants the law. Appellate courts 
complacently hold themselves "bound by the facts thus found by the 
jury, though we might have found differently if left to us alone," 
and the law goes on changing from system to doubt, and from doubt 
to hopeless confusion, and from hopeless confusion to conscienceless 
anarchy. 
Solemn contracts in writing have engrafted upon them parol condi­
tions destroying their intent and purpose. 
Public conscience is stultified, if not destroyed, and the law is 
sneered at and reviled. The average jury inversely reflects the same 
motives, when its passions and prejudices are appealed to, that actu­
ate the bloodthirsty mob, and calm judicial application of the law is 
lost in the maze of frenzied oratory. 
The jury system is destroying the law, and slowly but surely 
bringing on the bloodiest revolution known to history. Through it 
life, liberty and property are becoming more and more insecure as 
the days pass. 
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PETTY JURY 
BY W. F. WILLOUGHBY 
(From PrincipUis of Judicial Administration, pp. 497-511) 
A calm weighing of the advantages of the jury system in civil 
cases, supported by the experience of other countries, must lead to 
the conclusion that the use of a jury in this class of cases, if not en­
tirely done away with, should at least be narrowly restricted to the 
relatively few classes of cases where it can be advantageously 
employed. 
In point of fact, little attempt is made at the present time to justify 
the use of the jury system in civil cases upon its intrinsic merits as 
a piece of judicial machinery. Its defenders do little more than hark 
back to the services that it has rendered in the past as a protector 
of the liberties of the people against arbitrary rulers and as a human­
izer of a barbarously severe penal code, ignoring the fact that, with 
the rii!le of popular government, the establishment of constitutional 
guarantees, the securing of an independent judiciary, and the human­
ization of the penal law, the need for a special institution to render 
these services, has completely passed away. Typical of the arguments 
brought forward in support of the jury system is that of Joseph H. 
Choate, in his address before the American Bar Association in 1898, 
which was devoted almost wholly to the defense of that system. In 
this address he said: 
"The truth is, however, that the jury sys£em is so fixed as an 
essential part of our political institutions; it has proved itself to be 
such an invaluable security for the enjoyment of life, liberty, and 
property for so many centuries; it is so justly appreciated as the best 
and perhaps the only known means of admitting the people to a share, 
and maintaining their wholesome interest in the administration of 
justice; it is such an indispensable factor in educating them in their 
personal and civil rights; it affords such a school and training in the 
law to the profession itself; and is so embedded in our constitutions, 
which, as I have said, declare that it shall remain forever inviolate, 
requiring a convention or an amendment to alter it-that there can 
be no substantial ground for fear that any of us will live to see the 
people consent to give it up." 
The foregoing argument is one that should be carefully examined 
by anyone who believes that the time has come to abandon the petty 
jury, or at least so to modify it as to make it into a radically different 
institution. 
In the first place, it should be noted that this statement evidently 
emanates from one who carries his appreciation of our political in­
stitutions, not only as a whole, but as regards specific details, to the 
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point of veneration. It represents the position of one who apparently 
believes that American political institutions, taken as a whole and in 
respect to details, are superior to those of any other country and that 
the action of our political predecessors, though taken it may be hun­
dreds of years ago, when conditions and problems to be met were 
radically different, cannot be improved upon. If the same line of 
argument were advanced in respect to all proposals to change our 
political institutions and practices, it would mean that it is possible 
to devise political institutions and practices that are good for all time, 
regardless of change in conditions and ideals; that there is no such 
thing as political progress; and that our constitutions and funda­
mental laws are straight jackets that should yield to no efforts for 
improvement. 
It would hardly seem to be necessary to point out the error of this 
position. Politics is a science dealing with dynamic, not static con­
ditions. An institution or custom may well have been admirably 
devised to meet conditions existing at the time of its establishment 
and yet wholly fail to correspond to changed conditions. Though ad­
mitting that age or long established use is a strong a priori argument, 
and that the burden of proof rests upon the one who is advocating 
change, it by no means follows that the making of change is not often 
advisable. At all times and in respect to all political institutions, the 
maintenance of things as they are should be justified by their actual 
results under existing conditions. If this position is taken, it can 
be shown how little is the validity of the several arguments incor­
porated in the statement just quoted. 
The first is that the jury system is "so fixed as an essential part 
of our political institutions" that no change should be made in it. 
This argument is merely of a priori validity. It can be rebutted by 
showing, as can be shown, that the institution in its present form, 
no matter what its original merits, no longer gives satisfactory re­
sults in practice; and that other countries secure the same ends 
without its use and through institutions and practices presenting none 
of the evils admitted to characterize the use of the jury in the United 
States. Probably the strongest evidence against the retention of the 
jury simply because it is an old institution is to be found in the fact 
than in its home, England, its use has been greatly curtailed and, 
when employed, is operated under rules quite different from those 
now obtaining in the United States. The evidence is overwhelming 
that this change in England in respect to the use of the jury has 
represented an improvement in the administration of justice in that 
country. The bench, the bar, and the general public are united in 
sustaining this position. 
The second claim by the author of the quotation was that "it 
has proved itself to be such an invaluable security for the enjoy­
ment of life, liberty and property for so many centuries" that its 
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abolition should not for a moment be entertained. No one can ques­
tion this statement as it relates to past times. Since then, the whole 
problem of securing individual liberties has undergone a revolution. 
The English-speaking peoples now live under a government of their 
own and supreme power is in their own hands. The government 
from a position of supremacy has been reduced to that of an agent, 
and means have been provided whereby this agent may be rigidly 
controlled. Especially is this so in the United States where the most 
severe limitations have been placed by constitutional provisions upon 
the power of the government, whether acting through the executive 
or through the legislative branch to do violence to the life, liberty 
and property of the individual. The need for the jury as an institu­
tion from this standpoint has passed away. Other and more effective 
means have been devised which renders its continuance on this ground 
no longer necessary. 
The third statement is that the jury should be retained, since it is 
"so justly appreciated as the best and perhaps the only known means 
of admitting the people to a share and maintaining their wholesome 
interest in the administration of justice." This argument is almost 
wholly a sentimental one. It represents the principle of democracy 
as opposed to that of representative government. If it has validity 
here, it calls for the support of all proposals for the direct participa­
tion of citizens in governments; the initiative, the referendum, and 
the recall. The same argument has been advanced in favor of the 
election by the people of almost all officers of the government, even 
the more petty officers, and even in favor of the spoils system, since 
under that system so many persons have a direct interest in securing 
the victory of the party to which they belong. The interest of the 
people in the administration of justice is precisely that of the ad­
ministration of all other branches of the government; having a proper 
conduct of affairs. It is no more necessary that this interest should 
be stimulated by direct participation in the work to be done than it is 
in the case of other fields of governmental operations. In point of fact, 
this participation is had only by a small proportion of the population; 
it is resented rather than sought, and the nature of participation is 
for the most part not of a character greatly to increase respect for 
the manner in which justice is administered. 
Fourthly, the statement is made that the jury system is "an in­
dispensable factor in educating them (the people) in their personal 
and civil rights." It may be that the jurors do receive a certain 
amount of education through service on a jury. The jury system, 
however, can scarcely be defended from this standpoint. The inter­
est at stake is not that of the jurors but of the parties to the liti­
gation. It hardly seems reasonable to retain an institution that 
admittedly has evils and often results in miscarriages of justice on 
73 Trial by Jury 
the ground that it is a means of education to the persons operating 
the institution. 
Finally, the claim is made that the jury is a desirable instftution, 
since it affords "such a school and training in the law to the pro­
fession itself." Here again, the interests of those participating in the 
operation of the institution is considered rather than those of the 
parties for whose benefit it is supposed to exist. It is admitted that 
the use of the jury greatly complicates the procern of administering 
justice; that it is responsible for many of the techni~alities of pro­
cedure; that to it is due the highly technical rules of evidence; and 
that it is a fertile source of appeals. With Blackstone, Mr. Choate 
apparently saw in these technicalities and refinements of judicial 
procedure a merit rather than a defect; that it is advantageous to 
have them, as they make more subtle the practice of the law and thus 
make the game more of an intellectual feat on the part of counsel. 
The extent to which Mr. Choate emphasized this factor as a super­
merit of the jury system would be ludicrous were the issue not so 
important. In other parts of his address he said: 
"Let me say what I understand by a jury trial; that picturesque, 
dramatic and very human transaction, that arena on which has been 
fought the great battle of liberty against tyranny, of right against 
wrong, of suitor against suitor, that school which has always been 
open for the instruction and entertainment of the common people of 
England and America, that nursery, that common school of lawyers 
and judges, which has had five times more pupils than all the law 
schools and Inns of Courts combined-for there are ninety thousand 
lawyers in America of whom four-fifths probably never saw the inside 
of a law school. 
"It alone atones for and mitigates all the drudgery and painful 
labor of the rest of our professional work. Here alone we feel 
the real joy of the contest, that gadium certainminis which is the 
true inspiration of advocacy. Here alone arise those sudden and un­
expected conflicts of reason, of wit, of nerve, with our adversaries, 
with the judge, with the witnesses; those constant surprises equal to 
the most startling in comedy or tragedy. Here alone is our one 
entertainment in the confinement for life to hard labor to which our 
choice of profession has sentenced us, and here alone do the people 
enter into our labors and lend their countenance to our struggles and 
triumphs. Sorry indeed for our profession will be the day when this 
best and brightest and most delightful function, which calls into 
play the highest qualities of heart, of intellect, of will and of courage, 
shall cease to excite and to feed our ambition, our sympathy and our 
loyalty." 
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Not a word here of the interests of the parties to litigation. The 
jury is to be commended because it offers the setting of a great con­
test between counsel to be played before a gallery. It is as if hos­
pitals were to be commended because of the opportunities they afford 
to practitioners and not because of the patients who are to be cared 
for. 
Space has been devoted to this statement of Mr. Choate because it 
represents to so great an extent the character of the arguments gen­
erally brought forward against the abolition of the jury or even its 
modification in any essential respect. Nowhere has the author been 
able to find any really able argument in favor of the jury system in 
its present form based squarely upon the practical results in opera­
tion. It is, as has been stated, admitted that the burden of proof 
falls upon those advocating the abolition or modification of this sys­
tem. This burden, it is submitted, has been met by the marshalling of a 
great body of facts showing the extent to which the system compli­
cates and renders expensive the administration of justice, entails 
delay and trouble to all concerned, and too often results in positive 
miscarriages of justice. This done, it is incumbent upon the de­
fenders of the system to meet these facts with other than a mere 
appeal to the veneration that attaches to a long established institu­
tion and to the educational value that it may have from the stand­
point of the participating jurors and counsel. 
Retention or abolition of the petty jury in criminal cases.-Though 
many of the objections that can be urged against the use of the jury 
system in civil suits apply to its use in criminal cases, the argument 
against its abolition in the latter class of cases is much stronger. 
The power to deprive a man of life or liberty is such a serious matter 
that its exercise cannot be too carefully safeguarded. If the vesting 
of this power in the hands of a single judge, even with the right of 
appeal, presents an element of danger, and the requirement that 
guilt shall be established in the minds of twelve men is believed to be 
not an excess of caution, then the retention of the jury may be justi­
fied. The problem of its abolition is one, not of doing away with it 
entirely, but of determining whether its use should not be restricted. 
At the present time petty cases below the grade of felony are in 
great part tried without a jury. It is believed that this practice can 
be greatly extended with safety, with the result that the right to a 
trial by jury will exist only in certain specified cases where the 
punishment is that of death or imprisonment for a specified term of 
years. Certainly provision should be made whereby the accused, if 
he desires, may waive the right to a jury trial and elects to be tried 
by the judge alone. It is a common thing in municipal and police 
magistrate courts to try cases without a jury unless a jury trial is 
demanded by the accused. In criminal cases, the use of a jury is 
required by practically all of the states in felony cases. Maryland 
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and Connecticut are probably the only states where the accu11ed is 
permitted to waive the use of a jury in this class of cases. In both 
of these states this right of waiver is large! yavailed of, and the 
results have apparently been wholly satisfactory. In 1924 ninety 
per cent of all cases tried in the criminal courts of Baltimore were 
tried before a judge. In Connecticut the system was established in 
1921. Four years later a questionnaire was sent to judges, prose­
cutors, public defenders, and a considerable number of attorneys to 
elicit their opinions regarding its workings. The response was an 
almost unanimous endorsement of the system. 
The Missouri Crime Survey, the Michigan Commission of Enquiry 
into Criminal Procedure, the California Commission for Reform of 
Criminal Procedure, the Massachusetts Judicial Council, and the 
Committee of the National Crime Commission all recommended that 
the waiver of the use of a jury be permitted either in all but capital 
cases, or in all cases. 
Unanimity requirement.-If it is diffiult to defend the requirement 
that a jury shall be composed of so large a number of members as 
twelve, it is still more difficult to justify the requirement that these 
members shall reach a unanimity of opinion in order to render a 
verdict. This point is thus stated by Professor James W. Garner: 
"The weakest point in our jury system is the rule requiring unan­
imous verdicts to convict. Although time-honored, there have al­
ways been some to see the absurdity of the rule. Hallam in his 
"Middle Ages" called it a "preposterous relic of barbarism"; Jeremy 
Bentham and Francis Lieber inveighed against it and Judge Cooley 
in his edition of Blackstone declared that the rule was "repugnant to 
all experience of human conduct, passions and understandings" and 
asserted that "it could hardly in any age have been introduced into 
practice by a deliberate act of the legislature." Justices Miller and 
Brown of the United States Supreme Court and ex-Judge William 
H. Taft are all on record as favoring a modification of the rule. Jus­
tice Ingraham of the New York Supreme Court has suggested the 
possibility of adopting a rule making a verdict by three-fourths of 
the jury sufficient to convict, subject to the approval of the presiding 
judge. 
"Nowhere on the continent of Europe does the unanimity require­
ment prevail. In Germany, Austria, and Portugal a verdict may be 
returned by two-thirds of the jury; in France and Italy by a bare 
majority, and in the Nederlands, where crime is almost non-existant, 
trial by jury does not prevail at all. In Scotland curiously enough 
a unanimous verdict is required to convict in civil cases while a 
two-thirds verdict suffices in criminal cases. In England, the una­
nimity rule still prevails but juries are never empowered, except in 
libel cases, to pass on questions of law, and in determing questions of 
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fact they are so much under the control of the court that many of 
the abuses which result from jury trials in the United States are 
avoided. 
"The theory upon which the unanimity rule rests is that twelve 
men may be found who will take the same view of a disputed fact, 
that the balance of each juror's mind can be struck in the same 
direction, that all are able to feel the same cogency of proof and that 
no one can be drawn to a conclusion different from that to which his 
fellows have arrived. It is needless to say that such conditions are 
rarely present in the minds of twelve men picked up at random from 
the community. The result is that in many cases a unanimity is 
apparent and not real. Everyone is familiar with cases in which a 
single juror has set at naught the opinions of eleven-has by sheer 
obstinacy and power of physical endurance compelled his associates 
to return verdicts which did not represent their real convictions or 
driven them to disagreements, in either case defeating justice. 
"The unanimity rule gives too much power to one man. It virtually 
places the protection of the community in the hands of a single 
individual who is often selected without regard to mental or moral 
qualification." 
III. A Substitute for Trial by Jury 
A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE JURY SYSTEM* 
BY ED. L. GOSSETT, JR.** 
The writer submits that the jury system should be abolished. In 
its place we would set up a trial court composed of three judges to 
whom would be submitted the facts as well as the law of each case. 
A majority of the court could decide any case. A record of the evi­
dence would be carefully kept by a court reporter as at the present 
time and rights of review and appeal would be in nowise impaired. 
Such rights would be rendered simpler and more effective because 
the trial judges would be required in each case to state the reasons 
for their conclusions and to file their findings of fact. 
The r easons for a jury system no longer exist. The jury originated 
as a protection for the people from the tyranny of monarchs in those 
days when judges were the agents of absolute sovereigns. In a 
democracy the people rule and do not need this sort of protection 
against themselves. In a democracy the jury system has little or 
no place unless we presuppose inability and corruption on the part 
of the trial judges; and unless we at the same time presuppose an 
•This article was especially prepared for the Bulletin. 
••Former debater of The University of Texas and now a practicing attorney at 
Vernon. Texas. 
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absence of these things in jurors. Our sentimental eulogies to the 
jury system proclaim it to be the bulwark of our liberties and the 
safeguard of our lives and property. A careful study of it will 
reveal that the jury system more often endangers our liberties and 
is a hazard to our lives and our property. 
Our methods of selecting a jury tend to choose men who have 
heard nothing of the case, know nothing of its history, have never 
had any experience with similar facts or issues, and whose minds are 
as nearly blank on the particular subject as possible. The theory 
here is that the entire proceedings shall be to the jury one of first 
impression. The resulting evils are too numerous for elaboration. 
We are familiar with the enormous expense attached to the trial of 
capital offenses where frequently hundreds of men are summonsed on 
special venires and a week or longer is consumed in selecting a jury 
that perhaps cannot agree after its selection. Often a small civil 
suit will occasion unreasonable expense. It will not only consume 
the time of the court but jurors will suffer personal and business 
losses in discharging this duty of citizenship. It is not uncommon 
for the jurors to suffer a greater personal loss than is realized by 
either of the parties to the litigation. Again the jury system is too 
often made a vehicle for the lawyer who hasn't any case. In seven­
eights of the cases where the selection of a jury is optional with 
counsel one finds the party having the weakest case taking the jury. 
The reason is obvious. In many cases the only strategy left to the 
hard pressed counsel is to so muddy the waters that he may come out 
of the trial with some advantage to which he is not entitled. One 
often finds a defence attorney (however reprehensible the practice 
may be) resorting to the expedient of confusing the minds of the jury 
in such a manner that no verdict can be reached for the state or for 
the plaintiff that is entitled to the relief sought. Particularly in the 
small town jury we have the additional problem of securing a jury 
who will not decide the case on the basis of their admiration or dislike 
for the respective attorneys with whom they are acquainted. Even 
the most scrupulously honest juror is often subconsciously influenced 
by these irrelevant factors. All of these things would be less ob­
jectionable and would be minimized in the proposed tribunal of three 
judges. While we seek in the jury the benefit of twelve minds we 
in fact often get the benefit of only one or two. The jury is too often 
a jury of one man, he being some strong, dominant personality who 
controls the rest. In practically every case where juries are to be 
selected some lawyer may be heard to say to his associate counsel "if 
we take that man he will be the jury." Then there's the common a nd 
shameful spectacle of the "sinker" on the jury. He is the man who 
may be accidentally or purposely placed there and who is going to 
decide the case in favor of his friends, regardless of the merits, or 
else hang the jury. The writer has in mind a famous murder trial 
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handled by a friend. The murder was a repulsive, inexcusable affair. 
The defendant was an old resident who knew all prospective jurors. 
When the jury was empanneled the defendant's attorney knew that 
he had won his case and that his client would never be convicted. 
Such a thing could not possibly occur with such frequency were cases 
tried as proposed before a trial court of three judges. The trial of a 
complicated civil suit will often require days and days of tedious trial 
work on the part of court and counsel. On the completion of such 
a trial it often becomes necessary to submit to the jury from twenty­
five to fifty special issue11 or questions that must be answered before 
the case can be disposed. The jury has probably forgotten much of 
the tiresome evidence. The issues are often so intricate and involved 
that even the lawyers themselves would experience great difficulty 
in ·working them out. It would he much better to permit three skilled 
judges to take such evidence and such issues into some inner chamber 
and there work them out with methodical and painstaking accuracy. 
The miscarriage and paralysis of justice would then be reduced to a 
minimum. 
But when one attacks the jury system one at once hears the old 
battle cry of democracy. A pure democracy of course would be that 
state of society in which no governmental restraint of any kind was 
placed on the action of the individual; that such a condition would 
result in chaos is readily apparent. Merely to cry democracy is not 
to offer an argument. In terms of efficiency most every phase of our 
social order has outstripped that of government. We must think of 
our judiciary in terms of protection, in terms o.f securing the desired 
results, and then let it stand or fall by that standard. If a trial court 
of three judges would be more serviceable to our jurisprudence in its 
service to an enlightened and progressive social order, then why 
bury our heads in the sand and cry democracy. We believe in placing 
experts with trained minds in control of most of our social and eco­
nomic institutions, then why should we turn over to non-experts with 
untrained minds one of the most important departments of our ju­
diciary. If we have experts to determine the law why not have 
experts to determine the facts. The facts are often more difficult of 
accurate determination than is the law. If we demand an expert 
judge why not demand an expert juror We do not distrust our 
judges in the important domain of the law, why should we distrust 
them in the important domain of the facts, certainly integrity is not 
r elated to ability in the inverse ratio. 
A trial court of three judges would have many advantages over 
the present jury system. The judge is a man whose mind is trained 
to weigh evidence who understands its purposes and admissibility, he 
is skilled in the detection of falsehood, and he is not so likely as is 
the juror to be influenced by passion or prejudice. In submitting 
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the facts to the judges we would avoid confusing the minds of even 
honest and intelligent voters with a mass of technical issues and 
complicated facts with which they are unable to cope. Would the 
judges or the jury more likely arrive at a correct finding of facts? 
To ask the question is to answer it. The juror cannot be expected to 
properly weigh ev'idence; at best he is often mislead by some irrele­
vant or prejudicial factor in the case that would not trouble the 
trained trial judge. Again we are less likely to have "sinkers" on 
the bench than on the jury. Since time immemorial judges have 
been particularly distinguished for courage and integrity. They have 
prided themselves in a high sen:;e of honor and have guarded zeal­
ously the sacred trust imposed upon them. It would be very im­
probable that corruption or dishonesty would ever control the decision 
of more than one member of the proposed tribunal. It would be very 
improbable that corruption or dishonesty would often control the 
decision of even one member of the court. If that should happen 
occasionally no especial harm would result since the court's decision 
would be controlled by a majority vote. That contingency would be 
rendered further improbable, however, because the proposed system 
would hold out to the judge who would betray his trust the certainty 
of dishonor, disbarment, and imprisonment. 
We submit that the miscarriages of justice under the proposed 
system would be many times less than under the jury system. We 
submit that the expenses of operation would be greatly reduced, that 
efficiency would be promoted, that a vastly greater respect for law 
would be developed, and that an increased wholesomeness throughout 
our entire social order would result. 
THE AMERICAN JUDGE AND THE AMERICAN JURY* 
BY JOHN ALTON BURDINEt 
The exalted position of the trial jury and the corresponding impo­
tence of the judge are outstanding features of American judicial ad­
ministration which today are subject to the trenchant criticism of 
observers, both foreign and American. Under our federal system of 
government the administration of ordinary civil and criminal law 
falls within the province of the states, and, consequently, a proper 
appraisal of our system of administering justice must be confined 
largely to an analysis of the work of the state courts. Although 
there are considerable variations as to detail in the structure and 
functioning of the court systems in forty-eight separate jurisdictions, 
one is struck by the uniform adherence that is given to certain "fun­
damental" principles of court organization and procedure. The one 
•This article was especially prepared for the Bulletin. 
tMember of the Department of Government Faculty, The University of Texas. 
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characteristic that is most striking is the relative position of judge 
and jury in the trial of civil and criminal cases. 
The present features of our state judicial systems find their roots 
deeply imbedded in the past. The history of the states for seventy­
five years following the Revolution shows the influences that set the 
moulds for our modern judicial administration. Distrust of the co­
lonial judge, an appointee of the English crown, and the individualism 
and fear of concentrated power generated by the frontier and repre­
sented in the great "democratic" movement of the nineteenth century, 
combined to make the judge even more powerless than his common­
law prototype. The democratization of the administration of justice, 
as Professor Holcombe clearly demonstrates (State Government in 
the United States, Rev. Ed. 1926, p. 426), which was inevitable under 
frontier conditions of a century ago, t ended to exalt the jury at the 
expense of the judge. The jury became the pivot in the judicial 
process, for it represented another democratic check upon govern­
mental power. The historical pattern then cut to fit frontier life has 
been twisted to the utmost to meet the needs of a metropolitan age, 
and in most respects it has miserably failed to effect its purpose. 
The chief reason for this failure is the fact that in the trial of cases 
the judge is legally a mere umpire, the jury sits upon the throne of 
power, and the lawyer is the main performer in, what one has called, 
"the free show at the courthouse." 
Trial by jury has been used far more in the United States than in 
any other country in the world. The constitution of every state 
guarantees the right to trial by jury in criminal cases; and in civil 
cases this right is guaranteed by the constitutions in all states except 
two. In civil cases a few states permit waiver of jury trial, and in 
nineteen states a less than unanimous verdict is expressly provided 
for or permitted in courts of record. In criminal cases a unanimous 
verdict of a jury of twelve is required by all states in capital offenses, 
and in felonies in all states except Louisiana. A few states now 
permit waiver of jury trial in criminal cases, but usually only in 
misdemeanors. 
Not only is the jury used extensively in the trial of cases, but upon 
this venerable institution is bestowed considerable power. Although 
the theory behind the operation of the jury is that it shall be the 
judge of the facts only, in some jurisdictions it is judge of both the 
law and the facts. To the jury is submitted the whole case for a 
general verdict one way or another. Furthermore, in a majority of 
the states, the judge is not permitted to analyze or to comment upon 
the testimony presented, or the credibility of the witnesses. Conse­
quently, in the words of one authority, "the judge has largely been 
reduced to a mere presiding officer in most of the states. The judge 
as the permanent technically-trained agency in the administration of 
justice is subordinated to the temporary non-technical agency, the 
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jury.... In most states the lawyers, and not the judge, primarily 
determine who shall sit on the jury. Judge and jury are the audience. 
The lawyer's primary interest is in victory for his client. The trial 
is too often a game of skill or of chance." (W. F. Dodd, State Govern­
ment, 2d Ed., 1928, p. 297.) In marked contrast to this situation is 
that in England where "the central figure of a jury trial is and 
always has been not the jury, but the judge. It is felt that the judges 
represent His Majesty, the King himself. They are his officers; they 
are there for life. They come into the King's own court of justice 
carefully garbed for their royal role. It is not the judge but His 
Majesty who speaks. Consequently, every syllable uttered by the 
judge has weight and dignity. He not only rules the court and lays 
down the law, but he discusses the facts in detail. He tells the jury 
how he would decide the facts and how they ought to decide them. 
He often makes clear his views on the case, and his advice, with its 
royal warrant, has a powerful effect on the minds of the loyal men 
who compose the jury. To be sure, the jury has the power to dis­
regard him, and sometimes it actually does. But not often. As a 
rule the English jury does as it is told." (Robert H. Elder, "Trial by 
Jury: Is It Passing?" Harper's Monthly Magazine, April, 1928, re­
printed in The American Law School Review, May, 1928, p. 298.) 
Since our modern system of judicial organization and procedure is 
largely based upon frontier ideas of a century ago, it is but natural 
that in the complex society of today the process of administering 
justice is defective and needs to be overhauled. It is probable that 
a majority of the observers of our judicial process would demand 
only that in readjusting the relationship between judge and jury the 
judge should be given the greater power without effecting a total 
abolition of the jury. Some may go so far as to suggest the abolition 
of the jury in civil cases, but few would contend that in criminal 
cases it should be done away with entirely. However, due to the 
demands of our present society, much can be said for the total aboli­
tion of the jury, which has, in the minds of a few, become a worthless 
and obstructionist institution, and substituting therefor a single 
judge, or preferably a bench of judges. More weight can be added 
to this contention if a process of selection, other than popular election, 
were adopted which would reasonably insure that a judge would be 
competent and well-trained in the law. 
This argument presupposes that the jury now serves no useful 
purpose. To make such a statement relative to such a time-honored 
institution is to invite caustic criticism from a great majority of 
people; yet from an analysis of the work of the jury it is not im­
possible to demonstrate that this step in the judicial process is more 
futile than useful, more expensive than its service warrants. Further­
more, experience has proved in many forms of adjudication, such as 
equity, workmen's compensation acts, small claims courts, and the 
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like, that a judge, or a number of judges, will often render justice 
more effectively and more conformably to that ideal justice which, in 
the language of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, allows one 
"to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged to pur­
chase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without 
delay; conformably to the laws." 
In the trial of both civil and criminal cases, the jury is now under 
serious indictment. The method of selection at present employed 
insures that "when the jury is finally drawn, it will probably be 
composed of men and women who are scarcely intelligent enough or 
educated enough to understand or comprehend the nature and sig­
nificance of the whole procedure; and in a large number of cases the 
evidence and arguments concern matters of such technical nature that 
it is impossible for the type of men and women on the average jury 
to pass an intelligent judgment upon the dispute." (Bates and Field, 
State Government, 1928, p. 416.) In the language of Professor Callen­
der, a member of the Philadelphia Bar, "no matter how carefully 
jurors may be selected, they are likely to be persons with the usual 
imperfections of mankind. They will sometimes be actuated by 
emotion; they will sometimes fail to perceive falsehood; they will 
often be unable to weigh probabilities with nicety; they will not al­
ways be able to understand the refinements of the law." (American 
Courts, 1927, p. 217.) Hence, the process itself of selecting jurors 
throws the balance against the utility of the use of the jury as a 
judicial institution. "Hand-picked" juries, resulting from the system 
of challenges, are but indicia of the great part that lawyers play in 
the game of judicial administration, and result often in the mis­
carriage of justice. 
In criminal cases, sympathy too often furnishes the key to the 
verdict of the jury. Illustrations can be multiplied, and numberless 
authorities cited, to show that defendants are acquitted because of 
the personal likes and dislikes of the jurors for the witnesses, counsel, 
and laws concerned in the cases tried. Public opinion filters through 
the barred doors of the jury room and plays a significant role in jury 
deliberations. In any notorious criminal trial, one may ask in the 
manner of Robert H. Elder, former district attorney of King's County, 
New York, relative to the Snyder-Gray trial, "Can anybody believe 
that the jury in that case could and did analyze all the evidence placed 
before them during days of trial; separate the incompetent evidence 
from the competent, as to each defendant; synthesize the competent 
and relevant as to each; and then weigh each group of facts separ­
ately, uninfluenced by what they heard and must have been deeply 
impressed with, but were supposed to disregard?" (Loe. cit., 296.) 
The only answer that can be made to this question is obvious. 
In civil cases, likewise, deep-seated prejudices influence the action 
of the jury. It is a well-known fact that juries usually discriminate 
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against corporations and rich defendants. But the most condemning 
feature of jury trial in civil cases is the fact that the jury is utterly 
incapable of settling the questions of a highly technical nature that 
our social and economic system presents for solution. Such questions, 
arising from the complex interrelations of modern life, require the 
judgment of the expert, not the layman. 
In every general verdict there are three elements: (1) the facts, 
(2) the law, and (3) the application of the law to the facts. Each 
element, to be effectively ascertained or applied, must be, by the very 
nature of things, entrusted to those trained in the work. The jury, 
temporary and subject to influence by all the dramatics of the court­
room, is totally incompetent, in practically every case, to deal justly 
with any one of the three elements. Consequently, a solution for the 
evils incident to jury trial, such as "false logic, unprofessional trial 
tactics, appeals to bias, passion, and prejudice, exceptions to the ad­
mission of evidence, all the errors in charging the law, most reversible 
errors, the congestion of calendars, delays of justice, most of the un­
certainty of litigation," must be found in the abolition of the jury. 
(Report of the Committee on Criminal Courts and Procedure of the 
New York County Lawyers' Association, quoted in Elder, loc. cit., p. 
294.> In other word!I, the judge, or preferably a bench of judges, 
must take over the supposed functions of the jury. Nor would this 
practice be despotism. 
"The intricate questions now laid before juries for decision," con­
tends Mr. Elder, "must be presented for correct solution to persons 
who know the rules of decision, who are practiced in the art of using 
them, who are skilled in the rules of exclusion and inclusion and in 
the methods by which the values of testimony are ascertained, persons 
who, by experience, know the 'tricks of the game'; how the police 
operate and how unreliable they are, what motives lead to perjury, 
how falsehood manifests itself, both in manner of expression, and in 
the methods of construction of its testimony. They must be submitted 
to persons who by observation and practice have learned how to 
detect falsehood through analysis of the spoken words and comparison 
of relative values-in other words, by specialists, by judges. It is 
too much to expect ordinary laymen, men without special training, to 
do these things, just as it would be too much to expect them to solve 
chemical problems without having studied chemistry. If it be thought 
that there is anything mystical or effective in the number twelve, or 
in a unanimous vote it is not necessary to insist that these problems 
should be submitted to a single judge. Let more be called in, even 
twelve, if thought necessary; but by all means let us commit these 
problems to those qualified by study and experience to deal with 
them." (Loe. cit., 297-298.) Such is the reasoning of one who knows 
the intricacies of the judicial process. It is useless to argue whether 
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judges can be trusted or not. Certainly they occupy revered posi­
tions in the community, and almost all are above suspicion of pe­
cuniary corruption. People have placed great faith in a demonstrably 
incompetent and generally illiterate jury. Would it be more danger­
ous, then, to place such trust in the judges themselves? 
If trial by jury were abolished and trial by judges instituted, Mr. 
Elder (loc. cit., p. 300) points out, in language that is convincing, 
the many advantages that could be discerned: 
"No jury has to be 'packed.' No jury has to be examined and 
'picked.' That impossible attempt to differentiate between the partial 
and the impartial, the ignorant and the intelligent, is obviated. At 
the beginning of the trial, the court confers with counsel about the 
issues. Facts are conceded. Many disputes are thus disposed of by 
agreement, and the trial very much shortened. A few vital points 
only are contested. 
"The court frequently takes the witness in hand himself. He asks 
many questions. He sees just where the testimony is lacking. He 
asks that such points be cleared up. He is not interested in mud­
slinging or catch questions, so there are none. It is a thinking trial. 
If necessary, he takes a recess to give opportunity to clear up doubt­
ful matters. He is not interested in getting through, but in getting 
facts. If a witness makes mistakes due to nervousness, he under­
stands and does not hold it against him. Nobody has to tell him the 
law. He knows it, or can find out. He has time to do this; he takes 
time. He asks counsel to aid him if the law is abstruse. The trial 
is not a dramatic performance to impress observers. It is a thoughtful 
earnest conference and investigation into the facts. No lawyer is 
there to confuse the judge, or to 'pull the wool over his eyes.' All 
counsel on both sides are trying to help. They realize that that is 
the only practical thing to do. 
If the case is difficult, close, and doubtful as to the facts the judge 
does not have to decide on the minute or remain in a locked room for 
hours till he decides. He can take his time. He can order the min­
utes of the testimony, study them, and make sure what the facts are. 
He will frequently find that when studied carefully, analyzed, and 
classified at leisure they are by no means what they seemed to be 
when the testimony was spoken. He can visit the neighborhood in­
volved and study the physical conditions on the spot. They often 
reveal themselves much better than spoken words can picture them. 
There is, in short, no device that can be thought of for ascertaining 
the facts in their true light and relationships that is closed to him. 
When he renders his decision he will relate the facts, not in the form 
of general conclusions, but in their particulars, as he finds them to be 
credible, and upon these he will base his decision. Thus the justice, 
accuracy, and intelligence of his work may be known of all." 
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Trial by jury may never be abolished in the United States, for time 
enshrouds such institutions with a sanctity that weakens the force of 
constructive criticism. However, the strong indictment that is now 
made against jury trial is having, and will have, desirable effects. At 
least, a curtailment of the powers and functions of the jury, even to 
the point of abolition, is neither an impractical nor an idle dream. 
CRIMINAL LAW-WHAT'S WRONG WITH IT? 
BY CHARLES S. POTTS 
Dean of School of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. 
(Frotn The Dall<uo M Mnino News Reprints, No. 1 of a series of fifteen articles on 
Texas Criminal Procedure, Published in the Dallas MMnino Newe, 
Dec. 26, 1928-January 9, 1929, pp. 16-18.) 
Trial by jury.-There is much being said and written at this time 
in favor of the abolition of jury trial in civil cases and even in crim­
inal cases. Some writers would substitute trial by a judge or a group 
of judges in place of trial by a jury of ones' peers. It is claimed that 
jury trial is slow, cumbersome and expensive and that the ordinary 
juror is quite incapable of understanding the intricacies of modern 
business and commercial controversies or the crimes that grow out of 
them, such as were involved in the famous Fall-Sinclair-Doheny­
Daugherty cases. 
While there is much to be said in favor of an abolition of the jury 
in civil cases, it will here be assumed that in criminal matters the 
jury is here to stay, at least for many years to come. 
Waiving of jury in felony cases.-The Constitution of Texas de­
clares that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate," but it 
confers upon the legislature power "to pass such laws as may be 
needed to regulate the same and to maintain its purity and efficiency." 
This provision, it would seem, was adopted to protect the citizen in 
the enjoyment of a "right," but not to compel him to exercise the 
right if he does not care to do so. Its beneficent purpose is fully 
accomplished if the person accused of crime can in all cases and 
without cost to him have a jury if he wishes one. But so much wedded 
to the jury system were our ancestors of seventy-five years ago that 
they wrote into their first penal code, in 1856, a provision to the effect 
that "a defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may 
waive any right secured to him by law except the right of a trial by 
jury in a felony case." 
However, the world has learned a great deal in the last three­
quarters of a century and one of the surprising things it has learned 
is that persons accused of crime are not nearly so strongly wedded 
to the jury system as the Fourth of July orators would have us 
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believe. For, as a matter of fact, it turns out that wherever de­
fendants have been given an option in the matter, about four out of 
every five of them prefer to be tried by the judge rather than by a 
jury. 
In England, where defendants enjoy the privile~e of waiving a 
jury, about 85 per cent do so and are tried by one or more judges. 
In 1925, out of 50,764 indictable offenses only 8,120, or 16 per cent, 
were tried by jury, and of non-indictable offenses the percentage of 
jury trials was much smaller. 
In Canada a large majority of cases are disposed of by the judge 
without the help of a jury. Similar results have been reached in 
Connecticut, where a statute of 1921 permits defendants to waive 
trial by jury. 
Much the same story is told by the State of Maryland. As to the 
results reached in that State, let Mr. Edgar Allan Poe give testimony. 
Mr. Poe, who was for four years attorney general of the State, in a 
recent magazine article says : 
"For more than one hundred years a person accused of crime in 
Maryland has had the privilege under the State Constitution of 
electing to be tried by a judge instead of by a jury. As a result, 
juries are dispensed with in the great majority of criminal cases. The 
statistics for Baltimore show that 75 per cent of the criminal cases 
were tried before a judge without a jury. 
"It is no unusual thing for cases involving capital punishment to be 
so tried. On these occasions it is customary but not obligatory for 
the presiding judge to ask at least two other judges to sit with him. 
There is rarely, if ever, a miscarriage of justice. The rights of the 
accused are scrupulously protected and the cases are disposed of ex­
peditiously and without any of the theatrical display and unseemly 
wrangling that so frequently disgrace trials before a jury. Indeed, 
if the question were only whether the guilt or innocence of an ac­
cused person is more likely to be detrmined correctly by a judge or by 
a jury, the proof would be overwhelmingly in favor of the former." 
Saving in time and money.-Trial by the judge without jury results 
in an enormous saving of time and money. According to Hon. Carroll 
T. Bond, presiding judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, trial 
by the judge takes not more than one-third of the time required for 
trial by jury and much less than one-third of the expense. Ordinarily, 
he says, two criminal courts are sufficient to care for the criminal 
dockets in Baltimore, a city of nearly 800,000, or three times the 
size of Dallas or Houston. 
Judge Bond says: 
"At times there is not enough unfinished business for two courts, 
and one is able to keep up with the work. It is ordinarily possible 
to give trials without any delay beyond such time as may be needed 
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for preparation and there are times when the court seems too close 
on the heels of the grand jury, when the court is prepared to give 
trial on the day after indictment. For some years, now, only one 
jury panel has been kept in attendance upon two criminal courts, 
and, even so, the jurymen spend much of their time sitting aside as 
spectators. Of the 1,500 criminal cases docketed during the four 
months of the January (1925) term of the Criminal Court of Balti­
more City, all except 177, mostly those last docketed, were disposed 
of before the final day of the term. Unquestionably this compara­
tively rapid disposal of business is due to the prevalence of trials 
without jury." 
Testing qualifications of jurors.-It is common knowledge that an 
enormous amount of time is consumed in selecting juries in criminal 
cases. One case in California required ninety-one days to complete 
the jury. In a noted Chicago case, 4,821 jurors were examined at a 
cost to the people of $13,000. Contrast this with the procedure in 
the celebrated Crippen murder case where only eight minutes were 
required to select the jury. 
Mr. Justice Riddell of the Supreme Court of Ontario tells of having 
opened court across the border from Detroit just as a famous murder 
trial was started in that city. He cleared his docket, consisting of 
nearly thirty cases about equally divided between the criminal and 
the civil law, sent nine men to the penitentiary, adjourned court and 
returned to his home in Toronto. The next morning the papers an­
nounced the selection of the tenth juryman in the trial in Detroit...• 
WHY TRIAL BY JURY? 
BY LEON GREEN* 
(From Ths American Mercur11, Vol. XV, No. 67, September, 1928, pp. 316-324. 
Alfred A. Knopf, 730 Fifth Avenue, New York, Publishers) 
I 
In early England, and in the pioneer days of our own country, the 
sheriff, as the chief officer of the shire or county, could be depended 
upon to summon twelve or more good men and true for jury duty 
without any undue embarrassment of justice. But the political pos­
sibilities of his office were too great. He aligned himself offensively 
and defensively with influential lawyers and all character of other 
interests, so that it required generations of reform to separate him 
from the power to dispense favors and protection to as well as take 
vengeance upon, juror, litigant and lawyer alike. 
*Former member of The University of Texas Law School Faculty and now Dean 
ot the Northwestern University Law School. 
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In his stead have been set up jury commossioners, jury wheels, and 
many other schemes for cataloguing, drawing and checking jurymen, 
some of them extravagant in their detail. But still the results are 
no better. In New York the statutory provisions on the subject take 
up 236 sections of the Judiciary Law. Panels of from twenty-four 
to forty-eight prospective jurors, and in important cases or where 
there are several courts, many times that number are provided for 
each week of the jury calendar. And once a panel is presented in 
a particular case, the process of selection has barely begun. First, 
the judge will excuse those who have legal exemptions (and these are 
many) and also those having good execuses, even though not exempt 
under the statute. Inasmuch as lawyers are sometimes consulted as 
to what is a good excuse, some of our intelligent peers come well 
prepared to be excused. 
But the chief effort at elimination comes on the part of counsel in 
seeking to disqualify members of the panel for cause and to discover 
ground for exercising peremptory challenges. The examination by 
counsel takes a wide range; the possible grounds for challenge are 
innumerable. A bias or prejudice against a rich litigant, or a cor­
poration, or a public utility, or in favor of a poor man, or a certain 
class, or against capital punishment, or against damage suits, or a 
definite opinion about the merits of the case gained through the news­
papers or by personal contact with the witnesses, or by kinship or 
by employment or (in some juris<lictions) anything that may be 
"reasonably calculated" to make the juror less than "white as paper" 
a "perfect perpendicular" or a "judicial blank," will disqualify him. 
Here, again, the intelligent juror caught on the panel discovers 
quickly how to disqualify himself. Having eliminated as many as 
possible of the undesirables for cause, the parties each have from 
three to thirty-five peremptory challenges, depending upon the juris­
diction and class of case, which they can and usually do use, for 
good reason or no reason at all, to get rid of those not desired who 
have not been eliminated otherwise. 
Here we have a slaughterhouse of the few remaining peers on the 
panel. Whatever may be the law's ideal, the parties are not seeking 
impartial citizens; they are interested in obtaining favorable jurors. 
The time squandered in this preliminary may run from an hour to 
a week or more-time enough, in many instances, to try the case. 
The selection of a jury within three hours by Justice Bailey under 
the new Federal Court rules for the second Sinclair trial is the most 
remarkable instance of dispatch known in modern American jury 
trials. But even this small detail of procedure will require probably 
fifty years and hundreds of decisions before it will become a part of 
trial by jury generally in this country. 
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Assume that the machinery of justice is now set up for the par­
ticular case. The next case, of course, must provide its own jury; 
each party has his own set of peers. But to the merits! The parties 
are nervous, the judge is impatient, the witnesses are jumpy, the 
members of the jury are eager to be about their business. Counsel 
are not so impatient. They know who must do the chief acting in 
this drama, and the time required in order to act to advantage. In 
the examination of the jury they have introduced themselves. Whether 
serious and dignified, smiling and friendly, blustering and bullying, 
suave and clever, blunt and brutal, or quiet and cautious, they have 
chosen their roles. They are now ready to make their second appear­
ance in the opening statement to the jury. 
The opening statement is for the purpose of preparing the jury for 
what is to follow by way of proof. It is an outline of the theory of 
the case from the opener's standpoint, together with a statement of 
what he expects to prove and how. It offers no mean opportunities 
to a skilled trial lawyer. There is no argument so telling as artistic 
statement, and here the plaintiff's counsel has the advantage of talk­
ing to the jurymen while they are still eager and fresh. The lawyer 
who knows his jury neither overdraws nor blurs this first picture, and 
its lines are ineradicable. The opening statement gives the plaintiff his 
first great chance to tell his story. He will have few others so de­
pendably favorable. But when the plaintiff is through, the jury is 
whetted to hear what the defendant can say, and his story must be 
even more greatly told if he is to overcome the advantage of his 
opponent. 
Let it be noted that the whole scheme of trial by jury is designed 
to produce effects tellingly. The prelude in selecting the jurymen 
affords an opportunity to build up their expectancies, and arouse 
their emotions to a pitch where they can picture themselves chosen 
to play a most important part in a most serious business, and that 
under the public gaze. The longer the trial lasts, the larger the scan­
ning crowds, the more dramatic the witnesses, the more intensely 
counsel draw the lines of conflict, the more solemn the judge, the 
harder it becomes for these triers of the facts to restrain their reason 
from somersaulting. Little wonder the juries so often become 
avengers in behalf of an outragd plaintiff or persecuted defendant! 
The doers of justice are made as keen as the bull for his fight. This 
was well illustrated in a recent New Mexico case, in which the plain­
tiff sought to recover damages for money taken from him by force. 
The jury returned this verdict: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff 
in the sum of ten thousand five hundred dollars, less one hundred and 
ten dollars, and sentence each of the defendants to five years in the 
penitentiary, and recommend the mercy of the court." 
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II 
Each witness, feeling the importance of his part, is eager that his 
testimony be of the greatest value to his side and of the utmost hurt 
to the opponent. The litigants, knowing that they are down for lead­
ing roles, dress for the occasion, and bring their retinues of relatives 
and neighbors, whom counsel must both encourage and censor. Even 
the audience enters into the spirit of the play, taking sides and ap­
plauding one way or the other. The court attendants do no less. 
The judge unconsciously exaggerates his conduct. Of all these, coun­
sel alone, if skillful they are, know that the rest are mere stage dress­
ing for themselves, one of whom must be the villian and one the hero, 
but which, neither is yet certain. The play depends upon their fin­
esse and artistry. In other words, it is the lawyer who makes trial 
by jury dramatic, and trial by jury was designed and perfected 
through the centuries, perhaps unconsciously, to make a stage for 
him, its chief factor. The institution is the lawyer's most artistic 
handiwork; the courthouse is still his playhouse. 
The offering of evidence gives fine advantage to all parties in the 
play. The lawyer offering the witness assumes the attitude calculated 
to put him in the best light; the opposing lawyer objects and storms, 
or what not, as seems best suited to put the witness in the worst light. 
The judge takes whatever attitude toward the witness and the ob­
jections seems best designed from his standpoint to impress the jury 
and the audience with his impartiality-unless he desires to play a 
more important part than that of mere moderator. The jury leans 
forward; the crowd is quiet, and cranes and waits. The witness and 
the lawyer show whatever skill they possess. They may or may not 
score; but that is their immediate objective. Whether they do or 
not, when the tenseness is over the litigants come back into the pic­
ture; for the moment they have been forgotten. And thus it goes on 
until the last witness is excused. 
The rules of evidence which have come to govern the hearing of a 
witness's story appear as if they were designed to enable his opponent 
to minimize its effect. They are intended to protect the jurymen 
against hearing anything that may weigh so heavily with them that 
they will forget matters of greater significance. The twelve triers 
are so sensitive, it appears, that they cannot be trusted to discriminate 
between what is worth weighing and what is not. There are many 
of these rules and they have many exceptions. At one time a viola­
tion of any one of them meant certain reversal. Lawyers came to 
pay a great deal of attention to them and improved them, for they 
meant "time out" when a witness was scoring or threatening to score 
too heavily, and perhaps complete relief in the event that the verdict 
was unfavorable. 
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This development has been so great that these rules can now be 
properly presented and discussed only in four, five or six ponderous 
volumes. Their importance has begun to wane, but there is still 
entirely too much of this kind of law. Only so much may be ven­
tured here; there would be no law of evidence in the present sense 
of the term if it were not for the jury. No other method of investi­
gation could use such rules and survive. As trial by jury offers the 
lawyer his stage, the rules of evidence are but a part of the tech­
nique through which he speaks his lines, a technique so perfected as 
to give the leading role the emphasis and freedom which the drama 
requires. 
After the witnesses have all been heard, the judge is called upon 
to instruct the jury in the rules of law which govern the r ase. This 
tr:mslation of a case to the jury is the most difficult and most fatal 
step in procedure. More cases are reversed for errors in instructions 
to juries than for any other cause, and this despite m1merou-;i 
devices to make errors here unavailable for reversal. Today the 
process iil largely ritualistic; nevertheless the judge spends houl'S 
preparing his charge, and maybe other hours delivering it. The aim 
of the charge is to control the jury's judgment on the questions 
which they are supposed to decide without seeming to invade their 
province. Much of the law's theology has crystallized at this point, 
and the judge who does not respect the fine shadings of that theology 
finds himself reversed. It is the least understood of all the procedural 
devices, both by laymen and lawyers and at the same time it is the 
least useful. 
In a recent rape case the judge mistakenly gave the defendant the 
benefit of the defences of self-defence, adequate provocation, assault 
with a deadly weapon, and sudden passion! Nevertheless the defen­
dant was convicted. (Johnson v. State, 267 S.W. 713.) Only in those 
states in which the judge still has the common law power to comment 
upon the weight of evidence and advise with the jury is there any 
real place for this function. Yet the United States Senate has only 
recently passed the Caraway bill designed to deprive Federal judges 
of the power to advise and instruct juries. Thus, in the face of the 
most urgent appeals from all quarters for a better administration of 
the law, our highest legislative body would take away the power 
which has given trial by jury its chief, if not its only, dependability! 
Closely associated with the charge of the court is the argument of 
counsel-one to six hours to the side, depending upon the importance 
of the case. Cases are won and lost at this stage. Counsel may 
overcome handicaps of prior errors, handicaps of poor witnesses, 
handicaps of every sort if he has skill in jury argument. Likewise 
counsel may lose the advantage of good generalship, the advantage 
of good witnesses, the advantages of a just cause, if he lack skill at 
92 The University of Texas Bulletin 
this point. No one knows what the factors are that enter into a 
jury's conclusions. No one can guess what a particular jury will do. 
The least that can be said is that trial by jury is a process of strategy, 
of matching wits, a battle of surprises and emotional struggles at 
best, and that in this sort of combat the point of merit is apt to be 
lost. 
The closing scene of the trial is played behind the curtain. The 
jury's consideration of the case is not a matter for disclosure, except 
by someone listening at the keyhole or peeping over the transom or 
hidden in the closet. The juror may not impeach his own verdict. 
We may not hear him confess his own villainy. And well we may 
not, for in those few jurisdictions in which inquiry into the jury's 
deliberations is now allowed, it is found that there is seldom a case 
in which its members do not consider matters prohibited by their 
oaths-matters that give ground for a new trial. Such, for instance, 
as the defendant's being insured, or the wealth or poverty of the 
litigants, or the size of the attorney's fees, or facts that some juror 
knows about the case or about one of the parties or some witness. 
Beside, there are verdicts arrived at by the toss of a coin, the turn 
of a card, or other chance, or by some chicanery used by some of 
the jurors to get agreement by the others. (Consider, here, the first 
Knapp trial.) These twelve men once in the jury-room, are real 
peers. And their verdict is the judgment of the country. It may 
settle the case. But more and more frequently it is merely the first 
round of a prolonged bout. 
But a moment is required to contrast this ponderous process with 
trial before a judge, or a board of arbitration. If the jury is taken 
out of the courthouse, the drama is gone. The courtroom is not the 
same place. There is no tenseness. The lawyers are not the same; 
they no longer glare at one another. Even the parties are docile. 
The judge returns to himself. The attendants drop back into their 
humdrum ways. The crowd is made up of a few parties at interest 
and the habitual loungers. The place is dead. There is no haranguing 
in choosing the arbiter; nothing more than a brief statement of the 
issues, and seldom that; the examination of the witnesses proceeds 
with calmness, barring the most exceptional case; objections to evi­
dence are seldom made, and when made, if there is the slightest un­
certainty, the judge hears the evidence and states that if it appears 
to be inadmissible he will ignore it in his findings. 
The argument on the issues is brief and pointed. There are no 
instructions to prepare, no verdict, no motion for a new trial except 
in the rarest instance. The judge either announces his conclusion, 
or else takes it under advisement for further study and later an­
nouncement. He may then file the findings which support his decision. 
'l'he whole process is deflated until there is little left to do save get 
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down to business. The trial of the same case before a judge and 
before the same judge with a jury, with the same lawyers, reflects 
the most startling differences; but the differences are those of time 
and technique and errors. Judge and jury are generally in accord if 
the jury is not brought under some improper influence. If they dis­
agree, it frequently results from some error or mistake which ne­
cessitates a new trial. The differences come in those close cases in 
which there can be no certain opinion, and in which two juries or 
two judges would as likely as not reach opposite conclusions. 
Time is the most dependable of defences. It can be used both by 
meritorious and unmeritorious litigants. If a meritorious litigant 
does not ask for jury trial, his opponent usually does, and probably 
thereby secures his most effective defensive weapon. He can afford 
to wait and prefers to do so. His success depends upon adventitious 
factors. Anything may happen. Witnesses may scatter, death may 
intervene, the memories of claimants and witnesses may grow dim, 
opponents may lose interest, counsel may become absorbed in more 
promising litigation, the feeling of injury and injustice may subside. 
There are a thousand possibilities. 
Time has enabled many unmerited claims to become the basis for 
dangerous suits, and has in turn destroyed as many more of merit. 
To the same degree that it helps the one, it harms the other. The 
fraudulent claimant understands this and it is his insurance of the 
compromises on which he fattens. Defendants who buy their peace 
are his victims. It is good business, therefore, to keep the jury 
docket crowded; the more boldly he can make his claims, the more 
vicious his enterprises for employing the agencies of justice against 
herself. The recent disclosure of a New York City investigation of 
more than 600 pending negligence cases brought by one firm indicates 
the proportion this business may reach. 
But aside from all the handicaps that flow from mere delay, and 
from the prostitution of procedural devices, the chances for reversible 
error due to the treacherous steps of the extended process of jury 
trial are so great that no counsel for the defence can overlook the 
favorable hazards. This is contrary to the prevailing impression 
that the jury is the plaintiff's or poor man's friend. No doubt the 
individual juror is very favorable to the injured person, but despite 
that fact all available data show that defendants demand more juries 
than plaintiffs, and this is true even though a plaintiff normally 
exercises the first choice, thus relieving the defendant from making 
any choice at all. 
The reason is clear. At every turn a defendant may legitimately 
lie in ambush if he so desires, and most defendants do. ·The very 
favorable attitude of jurors for plaintiffs is justification enough for 
claiming all the protection the offsetting advantages afford. But 
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there is in fact little basis to warrant the belief that jurors are more 
favorable to claimants than are judges. In a recent survey of 8800 
Connecticut cases disposed of by the superior courts in 1925 and 
1926, it was found that of the cases disposed of by jury trial plain­
tiffs were given judgment in only 50 per cent, whereas in cases tried 
without juries plaintiffs received judgment in 75 per cent. Approxi­
mately the same ratio held in negligence and contract cases, the two 
most important classes of jury litigation. In bona fide cases, judges 
seem to have more sympathy for a plaintiff's claim than juries. I 
have heard defence counsel frequently express the opinion that to a 
bona fide claimant the judge will be more intelligently liberal than a 
jury, and this, plus the fact that a judge can protect his conclusions 
better than a jury, accounts for the defendants claiming jury trial. 
III 
How much business is disposed of by trial by jury? How much 
business can it be made to care for? How well are its peculiar guar­
antees executed! Trial by jury is not a matter of. right in equity 
cases except in two or three states. Equity cases are numerous, and 
usually are both important and complex. They are heard either by 
the chancellor in the first instance, or by a master under the super­
vision of the chancellor. The procedure may be fashioned to meet 
the exigencies of the particular case. There are also many cases 
between employer and employe, once the typical damage suit, whirh 
are now handled by industrial accident boards. Jury trial could not 
handle them satisfactorily, either to the parties or to society. Then 
there are thousands of small cases, violations of traffic laws, liqnor 
laws, health laws and other police regulations, also small-debt cas~s 
of all sorts, which could not be cared for at all if juries were required 
to dispose of even a smal part of them. Something substantially auto­
matic is required for them. There are a great many more cases in 
which there are pleas of guilty, confession of judgments in one form 
or another, and uncontested cases in which there is no need for a 
jury. Finally, there are very many cases in which the parties waive 
a jury. In Connecticut and Maryland a very large percentage of 
major cases, including many serious felonies, are tried by the judge 
without a jury. 
But aside from all these cases, what is the situation with jury 
cases alone? How much of normal jury business is disposed of by 
jury trials? A report of the Special Calendar Committee appointed 
by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First 
Department, made June 20, 1927, gives about as good an answer to 
this question as can be found. The report in part says: 
"A brief reference to the business pending in the three courts just 
before the January (1927) call will make this clear. There were 
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pending in the Supreme Court of New York County 29,466 cases 
triable by jury; and a case could not ordinarily be reached for trial 
for 22 months after it was at issue. There were pending in the 
Supreme Court for Bronx County 9562 cases triable by jury; and 
a case could not be reached for trial for 24 months after it was at 
issue. There were pending in the City Court of New York County, 
about 18,000 cases triable by jury, the delay in reaching a case for 
trial being 16 months. At the same time there were pending in the 
Municipal Courts 59,086 cases triable by jury, and a case could not 
be reached for trial in crowded districts for a year and a half." 
And further: 
"It is a significant circumstance that a large proportion of cases 
placed on the calendar are not disposed of by inquest or jury trial. 
Taking the year 1924, for example, as showing the recent trend, it 
appears that in that year out of 15,923 cases disposed of, 12,147, or 
<>ver 76 per cent, were disposed of without trial, by discontinuance, 
abatement, reference or otherwise. In the years 1919 to 1923, in­
clusive, the cases disposed of without a jury trial varied between 70 
and 75 per cent, except in 1923, when it rose to 80 per cent of the 
eases which disappeared from the calendar. The presence of these 
cases on the general calendar undoubtedly caused uncertainty and 
delay in reaching those of later issues which were awaiting an oppor­
tunity for trial." 
Taking the country over, this is not far from a representative 
picture of the conditions of the dockets. Twenty to thirty per cent 
<>f jury cases actually tried! This is our constitutional guarantee 
of the right to trial by jury in performance. 
Even more startling is the fact disclosed by a recent statement of 
Edwin C. Coe, calendar clerk of the Supreme Court of New York 
County, that the number of new cases added to the calendar in the 
Supreme Court for New York County for the ten months period 
ending March 1, 1928, decreased by 11,092, or 72 per cent, as com­
pared with a like period immediately before legislation went into 
effect increasing the calndar fee from $3 to $20. Under another 
recent statute, requiring an affirmative demand for a jury trial and 
a fee of $12 therefor, jury trial was affirmatively waived in almost 
<>ne-third of the cases when filed, and doubtless there will be further 
waivers before the cases are tried. 
The recent survey made by the Yale Law School covering approxi­
mately 8800 civil cases disposed of by the Superior Courts of Con­
necticut during 1925 and 1926 disclosed: 
(1) That juries were had in only 38 per cent of the cases tried 
in which juries might have been had; 
96 The University of Texas Bulletin 
(2) That approximately only 13 per cent (232) in number of all 
the cases tried (excluding uncontested divorces, uncontested fore­
closures and suits for change of name) were tried by juries. 
No doubt these two facts account in very large part for the com­
paratively uncongested condition of the dockets of these courts. 
The figures are remarkable in that they disclose that jury trial is 
little more than a bad habit, and yet one that serves to clog our 
courts so that only a fraction of the jury business can actually be 
done by juries. It is significant that we hear little complaint about 
delays in non-jury cases, despite the fact that there is small time for 
them, since the time of the courts is taken up very largely by jury 
cases. It is a safe conclusion that were it not for trial by jury, our 
present judges could clear their dockets and dispose of all the new 
business as it came to them, and that the number of judges could be 
reduced. Clearly it would be impossible to enlarge the judiciary 
sufficiently, or furnish enough court-room facilities, jurors, attendants, 
sheriffs and the like, to give prompt attention to all the jury cases 
docketed without disrupting the general business of the community. 
Our court machinery is already extravagantly large, so much so that 
it uses up much of its energy in the mere operation of the machine. 
Moreover, the satisfactory disposal of the cases still tried by juries 
is not at all certain. More jury verdicts than judge verdicts are 
appealed and more are reversed. Trial by jury not merely clogs 
the trial court, but furnishes a large part of the business of the 
appellate courts. In the recent survey of Connecticut cases there 
were new trials, disagreements and withdrawals in 15 per cent of 
the cases tried by juries against none in cases tried before judges; 
this, although the judges tried more than seven times as many cases 
(excluding divorce and other formal cases) as did juries. Moreover, 
approximately 26 per cent of the jury cases were appealed, whereas 
only 8 per cent of the cases tried without juries were appealed. The 
story is the same everywhere. The record of business done by juries 
is not merely not encouraging; it alone is enough to condemn trial 
by jury as a method of attending to the serious business of litigation. 
There is no promise that it can do better. It has neither the speed 
nor the precision required. 
What of the cost? Little need be said here. Anything that 
prevents the machinery of justice from functioning properly is ex­
pensive--more so than we can calculate. Assuming honest and most 
effective administration, the time consumed in jury trials, as shown 
by the Connecticut survey, is more than twice that required in trials 
by judges. The difference in time in getting to trial is even greater. 
The cost of obtaining a jury and keeping it until a verdict is reached, 
the time of the judge and court attendants, the additional time of the 
parties, lawyers, and witnesses, the greater facilities offered by trial 
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before a judge in allowing adjournments and accommodations to 
parties and witnesses, the reduction in appellate reviews incident to 
the more informal court trial, all make the cost of jury trial any­
where from three to eight times that of any other mode of trial now 
employed. 
This in calculable terms of money; it stands aside from the cost in 
terms of satisfactory justice. But whether we figure the cost of trial 
by jury in terms of time consumed, money expended, the quality or 
quantity of justice afforded, the waste of effort, the abuse of judicial 
process, or the loss in respect for the administration of law, we dis­
cover a deficit far greater than any imaginable satisfactions can 
overcome. The extra cost of jury trial in the United States is 
enough to cover the whole outlay required by the judicial branch of 
government, State and Federal. But it is said that citizens are edu­
cated by the institution, and are thus brought to have confidence in 
their government! I wonder if there is even a glimmer of truth 
here? And if so, what notions of government do they get? 
IV 
What is the case in behalf of jury trial? There is none, save such 
as lies in the reverence we may have for a venerable institution. 
There are some few cases, as, for instance, foolish political prosecu­
tions, and witch-burners persecutions, in which the jury may save 
the law's face. But after all, it is usually the backbone of some fear­
less judge that does the saving in such cases, if there is any saving 
at all. We have enshrined jury trial along with other antiquated 
ideas about the administration of justice in our fundamental law, 
and worse still, in the hearts of our people. They lie there as dead 
as Hector, and everybody knows they are dead, but who dares touch 
them? Why make one's self foolish? Those "true friends of the 
people" who traffic in trial by jury would want nothing better. "Oh, 
yes, just as we thought, those corporation lawyers and highbrows, 
those foes of justice, are finally showing themselves in their true 
garb! They propose to rob the poor man of his one chance of jus­
tice, his security against tyranny, the people's jury! They would 
destroy this jewel of Magna Charta!" Thus they capitalize the 
tendency in all people to worship the phrases as well as the practices 
and memories of their ancestors. What can be done against this 
cry? Nothing. 
Few institutions have struck their roots so deeply into the social 
order for so long a time and persisted through so eruptive a period as 
trial by jury. Its inception was one of the harbingers of the demo­
cratic era. It marks one of the first definite breaks between divine 
and secular dispensation-religion versus the ballot. It has endured 
the full period of democracy's ascendency and has been in the van­
guard wheresoever democracy has gone pioneering. But as religion 
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at last gave over a large part of the world's affairs to the voter, the 
voter in turn is now called upon to give over a large part of those 
affairs to the scientist. This call will be answered as stubbornly and 
as grudgingly as was the former. 
After all, religion has only become reconciled to sharing her powers 
with democracy when democracy has in turn shared her votes with 
religion. So religion finds no pleasure in seeing the voter hand over 
an increasing authority to this interloper called science. Religion 
en masse is afraid of the scientist; so is democracy en masse. The 
scientist wants too much; he claims too much; he is too self-sufficient; 
he has no deference for his elders. And he is just as stubborn and 
far more unmannerly than either the churchman or the politician. 
He is still young. Moreover, science means technique, patience, dis­
appointment, awareness, understanding, and all these are painful. 
They are often, indeed, beyond the range of men, whereas religion is 
always near and soothing, and voting is easy and intoxicating. 
To which shall be allocated the administration of justice? Re­
ligion surrendered that function slowly and painfully. Only a few 
vestiges of her ritual remain today; oaths, the third degree, minister­
ing to the condemned. Democracy's victory is complete. The shadow 
of the ballot is always apparent; the public prosecutor, the grand 
jury, the trial jury, and too often the judge himself. But can the 
mere voter do the job longer, or must he stand by for one who knows 
more about it--more about the true interests of society, more about 
the determination of facts, more about the prevention of crime, more 
about handling the complex business of men? 
It is hard to visualize the structure of English society during the 
Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth centuries-the formative period 
of the jury. The important interests of those days were primarily 
those relating to the possession of the surface of land, those protecting 
the persons against such violent harms as murders, robberies, assaults 
and batteries, those pertaining to chattels such as cattle, and those 
relating to the domestic relations, which were largely cared for by 
the church. It was to settle simple disputes that the jury had its 
early service. As the interests-the wants and desires-of people 
have multiplied a thousand fold and more since that day, so the legal 
protection granted to such interests has multiplied both in quality 
and detail. The remedies of those early centuries were few and 
simple, but drastic and fatal. Their science was crude. The ordeal, 
compurgation, and trial by battle were just fading out. Death and 
outlawry were prescribed for crimes; imprisonment and the ruthless 
seizure of property for crimes and civil wrongs as well. The jury 
could well understand these blunt methods. The jury also furnished 
a safeguard against a too tyrannical use of these bludgeons of the 
law. 
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The same factors which have repeatedly changed the fabric of the 
social order have likewise altered the texture of legal thought. 
Change in one brings change in the other. We are constantly en­
larging and remodelling the classification of rights, duties, powers, 
privileges and immunities in keeping with the general social and 
economic development. We deal fewer death blows; we take more 
pains. Even in crime the quickening of a rationalism is felt. In the 
courthouses alone the medieval complexion of our law has changed 
least. Here it was most ritualistic, and as formalism is always dear­
est to men, here it is the last to change. But even here there have 
been tremendous thanges. Few wigs remain; the old Spencerian 
flourishes have gone. The most persistent of all the institutions 
surviving is the jury. 
The litigation of the earlier centuries, as I have said, involved 
simple issues, simply fought out under relatively simple theories of 
law, and the fight was in the open and the methods of counsel were 
obvious. All this has changed. Elaborately trained counsel now 
have at their command the zeal of the publicist, and the machinery 
of the press, supported by the skill and daring of the sleuth, and the 
laboratories of the chemist, physicist, engineer, psychologist, psy­
chiatrist, biologist and all the other scientists. It is no longer only 
the hypothetical question that gives the courtroom its odor of science. 
It is no longer merely the ingenuity of one smart lawyer at work; a 
staff of specialists is at his command. 
Clients are demanding and receiving all the aid the scientific world 
can give their cases. Time and money pile up enormously. The data 
not infrequently assume aspects as far above the understanding of 
the every-day citizen as modern science is beyond the science of the 
Fourteenth Century. Under these conditions, honesty and ability to 
read and write are no longer enough to meet the demands of a mod­
ern law-suit. The average jury in any case of difficulty is about as 
helpful as it would be in solving a problem in the higher mathematics, 
in industrial finance, or in electrical engineering. 
As a formula for administering justice trial by jury is merely a 
societal antique. But it typifies something back in the growth of 
society which has been gripped by man's emotions and they will not 
let it go. Its processes radiate a flavor of popular justice and a 
flourish of democracy. Those are still stout words. But the fact 
is that in the organism of society, as in the organisms of all life, 
there are structural parts which no longer serve useful functions. 
They reappear nevertheless in succeeding generations. They are 
sometimes removed from the physical organism by heroic surgery. 
To this the social organism seldom submits. Moreover, the intelli­
gence that would do so in this instance would not stop with the jury's 
removal; it would demand more cutting. 
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But the social body as well as the physical one can isolate a useless 
part. In a thousand ways already and in others to come the social 
body is building the jury out of its anatomy. The jury's impotency 
is widely acknowledged. Informal bodies, courts with special juris­
dictions, trial by judges, insurance, arbitration and other devices 
have already taken over some of its most important functions. Yet 
much remains to be done before the irritation can sub11ide. The cost 
and the waste are without calculation. But life seldom counts costs; 
and neither does the law. 
NEGATIVE MATERIAL 
I. Efficiency of Trial by Jury 
IS TRIAL BY JURY AN INEFFECTIVE SURVIVAL?" 
BY A. C. UMBREIT 
Professor of Law, Marquette University School of Law 
(From Marquette Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, April 1924, pp. 126-133. Published by 
the Students of the Marquette School of Law, Milwaukee, Wis.) 
Count One: It is charged that trial by jury is old, antiquated, and 
was the outgrowth of a peculiar social and economic system for the 
protection of the common people, but that in modern times such pro­
tection is no longer needed and the institution itself is unsuited to 
present-day conditions. It is asserted that trial by jury was first 
promised and guaranteed by the provisions of Magna Charta and 
that the conditions existing in 1215 when the signature to this instru­
ment was forced from King John by the Barons of the Realm, were so 
peculiar that the liberty of the common people depended upon having 
their rights as between man and man determined by their peers, but 
that the conditions now have so vitally changed from the conditions 
then, that there is at present no excuse for the survival of this 
method of determining facts in litigation. 
It is true that trial by jury is old, in fact, the principle is much 
older than the date given by the writer of the article in question. 
Again, Magna Charta not only did not create the institution of trial 
by jury, but did not even guarantee it. Thus it has been said: 
"One persisten error, universally adopted for many centuries, and 
even now hard to dispel, is that the Great Charter granted or guaran­
lJeed trial by jury. This belief, however, which has endured so long 
and played so prominent a part in political theory is now held by all 
competent authorities to be ent irely unfounded."1 
This historian in concluding his discussion of trial by jury as re­
ferred to in Magna Charta says: 
"Magna Charta does not promise 'trial by jury' to anyone." 
•This article is an answer to Bruce G. Sebille'a article, "Trial by Jury: An In­
effective SurviTal," America1' Law Review, Vol. LIX, Jan.-Feb., 1925, pp. 67-73. 
NOTB: The Sebille article may be borrowed from the Extension Loan Library, 
University of Texas. 
'McKechnie, Ma/lfta Cl&o.rta, p. 168. 
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Other historians who have examined the origin of trial by jury 
have reached the same conclusion.2 Trial by jury is older than Magna 
Charta. 
The historian Hume credits Alfred the Great (871-901) as the 
originator of trial by jury in England. Thus in discussing the pro­
cedure adopted by Alfred in determining controversies between mem­
bers of different decennaries, the historian says: 
"Their method of decision deserves to be noted as being the origin 
of juries; an institution admirable in itself, and the best calculated 
for the preservation of liberty and the administration of justice that 
ever was devised by the wit of man. Twelve freeholders were chosen, 
who, having sworn, together with the hundreder, or presiding magis­
trate of that division, to administer impartial justice, proceeded to 
the examination of that cause which was submitted to their jurisdic­
tion." 
Trial by jury is older than the reign of Alfred the Great. The in­
stitution was known in the time of the Roman Republic; thus under 
the Plantian law proposed and adopted 89 B.C. the jury was made a 
popular institution and all classes were admitted to the jury box, 
three qualifications being required; first, proper age; second, honor­
able character; third, no other office in the public service. Hence, all 
Roman citizens were eligible to jury service. 
But trial by jury was known even under the Mosaic law. Thus it 
was provided under that ancient law that in cases where a person 
had inadvertently or accidentally killed another and had successfully 
escaped into one of the Cities of Refuge, the question whether the 
homicide was accidental or otherwise, was not to be determined by 
judges or priests, but by the "Congregation," that is, by a jury. 
The purpose of these historical references is not so much to correct 
the author of the article in question3 or to give a chronology of the 
origin and development of trial by jury, as it is to emphasize the fact 
that an institution which has survived varying experiences for cen­
turies, under varying conditions, and among totally dissimilar peoples 
and civilizations, must have something innately vital and must have 
filled a human want during all these centuries and under all condi­
tions of civilization. When it is remembered that trial by jury in 
every instance where it was inaugurated in the various civilized 
countries, ancient and modern, succeeded trials by judges alone, a 
reason for this vitality is readily suggested. Hence, the age of the 
judicial system under discussion, its survival under all kinds and 
forms of civilization, its meeting the needs of peoples and nations 
2II Reeves, History of English Law, p. 42 ; Forsyth's History, Trial by Jury, p. 91 ; 
Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, p . 162. 
•American Bar Association Journal, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 68. 
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widely different in thelr tastes, their aspirations, and their govern­
mental systems, instead of being a cause for condign condemnation, 
is rather a badge of its excellency and fitness for even modern con­
ditions. 
Count Two: It is next charged that trial by jury has ceased prop­
erly to function as a judicial institution because of the mimicry in­
dulged in "with pathetic earnestness" of selecting members of modern 
juries from political subdivisions, the inhabitants of which know 
nothing of the facts involved in the litigation for the determining of 
which they are selected, and resulting in a situation described as­
"Abysmal ignorance constitutes a condition precedent in the quali­
fication of jurors, and that ignorance must be established to the satis­
faction of contending counsel, else the prospective juror is sum­
marily dismissed from the body to which he would, if permitted, have 
brought enlightenment." 
It is possible that there are some benighted communities where the 
result just depicted by this charge is occasionally produced. If so, 
such is not the case in this state where jurors are selected by a ju­
dicially appointed commission from the electors at large, who rep­
resent the average intelligence and integrity of the community. In 
Wisconsin, women now have full civil rights and are eligible for jury 
duty, and hardly a jury is now selected here in which there are not 
a number of women. Hence, here, at least, "abysmal ignorance" is 
not only not the rule, but not even the exception. If communities 
can be found where jurors are justly subject to the criticism con­
tained in this count, then such communities receive just the kind 
of justice they deserve. 
Furthermore, this charge challenges the efficiency of the method 
of selecting the jurors and in no way affects the value of the institu­
tion of trial by jury itself. The supposed ignorance of jurors selected 
to determine facts in a given litigation which, it is claimed, will con­
trol their judgment in such determination, would likewise control 
their judgment in selecting and voting for the three judges of a given 
division who are to constitute the original trial courts and determine 
all facts in all litigations arising in the pertinent political division. 
If the assumed ignorance of jurors in a given case vitiates the due 
administration of justice in such case, then the same vice would 
operate when the same ignorant jurors select the trier of facts in all 
cases. 
Count Three: It is next charged that in addition to the ignoraJ.lce 
of the members constituting the modern jury, the jurors are asked 
to determine the issues of an instant case upon a distorted presenta­
tion of the facts because of the astuteness of respective counsel in 
carefully concealing the evidence of material facts that would ad­
versely effect their clients, and that such deceit is possible because 0f 
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the artful practices peculiar to the court room. This charge, instead 
of being a serious one against the modern jury and its members, is 
a most serious arraignment of the legal profession, as well as a 
serious reflection upon the courts. If such sharp practices are per­
mitted by the presiding judge in the trial of a case, then such judge 
is either incompetent, ignorant, or worse, and if a miscarriage of 
justice results from such practices, it cannot properly be charged 
against the jury or against the institution of trial by jury. If this 
practice has become so universal as to call for the abolition of trial 
by jury, then it must follow that a majority of the members of the 
bar are skilled in and practice this "astuteness" which results in a 
distorted presentation of facts elicited from "carefully coached and 
instructed witnesses." If the majority of practicing attorneys are 
thus corrupt, then the proposed substitute for trial by ju.ry will call 
for the selection and election of three judges as triers of all facts 
from this tainted contingent of the community. Shades of Bacon, 
note the advance made in judicial procedure under modern civiliza­
tion! 
Count Four: The next charge is that trial by jury is a failure be­
cause jurors are human, are subjected to human frailties and de­
linquencies and possess human passions and desires so that they leave 
the province of disinterested triers of fact and indulge in prejudice, 
bias, and all uncharitableness. This accusation is sought to be sus­
tained by the assertion that the three judges who are to take the 
place of jurors are not subjected to human frailties, delinquencies 
and passions, but have, by sustained and arduous discipline, overcome 
these human attributes and become unsympathetic arbiters of facts, 
cold-blooded logicians and, in a law suit, will "hew close to the line, 
let the chips fall where they may." Unfortunately, experience does 
not sustain this proposition. It may seem a paradox, but it is, 
nevertheless, true that the habitual and constant exercise of balancing 
disputed facts to discover where the truth lies, unfits a man to de­
termine the truth. Every person, even though he be a judge, has a 
mode of drawing inferences from certain facts proved, peculiar to 
himself, has certain theories with respect to the motives that in­
fluence conduct, has a strong disposition to adopt and resort to some 
general rule by which all questions of doubt and difficulty are to be 
measured and determined. It is certainly extremely unsafe in de­
termining the motives of human conduct which play so large a part 
in the cases of disputed and contested facts, to generalize and to 
assume that men will act according to a theory of conduct which a 
judge, or three judges, may have adopted as a guiding rule. Very 
many, if not the most, of the cases which reach courts for determina­
tion, arise out of commercial and industrial transactions, and it is 
safe to affirm that the persons most likely to understand the nature 
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of these transactions and arrive at the truth of the dispute between 
litigant parties are those who are conversant with the details of 
business and engaged in similar occupations themselves. It is such 
men who constitute our juries, who enter the jury box in a given 
case without any preconceived ideas of how the facts are to be tested 
and the probative value of circumstances proven to be measured in 
determining the rights of the parties before the court and the jury. 
It is a matter of almost common knowledge in the profession that 
many of our judges, while learned in the law and safe determiners 
of the law in cases tried before them are rather unsatisfactory triers 
of fact, and the longer they remain upon the bench the more unsatis­
factory their decisions of fact frequently become, because of their 
withdrawal from the active business and industrial affairs of the com­
munity and a consequent want of familiarity with the practical af­
fairs of life. 
Count Five: The next charge is that trial by jury is a failure the 
jury system in that it alleges that the average citizen, and our juries 
are composed of average cititzens, is a man of small means and if 
at all susceptible of corruption, makes him an easy prey to be in­
fluenced in reaching his verdict by financial considerations either 
directly offered by one of the parties to the litigation, or indirectly 
offered by the hope or the suggestion of financial advantages in the 
future after the verdict has been reached. That verdicts of juries 
have been bought may be admitted, but such crass corruption of our 
judicial procedure is very rare. If history is to be believed, judges 
have not been free from being so influenced, but, as already suggested, 
the instances of verdicts from juries, and decisions and judgments 
from courts, obtained by bribery are so infrequent, that these few 
cases cannot be considered as a condemnation of either judges or 
juries. 
Count Six: The last specific charge lodged against the institution 
of trial by jury is that verdicts of juries are frequently based upon 
the popular opinion of the community at the time, rather than upon 
the evidence submitted in coutt; in other words, that juries are 
guided by their decisions as to the facts of a case by what they be­
lieve would be the opinion of the majority of the people, were the 
question submitted to them. That juries sometimes decide cases not 
upon the facts presented to them but upon what they believe would 
reflect the popular side of the litigation is true, but it can be asserted 
with confidence that judges are not always entirely free from the 
influence of popular opinion in deciding cases before them. The 
instances where the "ear to the ground" is decisive in determining 
the facts in a litigated case, rather than conscience and judgment, 
are generally criminal cases brought under an unpopular law, a law 
that the majority of a community does not endorse. Where such a 
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miscarriage of abstract justice occurs, the community, as stated be­
fore in another connection, receives just such an administration of 
justice as it deserves. 
Perverse verdicts have been rendered by juries, but the damage 
done to the administration of justice by such verdicts has been 
greatly minimized, if not entirely neutralized, by the power of the 
court to set aside such verdicts and grant new trials. A striking 
example of the use of such power on the part of the court was the 
recent case of Jackson v. The American League Baseball Club, et al., 
tried in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County within the month. 
The jury in this case returned a large verdict in favor of the plain­
tiff and the trial court reprimanded the jury for the verdict, set it 
aside and dismissed the action on the ground that the trial of the 
case "reeked with perjury." During the trial of the case, one of the 
witnesses for the plaintiff was ordered arrested by the court for 
perjury, and after the case had been submitted to the jury the plain­
tiff himself was arrested for perjury upon the order of the court. 
Trial by jury is not to be consigned into oblivion because here and 
there an individual jury will fail to do its duty, will cause an ap­
parent miscarriage of justice, render a perverse verdict, be misled 
by the "adroit manipulation and the flagrant disregard of principles" 
on the part of astute and conscienceless attorneys in the trial of 
cases. 
So far I have considered trial by jury merely as a judicial institu­
tion, as an arm of the court in the administration of justice, but 
trial by jury plays a large part in the social and political life of a 
community. Serving upon a jury brings the individual not only in 
close contact with the law as administered by our courts, but brings 
him in closer contact with his fellow citizens, gives him a very active 
share in the administration of public affairs and offers him an op­
portunity to make his voice heard and his influence felt in questions 
of local interest. Want of respect for the law has been repeatedly 
urged as one of the dangers threatening our Republic. While quite 
a respectable number of the people of a community are called to 
serve as jurors and thus brought into direct and close connection with 
the law itself and given a share in its administration, respect for 
the law will be created in the minds of those in whom it did not 
exist, and will be strengthened in the minds of others who had it, 
but in whom such respect may have lain dormant. 
Trial by jury also tends to foster respect for our courts, the last 
and final protecting tribunal of our liberties. Abolish this institution 
and you have taken away practically the last opportunity the great 
mass of the people have of participating in any way in any of the ac­
tivities of government, of being in any way concerned in the political 
life of the community and have left them only the right of exercising 
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the elective franchise, a privilege which all too many of our citizens 
at present do not appreciate. 
Trial by jury is too deeply rooted in. our civilization, is too im­
portant to our judicial system, is of too great value to our social and 
political life to be rudely condemned and unceremoniously abolished 
at the request and behest of disappointed litigants and their at­
torneys, and to be replaced by an experiment in judicial procedure 
which history has shown to be a failure whenever tried and to replace 
which trial by jury was instituted. At any rate, it is the part of 
wisdom to follow the conclusion of Hamlet when he said: 
"rather bear those ills we have, 
Than fly to others that we know not of." 
The indictment should be quashed. 
HOW ABOUT THE JURY? 
BY K. E. LEIGHTON 
(From J<ntr...U of the Americ1tn Judic1tture Society, Vol. 8, No. 1, June, 1924, p . 246. 
Published bi-monthly from 31 West Lake Street, Chicago) 
Criticism of our courts has become so common that anyone with a 
pen or a typewriter feels called upon to add his mite to the subject. 
For some reason, perhaps for fear of being unpopular, very few have 
said anything regarding juries. 
After twenty-five years of observation and actual experience I 
firmly believe that the work of juries is the cause of more of the 
criticism of our courts than the work of the judges or the lawyers, 
yet I have seen but little attempt made towards improvement. 
The theory of trial by jury is, I believe, correct, but we fail in 
practice for the very simple reason we do not obtain the services of 
men of experience and judgment to sit as jurors. I was a trial 
judge for ten years in a state court, mostly in rural communities, 
and during that time there was only one jury that fulfilled the duties 
of juror s to the satisfaction of counsel, the judge and the people. No 
criticism was ever heard of their work and the business of the court 
was transacted much more quickly and with less friction than during 
any other term during my experience. 
Men who have had no business experience or have always followed 
one particular occupation are usually not men who are able to exer­
cise that kind of judgment r equired in jury trials. Such men are 
not familiar with men and their method of living and cannot cor­
rectly judge the motives which actuate men in business affairs or in 
any circumstance outside of their own particular line of activity. I 
have no fault to find with the integrity of jurors, but they certainly 
lack the one great essentia.l to make proper deductions, and that is 
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judgment, or horse sense, or whatever you may call it. It is ap­
parent in so many cases that jurors are guided by their prejudice or 
bias. All of us are human, but when we are dealing with the affairs 
of others facts are a better guide than our emotions. A man who 
lacks worldly experience is unable to make correct deductions from 
facts which are so often colored to suit the litigant. It is a common 
expression of a business man to say that if he has a good case he 
would prefer to try it to the judge and if a poor one before a jury. 
The method of selecting names for the jury box used in many 
states is to have the city, village, and township boards send the 
names to the clerk. Too often the question of the qualifications of 
these men is the least considered. 
The method employed in federal courts has resulted in securing 
excellent juries. That fact indicates that we may also secure im­
provements in our state courts. We cannot do away with juries, and 
I would not wish it, but by a selection of names by a jury commission 
we can improve the personnel of the jury. The Legislature can 
change the method of selection of names and one method would be to 
have the judge of each district, or the senior judges where there are 
more than one, appoint a jury commission that would meet at stated 
intervals and select names to be placed in the jury box. In this way 
I am certain that we would find an immediate improvement. 
Usually a jury is controlled by two or three men and if on each 
jury it is possible to secure a small percentage of men of good judg­
ment and experience there will be far less criticism of our courts. In 
the last analysis the criticism is only important when it affects re­
sults and juries are more responsible for the results than the judge 
or counsel. 
THE JURY SYSTEM UNDER CHANGING SOCIAL 
CONDITIONS 
BY JOHN WURTS 
(Froni The American Law Review, Vol. XLVII, January-February, 1918, pp. 86-89. 
Review Publishing Co., St. Louia, Mo., 1918) 
There are certain reforms which ought to be made in order to bring 
the efficiency of the jury system up to present day requirements. All 
of these reforms can be brought about by an aroused sense of re­
sponsibility among the members of the bar. The reforms are bound 
to follow. 
In the first place it should be borne in mind that the increased 
diffusion of education, bringing a higher average of intelligence which 
has raised the quality of our juries, has developed the skill of those 
who, taking advantage of the general respect for the forms of law, 
stand ready to pervert these forms for their own sinister ends. The 
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smaller the number from which juries are drawn, the easier it will 
be to obtain by devious methods juries which are not fairly repre­
sentative. The social conditions of today have raised questions of 
portentous import which threaten at every moment to become acute, 
to arouse blind passion, and to array class against class. It is in 
such a crisis that unrepresentative juries can be made the instru­
ments of tyrannous oppression. Therefore, legislation should be di­
rected toward enlarging the jury lists to the utmost practical extent 
and to placing in the box the full list of names except of those who 
are excusable by reason of service within a limited time. 
In my judgment an example of vicious legislation in this regard, 
full of potential wrong-doing, is found in section 277 of the Act of 
Congress of March 3, 1911, which would permit United States District 
Court juries to be drawn from a single county of the district. 
But more important still is it that jury drawings should become 
public functions in fact as well as in law. The only way to bring this 
about is for the lawyers to make it part of their business to attend 
and scrutinize the drawings. Why leave the officials designated by 
law to meet in an empty court room and make up their own record 
with no one to verify it? We do not allow election returns to be made 
up in that way. If the drawings were made from full lists and were 
in fact public we would get rid of the rounders who, in almost every 
county, appear on the panel term after term to the exclusion of more 
competent men who should be forced to serve. 
I have only spoken of what seems to me a lack of preparedness of 
the jury system to meet a possible storm, the mutterings of which 
have come to us in louder and louder tones from Pennsylvania and 
Illinois and Idaho and Indiana and Massachusetts-a storm which, if 
it comes will bring widespread danger to life, liberty, and property. 
It remains for me to speak of an anomaly in our administration of 
justice whose baleful effect on the trial of issues of fact is becoming 
more and more obvious. I refer to a large part of the body of our 
so-called rules of evidence, and particularly to that rule which ex­
-eludes hearsay testimony-a rule subject to several explicit, and in 
some cases, utterly arbitrary exceptions. 
For the purpose of convicting one accused of homicide we admit 
the dying declaration of the alleged victim on the theory that the 
declarant's realization that he is about to die takes the place of the 
sanction of an oath, and we dispense with cross-examination from 
the necessity of the case. But with stolid inconsistency, we reject 
the theory and deny the necessity when the dying confession of an­
other is offered to save the accused. To limit the admissibility of 
deathbed statements as to relevant or material facts, to what are 
technically called "dying declarations,'' lacks, in these modern days, 
the merit of common sense. 
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The rule which excludes the self-serving declarations of a party to 
the suit unless they are a part of the res gestae, but admits his 
declarations against interest, conforms to the ordinary judgment of 
mankind; but that cannot be said of the rule as to the declarations of 
a party not in interest, since deceased. Upon an issue of curtesy, 
we exclude the declaration of the accoucheur as to the birth of the 
child, if coupled with a charge entry for professional services, but 
admit it if coupled with a credit entry. Is there any sound reason 
why the admissibility of such evidence should be made to depend on 
the fact that the declaration was made against the pecuniary or 
property interest of the declarant? Men of sagacity do not frame 
their judgments in the most important affairs of life by any such 
arbitrary rule. 
Forgetting that "rumor is a pipe blown by surmises," we go to 
the other extreme in proving character and insist that it must be 
shown by reputation, denying that the opinion of a witness formed 
from personal acquaintance affords any legitimate basis from which 
the jury could draw a conclusion as to character. 
We have some equally arbitrary and wholly artificial rules of 
exclusion in the matter of proving pedigree. 
This is not a fair way to treat a twentieth century jury. We de­
mand that a jury shall do justice by applying average human judg­
ment to the issues; but at the same time we withhold from them 
facts essential to reach a judgmatical conclusion, thereby, you may 
say, blinding them in one eye and depriving them of all sense of 
perspective. 
The present day jury is no longer the body of presumably ignorant 
men for whom, we are told, these rules of evidence were formulated 
by the judges centuries ago because their minds were so untrained 
that they were incapable of making nice discriminations as to the 
weight of testimony.1 This is to say that the rules of evidence have 
not kept pace with the development of the jury idea and with chang­
ing social conditions. In early days these rules were mere rules 
of procedure and they still remain so, technically. But they have 
acquired all the force of substantive law, calling for legislative ac­
tion, since we apply them in cases which do not require the interven­
tion of a jury. 
The conclusion of the whole matter is that while bar associations 
and legislative committees are giving heed to the demand for a re­
form in judicial procedure, they should also turn their attention to 
measures tending to safeguard jury trials, in view of impending 
social crises, and admitting that the intelligence of juries has kept 
pace with general social advancement. 
1Hon. Simeon E . Baldwin, 21 Yale Law Journal, 105 (Dee., 1911). 
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THE ARTIFICIALITY OF OUR LAW OF EVIDENCE 
BY HON. SIMEON E. BALDWIN, LL.D. 
(From Ya.le Law Journal, Vol. XXI, No. 2, December, 1911, pp. 105-106. Published 
by Yale Law Journal Co., New Haven, Conn.) 
The time of an American judge, in the trial of a case, is largely 
taken up in excluding evidence which, if admitted, would strengthen 
the case of the party who offers it. He excludes it generally, not 
because he thinks it would have no effect on the jury, but because he 
thinks it would have such an effect; not because he thinks it ought not 
to be admitted in the interest of justice, but because there is a rule 
in the books against its introduction. 
Who made our rules of evidence? Whence do we derive them? 
What do they rest on? 
The answer is easy. Judges made them-for the most part, English 
judges centuries ago, and made them because they had to deal with 
juries composed of illiterate men of untrained minds, incapable of 
making nice discriminations as to the weight of testimony. 
The English jury also, when the jury system took shape, was under 
the control of the judge in all matters, to a degree never known in 
this country. Down to the era of Vaughan's case, in the seventeenth 
century, for a verdict in a criminal case that was deemed by the 
Crown, or the judges acting for it, to be clearly wrong, the jurors 
could be attainted and punished by fine or imprisonment. Not only 
were they to be kept together, in order to force a verdict, as now, as 
long as the judge might think proper, but even down to the eighteenth 
century they were denied food, light, or heat, and could be carted 
about after him from one assize town to another. His directions, in 
all ordinary cases, controlled their decision; the judge was the de­
ciding factor; simply speaking through the mouth of the foreman. 
THE TRIAL: PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
BY W. F. WILLOUGHBY 
(From Principals of Judicial Administration, pp. 468-471. The Brookings 
Institution, Washington. 1929) 
In our analysis of the functions of courts, it was pointed out that 
the determination of facts not only constitutes a distinct function 
that can be clearly segregated from the other functions of courts, 
but that in the performance of this function courts have developed 
a procedure radically different from that employed by administrative 
bodies. This procedure consists of having the facts brought out by 
witnesses, who are produced by the parties, and testify as to facts 
supposed to be within their knowledge. From such testimony it is 
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the duty of the court or the jury, where use is made of that agency, 
to reach a decision regarding the facts. 
Complexity of existing rules.-In the operation of this procedure 
the courts have developed a body of rules governing the persons who 
are competent to appear as witnesses, the nature of the testimony 
that they are permitted to give, and the character of interrogatories 
that may be addressed to them. These rules abound in subtle dis­
tinctions, many of which are of an arbitrary character. Some idea 
of the extent of this complexity may be gained from the statement 
that five volumes, each several hundred pages in length, are required 
in one of the latest and best treatises on the subject fully to make 
known the character of these rules. Of it, one of our leading writers 
on the practical phases of American jurisprudence says: 
"The science of special pleading is usually pointed to as the climax 
of legal refinement, but the science of evidence pays a much greater 
tribute to the microscopic discrimination of the legal mind. It is an 
elaborate and comprehensive system for excluding evidence from the 
jury, based upon the fundamental idea that the jury cannot be 
trusted with all the facts of the case, but only with such as the 
court thinks are not likely to mislead. Fearful that the jury will 
draw false conclusions or will become confused in regard to the issues 
submitted to it, the law devises a protective scheme which is so com­
plex and so infinitely refined that the labors of a lifetime are hardly 
sufficient to master it. It is a labyrinth set with pitfalls at every 
turn. No lawyer fully understands it; no judge can accurately ad­
minister it. Errors in the admission and exclusion of evidence are 
not only common but inevitable, and they bring with them appeals, 
reversals and retrials. No such rules are necessary to protect the 
judge when he tries the facts, for he is deemed to have sufficient 
knowledge, judgment, and experience to understand the probative 
force of whatever is presented to him. But the juror is presumed 
to be an easy prey to illegal influences and suggestions and if he 
might have gone wrong by reason of such an error it is usually pre­
sumed that he did go wrong. 
The following taken from a recent address by a justice of one of 
our important courts, brings out in a graphic way the illogical char­
acter and the evil results of this system: 
"I next ask you to consider whether the time has not come for a 
radical and sweeping change in our whole attitude toward the law 
of evidence. It was during the last half of the eighteenth century 
that the jury came to rely upon evidence adduced before it and not 
in part upon private sources of information. Then there came the 
first manifestation of our law of evidence, which has rapidly de­
veloped from an orderly method of procedure, designed to assist the 
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jury, into a complicated set of rules too often designed to befog both 
judge and jury. Most of the time in our courts of law is not con­
sumed with the adducing of evidence; it is largely occupied with con­
troversy and discussion as to the manner in which the evidence shall 
be adduced. 
"And here again I venture the assertion that in this practical 
country, immeasurably more than in any other civilized country in 
the world, there are consumed in the courts vast quantities of price­
less time with wholly impractical contention regarding forms of 
questions, the attempt to draw a sharp dividing line between fact 
and opinion, the unending chatter as to whether the question calls for 
a conclusion, the meaningless formulation of and assault upon in­
terminable hypothetical questions. 
"The law of evidence is not an end in itself and we should cease 
making it our objective. It is purely adjective law, simply a method 
by which to ascertain facts. A great accomplishment of the English 
procedural reform was to emphasize that rules of evidence are merely 
a method and not an end of litigation.... 
"In the United States the meaningless mumble of the objection as 
incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial sounds through our court 
rooms like the drone of destroying locusts. 
"I have found it well nigh impossible by individual effort to make 
the slightest impress on this habit. By contrast I recall the trial 
of an accident case I heard in England. A witness was asked to 
describe the accident and then was asked: "To what do you attribute 
the accident?" The answer was succintly given that the chauffeur 
had not been looking where he was going. I should like to parallel 
that incident in an American court. The witness would be asked 
what he saw; he would probably endeavor to say that he saw the 
chauffeur was not looking where he was going. A motion to strike 
this out as a conclusion would be promptly made and promptly 
granted. The question would be repeated. The bewildered witness 
would again approximate to a statement of what he really thought 
he saw, namely, that the chauffeur had not been looking; a new 
motion to strike out made and granted would be followed by an ad­
monition of the trial court to the witness to be careful not to give his 
conclusion, but only what he saw, and the situation would end with 
the collapse of a witness, now no longer bewildered, but utterly stupe­
fied by the obscurity of a system of law which would not permit him 
to tell the story of the accident exactly as he would relate it to any 
human being in the worId. 
"I ask, therefore, that the profession realize that most of the ob­
jections urged upon trial are futile and meaningless and that we 
should reform ourselves in this respect by just ceasing to make them. 
We should also cease requiring our adversaries to formulate hypo­
thetical questions, when the same result can be more simply achieved 
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by a mere request for the opinion of an expert, and that the unspeak­
able practice of making our adversary prove a fact, even if you know 
it is provable, be eradicated among all decent members of the pro­
fession." 
There can be no doubt that the existence of this mass of complex 
rules constitutes one of the major defects in our judicial system. No 
other country has a system comparable to it in its refinements and 
limitations. More than anything else, it is responsible for making 
the trial of causes an intricate game in which there is a contest of 
wits as between counsel for the parties and between counsel and the 
judge, leading to a multiplicity of appeals and retrials. 
It is manifestly beyond the scope of the present work to subject 
these rules to intensive examination with a view to determining their 
justification. All that can be done is to consider their general char­
acter, the reasons that have led to their establishment, and the lines 
along which steps for their improvement can best be taken. 
In seeking to determine whether the complexity that characterizes 
the whole system of evidence is necessary and whether there cannot 
be substituted for it one which is simpler and more direct, it is neces­
sary to examine the underlying principles to determine whether they 
are ones which should be adopted; in a word, the problem is not so. 
much one of details as of the fundamental principles that should 
govern in making provision for this branch of judicial administration. 
QUOTATIONS FROM AUTHORITIES* 
(Froni "Current Criticism on Trial by Jury," by Theodor Megaarden, Law Notea, 
Vol. 33, No. 7, pp. 123-126, 1929) 
Judge Dillion, in a lecture at Yale, said: "I have tried literally 
thousands of cases with juries, and the instances are few where I 
had reason to be dissatisfied with their verdicts. I recall with inter­
est the views of the late Mr. Justice Miller and the change of opinion 
on his part on the subject of trial by jury. His opinions are of value, 
for by general consent he ranks among the ablest judges who have 
ever held a seat on the bench in this or in any country. He said to 
me at one time that his notion of an ideal trial court was a court 
composed of three judges to try all civil issues of law or fact. Some 
years afterwards, as a result of more observation and experience, he 
told me he had changed his views and that he thought juries better 
judges of fact than judges. 
"Twelve good and lawful men are better judges of fact than 12 
learned judges." 
•These quotations were selected especially for the Bulletin by MiBB Rae Logsdon, 
'30, The University of Texas. 
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Mr. Justice Miller : "In my experience in the conference room of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, which consists of nine 
judges, I have been surprised to find how readily those judges come 
to an agreement upon questions of law and how often they disagree 
in regard to questions of fact which apparently are as clear as the 
law. I have noticed this so often and so much that I am willing to 
give the benefit of my observation on this subject to the public, that 
judges are not pre-eminently fitted over other men of good judgment 
in business affairs to decide upon mere questions of disputed facts." 
Judge Caldwell (after serving on the Federal bench nearly 35 
years) : "The constitutional mode of ascertaining the sense of rea­
sonable men on disputed questions of fact in common-law actions is 
by verdict of 12 jurymen and not by the opinions of the judges. It 
was because the people knew the judges were poor judges of fact 
that they committed their decisions to a jury, and every day's ex­
perience confirms the wisdom of their action." 
Lord Penzance (in speaking of a divorce case in England) : "I 
should have preferred having the case tried by a jury, for the question 
is one of credibility for which a jury is the fittest tribunal." 
Lord Tenderden, of England (speaking of criminal cases) : "It is 
one of the peculiar advantages of our jurisprudence, that the con­
clusion is to be drawn by the unanimous judgment and conscience of 
12 men, conversant with the affairs and business of life, and who 
know that where reasonable doubt is entertained, it is their duty 
to acquit, and not of one or more lawyers, whose habit might be su~ 
pected of leading them to the indulgence of too much subtlety and 
refinement." 
Judge Weatherbe (of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Canada): 
"Distinguished English judges who have had most experience with 
juries have taken pains to express their opinion that they are sel­
dom wrong in finding the facts, especially where they are unanimous. 
For myself, I have seldom found them wrong except where I had to 
regret on reflection that I had not taken sufficient pains in directing 
them." 
Chief Justice Armour of Ontario said that the mind of a judge 
"by education and habit is trained to reject inferences and to require 
strict proof of every fact, and is thereby rendered less competent to 
draw reasonable inferences than minds not so trained." 
Mr. Megaarden concludes: "While these opinions, however eminent 
their source, are not conclusive of the matter, they are well worth 
remembering when we are confronted with the cock-sure assumption 
of many critics of the jury system that juries are not qualified and 
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are not competent to perform the duties with which they are charged 
in the trial of causes and that the judges could discharge those 
duties much better." 
Lord Russell in his book, The English Government and Constitution, 
in expounding upon the influence of juries in interpreting and modi­
fying the laws, says: "Not only are the juries in fact the real judges 
in England, but they possess a power no judge would venture to ex­
ercise, namely, that of refusing to put the law in force. 
"This may be a dangerous power as the jury decides in secret, 
separates and is no longer responsible, yet it has been the cause of 
amending many bad laws which judges could have administred with 
exact sincerity and defended with professional bigotry, and above all, 
it has this important and useful consequence, that laws totally re­
pugnant to the feelings of the community in which they are made 
cannot exist in England." 
(From Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 25, Edward Thompson Company) 
Judge Cooley, of Michigan: "The jurors, and they alone, are to 
judge the facts and weigh the evidence. The law has established this 
tribunal because it is believed that, from its members, the mode of 
their selection, and the fact that the jurors come from all classe!'l of 
society, they are better calculated to judge of motives, weigh proba­
bilities, and to take what may be called a common-sense view of a 
set of circumstances involving both act and intent, than any single 
man, however pure, wise and eminent he may be. This is the theory 
of the law and as applied to criminal accusations, it is eminently wise 
and favorable alike to liberty and to justice." 
Speaking for the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Shelby said: 
"The experience of the judiciary as shown by history, should teach 
tolerance and humility when we recall that the bench once accounted 
for familiar physical and mental conditions by witchcraft and that 
too at the lives of innocent men and women. In that day, it was 
said from the bench that to deny the existance of witchcraft was to 
deny the Christian religion. Juries would have done better. Then 
and now, questions of fact were best tried by jury." 
Judge Hopkinson of a Federal district court remarked that ques­
tions of fact "are referred to a jury, whose natural intelligence and 
knowledge of men, and the business of men, make them excellent 
judges of the credibility and effect of evidence." 
In a bankruptcy case where the pivotal question depended upon the 
testimony of two witnesses of apparent equal veracity who directly 
contradicted each other, Judge Lowell said, "I can only regret that 
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the parties did not see fit to submit the decision of this question to a 
jury." 
Lord Hatherly speaking for the House of Lords in a divorce case 
charging adultry, said: "I must confess that I greatly regret that a 
case of this kind should not rather have been submitted to a jury than 
brought before the judges sitting as judges both of fact and of law." 
Judge Porter, New York: If it be true as is sometimes intimated, 
even from the bench, that false verdicts are occasionally rendered on 
questions like this (contract case) the remedy is to set them aside 
and not to usurp the prerogative of the jury." 
Judge Willard, New York Court of Appeals: "From their inter­
course with the world, and observation of human conduct, they are 
more capable than a more secluded tribunal to appreciate the force of 
the various circumstances which attended the transaction." 
Chief Justice Bleckley, of Georgia: "Where there is a possible 
doubt as to the effect of villainy upon veracity, the jury ought to be 
left to decide it. As coming from the average of society, they know 
best what to think on such a question." 
Judge Lumpkin, of Georgia: "I would take the liberty of suggest­
ing that the general diffusion of knowledge and education among the 
people of this country much better fits them for weighing and com­
paring evidence than in any other nation or age since the institution 
of trial by jury." 
Chief Justice Hazelrigg, Kentucky Court of Appeals: "The jury 
are taken from the various walks of life, and their combined knowl­
edge and experience afford the very best opportunity for safe and 
wise conclusions." 
Judge Campbell, of Michigan: "The jury system is generally re­
garded as deriving one of its chief advantages from having the law 
applied to facts by persons having no permanent offices as magistrates, 
and who are not likely to get into the habit of disregarding any cir­
cumstances of fact, or of forcing cases into rigid forms and arbitrary 
classes. It is especially important where guilt depends on a wrong 
intent, to give full weight to every circumstance that can possibly 
affect it; and professional persons are under a constant temptation 
to make the law symmetrical by disregarding small things." 
Judge Scott, of the Missouri Supreme Court: "The jury, from 
their experience and knowledge of the common concerns of life are 
presumed to be the best triers of fact. They take with them into the 
jury box their experience in life which has enabled them to form the 
rules by which they will ascertain the weight to be given to the 
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evidence of any one who speaks in their sight and hearing, having 
due consideration of the circumstances by which he is surrounded, 
his character, if known, and any influences which may operate upon 
him." 
II. Necessity of Trial by Jury 
IN DEFENSE OF THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY 
BY JEREMIAH S. BLACK1 
(From E~ Parte Milligan, United States Supreme Court, December, 1866) 
We, on the other hand, submit that a person not in the military or 
naval service cannot be punished at all until he has had a fair, open, 
public trial before an impartial juray, in an ordained and established 
court, to which the jurisdiction has been given by law to try him 
for that specific offense. There is our proposition. Between the 
ground we take and the ground they occupy there is and there can 
be no compromise. It is one way or the other. 
Our proposition ought to be received as true without any argument 
to support it; because, if that, or something precisely equivalent to 
it, be not a part of our law, this is not, what we have always sup­
posed it to be, a free country. Nevertheless, I take upon myself the 
burden of showing affirmatively not only that it is true, but that it 
is immovably fixed in the very framework of the government, so that 
it is utterly impossible to detach it without destroying the whole po­
litical structure under which we live. By removing it you destroy 
the life of this nation as completely as you would destroy the life of 
an individual by cutting the heart out of his body. I proceed to the 
proof. 
In the first place, the self-evident truth will not be denied that the 
trial and punishment of an offender against the government is the 
exercise of judicial authority. That is a kind of authority which 
1Speake1' (1810-1883) : Member of the counsel for the defense. Formerly Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1861-1857; Attorney General of the 
United States, 1867- 1860; Secretary of State, 1860-1861. 
Occasion: In October, 1864, during the Civil War, Lambdin P. Milligan, W. A. 
Bowles, and Stephen Horsey were arrested and tried before a military courtmartlal. 
The specific charges were that they were members and supporters of a secret order 
known as "Order of American Knights," or "Sons of Liberty," having for its pur­
pose the seizure of ammunition, liberation of Confederate prisoners, and destruction 
of the government in general. All three were convicted and sentenced to be banged, 
but Milligan filed petition with the Circuit Court of the United States for a discharge 
on the ground that his detention was illegal. The Cincuit Court, being divided in 
opinion, therefore certified three legal questions to the Supreme Court of the United 
States for decision; the central one being, "Had the military commission jurisdiction 
legally to try and sentence the petitioner?" 
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would be lost by being diffused among the masses of the people. A 
judge would be no judge if everybody else were a judge as well as he. 
Therefore, in every society, however rude or however perfect its or­
ganization, the judicial authority is always committed to the hands 
of particular persons, who are trusted to use it wisely and well; and 
their authority is exclusive,-they cannot share it with others to 
whom it has not been committed. Where, then, is the judicial power 
in this country? Who are the depositaries of it here? The Federal 
Constitution answers that question in very plain words by declaring 
that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish." Congress has, from time to time, 
ordained and established certain inferior courts; and in them, together 
with the one supreme court, to which they are subordinate, is vested 
all the judicial power, properly so called, which the United States 
can lawfully exercise. That was the compact made with the general 
government at the time it was created. The states and the people 
agreed to bestow upon that government a certain portion of the 
judicial power, which otherwise would have remained in their own 
hands, but gave it on a solemn trust, and coupled the grant of it with 
this express condition that it should never be used in any way but 
one,-that is, by means of ordained and established courts. Any per­
son, therefore, who undertakes to exercise judicial power in any other 
way, not only violates the law of the land, but he treacherously 
tramples upon the most important part of that sacred covenant which 
holds these states together. 
May it please your honors, you know, and I know, and everybody 
else knows, that it was the intention of the men who founded this 
republic to put the life, liberty, and property of every person in it 
under the protection of a regular and permanent judiciary, separate, 
apart, distinct from all other branches of the government, whose sole 
and exclusive business it should be to distribute justice among the 
people according to the wants of each individual. It was to consist 
of courts, always open to the complaint of the injured, and always 
ready to hear criminal accusations when founded upon probable 
cause surrounded with all the machinery necessary for the investiga­
tion of truth, and clothed with sufficient power to carry their decrees 
into execution. In these courts it was expected that judges would 
sit who would be upright, honest and sober men, learned in the laws 
of their country, and lovers of justice from the habitual practice of 
that virtue; independent, because their salaries could not be reduced; 
and free from party passion, because their tenure of office was for 
life. Although this would place them above the clamors of the 
mere mob, and beyond the reach of executive influence, it was not 
intended that they should be wholly irresponsible. For any wilful 
or corrupt violation of their duty they are liable to be impeached; 
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and they cannot escape the control of an enlightened public opinion, 
for they must sit with open doors, listen to full discussion, and give 
satisfactory reasons for the judgments they pronounce. In ordinary, 
tranquil times, the citizen might feel himself safe under a judicial 
system so organized. 
But our wise forefathers knew that tranquility was not to be al­
ways anticipated in a republic. The spirit of a free people is often 
turbulent. They expected that strife would rise between classes and 
sections, and even civil war might come, and they supposed that in 
such times judges themselves might not be safely trusted in criminal 
cases,--especially in prosecutions for political offenses, where the 
whole power of the executive is arrayed against the accused party. 
All history proves that public officers of any government, when they 
are engaged in a severe struggle to retain their places, become bitter 
and ferocious, and hate those who oppose them, even in the most 
legitimate way, with a rancor which they never exhibit toward actual 
crime. This kind of malignity vents itself in prosecutions for political 
offenses, sedition, conspiracy, libel, and treason, and the charges are 
generally founded upon the information of hireling spies and common 
delators, who make merchandise of their oaths, and trade in the blood 
of their fellow men. During the civil commotions in England, which 
lasted from the beginning of the reign of Charles I, to the revolution 
in 1688, the best men and purest patriots that ever lived fell by the 
hand of the public executioner. Judges were made the instruments 
for inflicting the most merciless sentences on men the latchet of whose 
shoes the ministers that prosecuted them were not worthy to stoop 
down and unloose. Let me say here that nothing has occurred in 
the history of this country to justify the doubt of judicial integrity 
which our forefathers seem to have felt. On the contrary, the high­
est compliment that has ever been paid to the American bench is em­
bodied in this simple fact: that if the executive officers of this gov­
ernment have ever desired to take away the life or the liberty of a 
citizen contrary to law, they have not come into the courts to get 
it done; they have gone outside of the courts, and stepped over the 
constitution, and created their own tribunals, composed of men whose 
gross ignorance and supple subservience could always be relied on 
for those base uses to which no judge would ever lend himself. But 
the framers of the constitution could act only upon the experience 
of that country whose history they knew most about, and there they 
saw the brutal ferocity of Jeffreys and Scroggs, the timidity of 
Guilford, and the base venality of such men as Saunders and Wright. 
It seemed necessary, therefore, not only to make the judiciary as 
perfect as possible, but to give the citizen yet another shield against 
the wrath and malice of his government. To that end they could 
think of no better provision than a public trial before an impartial 
jury. 
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I do not assert that the jury trial is an infallible mode of ascertain­
ing truth. Like everything human, it has its imperfections. I only 
say that it is the best protection for innocence, and the surest mode of 
punishing guilt, that has yet been discovered. It has borne the test 
of a longer experience, and borne it better than any other legal in­
stitution that ever existed among men. England owes more of her 
freedom, her grandeur, and her prosperity to that than to all other 
causes put together. It has had the approbation not only of those 
who lived under it, but of great thinkers who looked at it calmly 
from a distance, and judged it impartially. Montesquieu and De 
Tocqueville speak of it with an admiration as rapturous as Coke 
and Blackstone. Within the present century, the most enlightened 
states of continental Europe have transplanted it into their coun­
tries; and no people ever adopted it once, and were afterwards willing 
to part with it. It was only in 1840 that an interference with it in 
Belgium provoked a successful insurrection which permanently di­
vided one kingdom into two. In the same year, the revolution of the 
Barricades gave the right of trial by jury to every Frenchman. 
Those colonists of this country who came from the British islands 
brought this institution with them, and they regarded it as the most 
precious part of their inheritance. The immigrants from other 
places, where trial by jury did not exist, became equally attached to 
it as soon as they understood what it was. There was no subject 
upon which all the inhabitants of the country were more perfectly 
unanimous than they were in their determination to maintain this 
great right unimpaired. An attempt was made to set it aside, and 
substitute military trials in its place, by Lord Dunmore, in Virginia, 
and General Gage, in Massachusetts, accompanied with the excuse 
which has been repeated so often in late days, namely, that rebellion 
had made it necessary; but it excited intense popular anger, and every 
colony, from New Hampshire to Georgia, made common cause with 
the two whose rights had been especially invaded. Subsequently the 
continental congress thundered it into the ear of the world as an 
unendurable outrage, sufficient to justify universal insurrection 
against the authority of the government which had allowed it to be 
done. 
If the men who fought out our Revolutionary contest, when they 
came to frame a government for themselves and their posterity, had 
failed to insert a provision making the trial by jury perpetual and 
universal, they would have covered themselves all over with infamy 
as with a garment, for they would have proved themselves basely 
recreant to the principles of that very liberty of which they professed 
to be the special champions. But they were guilty of no such treach­
ery. They not only took care of the trial by jury, but they regulated 
every step to be taken in a criminal trial. They knew very well that 
no people could be free under a government which had the power to 
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punish without restraint. Hamilton expressed in the Federalist the 
universal sentiment of his time when he said that the arbitrary power 
of conviction and punishment for pretended offenses had been the 
great engine of despotism in all ages and all countries. The existence 
of such a power is utterly incompatible with freedom. The difference 
between a master and his slave consists only in this: that the master 
holds the lash in his hands, and he may use it without legal re­
straint, while the naked back of the slave is bound to take whatever 
is laid on it. 
But our fathers were not absurd enough to put unlimited power in 
the hands of the ruler, and take away the protection of law from the 
rights of individuals. It was not thus that they meant "to secure the 
blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity." They de­
termined that not one drop of the blood which had been shed on the 
other side of the Atlantic during seven centuries of contest with arbi­
trary power should sink into the ground, but the fruits of every popu­
lar victory should be garnered up in this new government. Of all the 
great rights already won they threw not an atom away. They went 
over the Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, and 
the rules of the common law, and whatever was found there to favor 
individual liberty they carefully inserted in their own system, im­
proved by clearer expression, strengthened by heavier sanctions, and 
extended by a more universal application. They put all those pro­
visions into the organic law, so that neither tyranny in the executive 
nor party rage in the legislature could change them without destroy­
ing the government itself. 
Look for a moment at the particulars, and see how carefully every­
thing connected with the administration of punitive justice is guarded. 
(1) No ex post facto law shall be passed. No man shall be an­
swerable criminally for any act which was not defined and made 
punishable as a crime by some law in force at the time when the act 
was done. 
(2) For an act which is criminal he cannot be arrested without a 
judicial warrant founded on proof of probable cause. He shall not 
be kidnapped and shut up on the mere report of some base spy, who 
gathers the materials of a false accusation by crawling into his house 
and listening at the keyhole of his chamber door. 
(3) He shall not be compelled to testify against himself. He may 
be examined before he is committed, and tell his own story if he 
pleases, but the rack shall be put out of sight, and even his consicence 
shall not be tortured; nor shall his unpublished papers be used 
against him, as was done most wrongfully in the case of Algernon 
Sidney. 
(4) He shall be entitled to a speedy trial; not kept in prison for 
an indefinite time without the opportunity of vindicating his in­
nocence. 
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(5) He shall be informed of the accusation, its nature and 
grounds. The public accuser must put the charge into the form of a 
legal indictment, so that the party can meet it full in the face. 
(6) Even to the indictment he need not answer unless a grand 
jury, after hearing the evidence, shall say upon their oaths that they 
believe it to be true. 
(7) Then comes the trial, and it must be before a regular court, 
of competent jurisdiction, ordained and established for the state and 
district in which the crime was committed; and this shall not be 
evaded by a legislative change in the district after the crime is al­
leged to be done. 
(8) His guilt or innocence shall be determined by an impartial 
jury. These English words are to be understood in their English 
sense, and they mean that the jurors shall be fairly selected by a 
sworn officer from among the peers of the party, residing within the 
local jurisdiction of the court. When they are called into the box, 
he can purge the panel of all dishonesty, prejudice, personal enmity, 
and ignorance by a certain number of peremptory challenges, and as 
many more challenges as he can sustain by showing reasonable cause. 
(9) The trial shall be public and open, that no underhand ad­
vantage may be taken. The party shall be confronted with the wit­
nesses against him, have compulsory process for his own witnesses, 
and be entitled to the assistance of counsel in his defense. 
(10) After the evidence is heard and discussed, unless the jury 
shall, upon their oaths, unanimously agree to surrender him up into 
the hands of the court as a guilty man, not a hair of his head can 
be touched by way of punishment. 
(11) After a verdict of guilty, he is still protected. No cruel or 
unusual punishment shall be inflicted, nor any punishment at all, 
except what is annexed by law to his offense. It cannot be doubted 
for a moment that, if a person convicted of an offense not capital 
were to be hung on the order of a judge, such judge would be guilty 
of murder as plainly as if he should come down from the bench, tuck 
up the sleeves of his gown, and let out the prisoner's blood with his 
own hand. 
(12) After all is over, the law continues to spread its guardian­
ship around him. Whether he is acquitted or condemned, he shall 
never again be molested for that offense. No man shall be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb for the same cause. 
These rules apply to all criminal prosecutions; but, in addition to 
these, certain special regulations were required for treason,-the one 
great political charge under which more innocent men have fallen 
than any other. A tyrannical government calls everybody a traitor 
who shows the least unwillingness to be a slave. The party in power 
never fails, when it can, to stretch the law on that subject by con­
struction, so as to cover its honest and conscientious opponents. In 
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the absence of a constitutional provision, it was justly feared that 
statutes might be passed which would put the lives of the most pa­
triotic citizens at the mercy of the basest minions that skulk about 
under the pay of the executive. Therefore a definition of treason was 
given in the fundamental law, and the legislative authority could not 
enlarge it to serve the purpose of partisan malice. The nature and 
amount of evidence required to prove the crime was also prescribed, 
so that prejudice and enmity might have no share in the conviction. 
And, lastly, the punishment was so limited that the property of the 
party could not be confiscated, and used to reward the agents of his 
persecutors, or strip his family of their subsistence. 
If these provisions exist in full force, unchangeable and irrepeal­
able, then we are not heredity bondsmen. Every citizen may safely 
pursue his lawful calling in the open day; and at night, if he is 
conscious of innocence, he may lie down in security, and sleep the 
sound sleep of a freeman. 
I say they are in force, and they will remain in force. We have 
not surrenderd them, and we never will. (If the worst comes to the 
worst, we will look to the living God for his help, and defend our 
rights and the rights of our children to the last extremity.) Those 
men who think we can be subjected and abjected to the condition of 
mere slaves are wholly mistaken. The great race to which we belong 
has not degenerated so fatally. 
III. The Substitute Plan and Modification 
FIRST AID FOR TRIAL BY JURY 
BY JOHN H. WIGMORE 
(From Illinois Law R eview, Vol. XX, No. 1, May, 1925, pp. 106-107. Published for 
the Editing Schools by Northwestern University Press, 1926. Edited by the 
Law Schools of University of Chicago, University of Illinois, 
Northwestern University) 
"I nominate for the Ignoble Prize, Trial by Jury. More than forty 
years ago I heard that distinguished jurist, Edward J. Phelps, say in 
a public lecture, 'Trial by jury is a.good thing which has outlived its 
usefulness.' Today it looks like a bad thing which continues to dem­
onstrate its uselessness," William Lyon Phelps, in Scribner's Maga­
zine for April, 1925. 
1. When a superficial view with such subversive and legicidal 
import is responsibly and printedly expressed on a matter of civic 
interest, by a gentleman of such extensive erudition and such (ordi­
narily) even judgment and exquisitely-balanced temperament as the 
genial Mr. Phelps, it is certain that one of two things has happened: 
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(a) Either: Mr. Phelps himself (like many another good citizen) 
has just stubbed his personal toe on jury trial (perhaps he had to 
sit overnight in a foul New Haven jury-room, as a bored member of 
a smelly, back-alley-slander-case jury whence all (the gentlemen) 
but him had fled; or, perhaps even, as a plaintiff in a motor collision 
he had been stalled by an obviously irrational verdict) ; 
(b) Or: In a purely rational and impersonal spirit, he is voicing 
precisely the educated public's conviction, with that unerring instinct 
which makes him today the admired literary precentor of America's 
best educated element in public opinion. 
We promptly reject the former hypothesis, as "a priori" maximally 
improbable and also as totally unevidenced. We accept the latter as 
the obvious one. 
And the question arises: What is the American Bar going to do 
about it? 
2. We think the time has come for the American bar to awake to 
the situation and take it seriously. 
3. Let us admit at the outset our own creed: Trial by jury must 
and shall be preserved! Amidst the throng of crude sacrilegisms and 
demi-semi-cerebrated iconoclasms that assail us nowadays in the legal 
sanctuary, from even the most reputable and plausible quarters, none 
is more shortsighted, none more dangerous, than the proposal to 
abolish trial by jury. 
4. Of course, jury trial, as is, works badly. Of course, jury trial, 
as now managed, is inefficient. Of course, it exudes an aroma of 
repellence to the citizen, of shame to the legal profession, and of 
doubt to the chambered student of political science. 
But take your gold watch,-your chronometer, that alone makes 
world-commerce what it is in modern times on land and sea. If you 
had not cleaned it for a decade,-if you had left it forgetfully on the 
stove when your egg had been rjghtly boiled,-if you had given it 
to little George to pick at the works,-if you had dropped it on the 
concrete pavement and not had it mended since,-if you had done 
this and more to it, and a friend had then suggested that it was "use­
less," and asked you why you still kept up the farce of carrying it,­
would you think it unnatural in him? 
All this, and more, have we done to trial by jury in the last hundred 
years in the United States. 
5. But is that a good and sufficient reason for abolishing trial by 
jury? No more than our mishandling of a once perfectly good watch 
is a reason for discarding the watch-or watches in general- if it or 
they can be mended. 
The true thing to be done about trial by jury is to MEND IT! 
6. Trial by jury, as the Constitution gave it to us, is one thing. 
Trial by jury as we have allowed it to be spoiled by laws and practices 
not required by the Constitution is a very different thing. To abolish 
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the constitutional trial by jury is needless. (It would also be a reck­
less leap into the untried,-but that is a further question.) What 
trial by jury needs is to cleanse it from the foul dirt which harmful 
laws and practices have spread over its works and its face. If we 
cleanse and repair that watch, and wind up the original mechanism 
that the Constitution placed in our hands, then even Mr. Phelps, 
et id omne genus rationabile, will be compelled to admit that we have 
chosen the better course. 
7. This comment is offered in the hope of waking up the American 
bar--0r some part of it, at any rate-to the dangerous point that has 
been reached in public and private thinking outside the bar. 
This is not the place to mention the essential and conclusive argu­
ments for preserving the constitutional trial by jury. What we want 
to do is to urge the bar in general to face promptly the coming issue; 
to probe its own convictions; and to test thoroughly and officially the 
arguments pro and con. And we want to warn those who already 
have thought it out in favor of the constitutional method that their 
cause will soon be as good as lost if they do not now render first aid 
to trial by jury. 
THE PROBLEM OF TRYING ISSUES 
BY PROFESSOR E. R. SUNDERLAND 
(From Jm,irn,al of the America.. Judicature Societ11, Vol. XI, No. 1, April, 1928, 
pp. 20-28. Published bi-monthly from 857 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago) 
As long as the ultimate decision rests with the jury there can be 
no serious encroachment by the judge. His advice will be taken 
when it appears to be justified by the evidence; otherwise it will fail 
of effect. The jury will be quick to see and resent any attempt on 
the part of the judge to be unfair to either party, and the concurrence 
of the jury in the advice of the court will be good evidence that his 
advice was sound. Even so radical an antagonist of judicial usurpa­
tion as Bentham recognized this when he said: "In so far as upon 
what he does or says depends the decision given by the jury--0nly in 
so far as what he does and says, has in their eyes the appearance of 
justice, can he hope to exercise any influence upon the decision they 
are about to pronounce." 
The doctrine that a final decision on the facts from the judge alone 
is entirely proper and just in a so-called equity case, while the slight­
est intimation of the court's opinion on any part of the facts is a 
monstrous and fatal error in a so-called law case, is a phase of legal 
legerdemain which ought not to be perpetuated. There is no esoteric 
virtue in the chancellor which fails in the judge. Facts are facts, 
whether they are investigated on the law or equity side of the court. 
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Mr. Frank W. Grinnell says in 3 Mass. Law Quar. 357: "I talked 
with a friend of mine, a few years ago, just after he had serped as 
a juryman for five or six weeks. He said: 'The thing that we could 
not understand on the jury with which I sat was why the judge did 
not talk to us more about the facts and the evidence. We knew that 
he must have some ideas on the subject and, naturally we should 
have liked to hear what those ideas were so that we could consider 
them. That is what we would have wanted in making up our minds 
about anythiny outside the court room, and we could not understand 
why we should not be treated in the same way inside the court room 
and given such assistance as the judge might be able to give us. 
There he was, sitting upon the bench all through the trial, listening 
to the case with us for the purpose of doing justice, and yet he was 
the only man who did not talk at all about the case in any practical 
way. I don't know what you lawyers think about it, but I know 
what I think of such a situation.' " 
But aside from the obvious advantages which the jury would gain 
from the impartial advice of the judge based upon his experience, 
skill and technical training, the full recognition not only of the right, 
but the duty of the judge to advise the jury on the facts, would pro­
duce amazing results in diminishing the costs, delays, and technical­
ities of jury trials. Among the most striking of the advantages, the 
followiny may be named : 
1. It would reduce the time, strain and scandal in empaneling 
juries. Nowhere in the English-speaking world are there such ex­
hibitions of judicial ataxia in obtaining juries as in the United States. 
Why should a judge sit helpless for days and weeks while lawyers 
wrangle and struggle over the selection of a jury? Why should the 
court be paralyzed at the whim of contentious counsel, piling up ex­
pense on the taxpayers, congesting dockets, delaying justice, and 
bringing the Jaw into disrepute? Chiefly because the jury is an ir­
responsible and uncontrolled subject for the lawyer's manipulation. 
In many cases he does not try to get an impartial jury, but a jury 
which he can handle. If the judge by his advice can counteract the 
efforts to prevent a decision on the merits, such efforts will cease. 
This has been the experience in England and her colonies. Juries are 
quickly obtained and do their duty well. Justice Riddell of the 
Supreme Court of Ontario recently said : "I have never, in thirty 
years' experience, seen it take more than half an hour to get a jury 
even in a murder case, and never but once heard a juryman asked a 
question.'' 
2. It would facilitate the introduction of evidence. The science 
of special pleading is usually pointed to as the climax of legal re­
finement, but the science of evidence pays a much greater tribute to 
the microscopic discrimination of the legal mind. Errors in the ad­
mission and exclusion of evidence are not only common but inevitable, 
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and they bring with them appeals, reversals and retrials. But if the 
case is carefully analyzed for the benefit of the jury by the judge 
and the force and effect of the various parts of the evidence is fully 
explained to the jury, and the judge suggests to them what appear 
to him to be proper conclusions to draw from it, is not the chance 
of the jury being misled practically eliminated? By a perusal of 
the judge's advice and suggestions, it can readily be seen whether 
the case in its substantial aspects was clearly laid before the jury 
for decision. If it were, no harm has been done, for cautions from 
the judge are a reasonably reliable corrective for violations of rules 
of evidence. 
3. It would enable the judge to exercise much more effective con­
trol over the conduct of the trial. The prevailing American rule 
prohibits any remarks from the judge, as well during the prior 
course of the trial as during the giving of instructions, which inti­
mate any opinion he may hold as to whether any fact has or has not 
been established, as to whether any piece of epidence is entitled to 
much or little weight, and as to whether any witness or class of wit­
nesses is to be deemed more or less credible. Almost every ruling he 
is called upon to make during the trial relates directly or indirectly 
to the evidence. In just so far as he is an active participant in the 
trial he is likely, therefore, by word or act, to give the jury some 
inkling as to his own impressions. A word used, a suggestive phrase 
dropped. an inadvertent failure to properly balance his statements, 
even a perfectly valid reason given for a ruling, might reveal an 
opinion. In every sound he utters there lurks the possibility of re­
versible error. Is it strange, then, that the judge inclines to hold 
himself aloof from the contest, to sit as an umpire or moderator, 
rather than as a participant in the proceeding, to let things take 
their own course as far as he can, and to throw the responsibility for 
a proper decision of the case upon the parties, the lawyers and the 
jury? 
4. It would simplify the task of instructing the jury on the law. 
It is very difficult to prepare a set of instructions which will not be 
suggestive of matters of fact on the one hand, or be too abstract on 
the other. The judge must give the jury the law, but he must not 
intimate opinions on the facts; and yet the rules of law which he 
gives must be concrete and applicable to the precise facts in evidence. 
The court must not assume the existence of any controverted fact, 
must not put in doubt any uncontroverted fact, must not emphasize 
by special reference, nor minimize by silence, any particular facts; 
must not call special attention to particular witnesses, must not use 
ambiguous forms of grammatical expression which may or may not 
carry suggestive inferences as to the existence of facts. But suppose 
129Trial by Jury 
the court should be permitted to really explain and elucidate the evi­
dence for the jury's benefit. Most of these baffling rules and restric­
tions would at once disappear. 
5. It would reduce the frequency of resort to that expensive 
remedy for bad verdicts-the new trial. 
Many of the grounds for new trial are based upon the manner in 
which the trial was conducted and upon the justness of the verdict, 
as related to the evidence. Thus, the admission of improper evidence, 
the misconduct of counsel in improperly appealing to passion or 
prejudice or in bringing to the attention of the jury facts which are 
not proper for their consideration, excessive or insufficient verdicts, 
and verdicts which are against the weight of the evidence, all consti­
tute grounds of this nature. This doctrine of new trials based upon 
perverse verdicts sufficiently shows that the jury are not exclusive 
judges of the facts. Even if they are flattered to their faces by being 
told so, their exclusive jurisdiction is repudiated behind their backs 
when their verdicts are set aside as contrary to the weight of the 
evidence. They are exclusive judges if they decide right, but not if 
they decide wrong, and the court has the final decision. Of course it 
may be answered that the court's decision is not final , because the 
only effect of its action is to send the case back to another jury. 
But practically there would be little use in going before another jury 
with "the same evidence, if held by the court insufficient, for the case 
would be shipwrecked on the same rock as before; and if the verdict 
is set aside as excessive, it would be a foolish lawyer who would tempt 
providence by asking another jury for the same amount. 
If, then, the court has the power, for all practical purposes, to 
prevent parties from obtaining judgments upon perverse verdicts, 
why should it not have the power to help juries to avoid such verdicts? 
Why must the court sit mute, allow the verdict to be rendered without 
a word of warning, and then destroy it? A supervising architect 
does not stand silent and allow a building to go up in a manner he 
cannot approve, and when it is completed at much cost, order it 
demolished and built over from the beginning. An executive having 
the veto power on legislation, if he felt any interest in obtaining 
needed laws, would not refrain from all comment upon pending bills 
until after the legislature had completed its task and adjourned, and 
then veto its work and force another legislature to attack the same 
problem without any information as to why the veto had been exer­
cised. And yet the American people, who pride themselves on their 
efficiency and common sense, require or permit their courts to be 
run on just this plan. 
If the jury is to be employed at all in civil litigation, its activity 
should be restricted to the finding of special issues or special verdicts. 
There was no general common law requirement that juries should 
have anything to do with matters of law, as they necessarily do have 
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when they render general verdicts. The parties could always prevent 
the jury from coming in contact with the law of the case by demurring 
to the evidence, and the jury could always decline to meddle with the 
law by rendering a: special verdict. Issues of fact, on the other hand, 
could not by any procedural device be withdrawn from the jury, 
which makes it clear that the primary and essential function of the 
jury was to determine the facts, not to apply the law. Statutes 
which take away the jury's common-law right to elect between a 
general and special verdict, and force them, on the request of either 
party, to render a special verdict, do not, therefore, impair the fun­
damental character of trial by jury, and have been held constitutional. 
The procedural weaknesses of the general verdict are two. In the 
first place, it allows laymen to deal with matters with which they 
are entirely unfamiliar and which they will necessarily remain largely 
ignorant in spite of all the judge may tell them, and there is no way 
of knowing in any case whether or to what extent the jury misunder­
stood the law or whether or to what extent they misapplied it. In 
the second place, the particular facts completely lose their identity 
in the general finding, so that if error occurs it vitiates the whole 
verdict. The jury will not be permitted to testify as to how they 
compounded it, and there is accordingly no way in which errors can 
be localized, enabling the sound portions to be saved. This is a highly 
uneconomical arrangement, and causes an enormous loss of effort. 
Both of these weaknesses are entirely avoided in the special verdict. 
Texas stands in an almost unique position in regard to this problem 
of the verdict, having substantially abolished the general verdict in 
civil cases and substituted special issues. All states must eventually 
come to this practice, for the general verdict is the most prolific 
source of error and the most far-reaching cause of reversals and new 
trials known to procedural law. 
Looking over the field of trial practice, it is quite apparent that 
neither the rules of pleading, nor the rules of evidence, nor the rules 
for obtaining or dealing with the jury, are rules of precision, but are 
rules of approximation only; and that determining the merits of a 
lawsuit, like the selection of the best candidate for an office is a com­
plex social and not a simple logical problem. Hence technical tests 
are only a delusion and a snare, and are more likely to disturb than 
to promote the course of justice. An instinct for social service will 
carry both the lawyer and the judge much farther than an instinct 
for that emptiest of all abstractions-procedural logic. 
TRIAL BY JURY 
(From Editorials of the Month, Houston, Texas, June 30, 1930, p . 272) 
From its Anglo-Saxon forebears, American civilization received 
many and many a priceless heritage. None of them, however, is so 
distinctively the badge of freedom as trial by jury. 
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When Englishmen demanded and exacted the right of trial by a 
jury of their peers, they laid the foundations upon which the struc­
ture of democracy was built. This right has become, not only the 
oldest, but the most sacred of the institutions of freedom. It is the 
strand upon which are strung the beads of "government of the people, 
by the people, for the people." 
Just as it is the safeguard of those who respect the rights of others, 
and for their own rights demand respect, so trial by jury is the ever­
present threat which restrains the natural wickedness of the vicious. 
In consequence, trial by jury has become the test of democracy. 
Where a trial by jury is above all else a just trial, democracy stands 
vindicated before the world; and, by the same token, where trial by 
jury becomes a travesty upon justice, then government of the people, 
by the people, for the people stands indicted before all mankind I 
It is one of the inexorable laws of nature that no great privilege is 
gained except an equally great responsibility is assumed. When 
English-speaking people acquired the right of trial by jury, they were 
charged with the responsibility to keep pure and uncontaminated the 
institution given into their care. 
Of late, in Texas as in other states of the Union, students of govern­
ment have been disturbed by the apparent indifference with which 
citizens view their responsibility as jurors. Jury duty has become, 
not the privilege of a freeman, but some disagreeable task to be 
avoided by hook or by crook, a symptom which suggests an unwhole­
some condition. 
Alarmed, perhaps, by such evidences of the state of the public 
mind, the Honorable Royall R. Watkins, Judge of the 95th District 
Court at Dallas, wrote and caused to be printed a most informative 
brochure which he calls "A Handbook for Jurors." As we understand 
it, every juror, reporting for service in the district courts of Dallas 
County, is given a copy of this booklet and requested to read it. 
In undertaking this work, Judge Watkins was moved by two con­
siderations. He wished, first, to warn jurors against conduct which 
so frequently results in reversals and new trials because of "miscon­
duct of juries," thereby saving to Dallas County the tremendous sums 
annually spent for such needlessly extended litigation; and, finally, 
he desired to take advantage of a most favorable opportunity to 
impress upon jurors a full appreciation of their solemn responsibility 
and privilege. 
Observers say that Judge Watkins' experiment in "juror education" 
has proven to be most worthwhile. Dallas County citizens already 
are viewing juries and jury duty in a new and more serious light. 
It goes without saying that other Texas counties should follow the 
excellent example set in Dallas district courts. Every district court 
in the state should use Judge Watkins' Handbook for Jurors, or a 
work of similar character. 
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On the other hand, it is our opinion that Judge Watkins stopped 
just short of his full duty. It is true, of course, that he is doing a 
splendid work, but he should extend the scope of his service to include 
the public schools. He should prepare a longer treatise, guaged to 
the mental capacities of average high school students and make it 
available for special study by these boys who will be the jurors of 
tomorrow. 
BY C. S. BRADLEY, President Texas Bar Association 
(Quotation from San Antonio Express, July 4, 1930) 
The English-speaking people everywhere use the jury as a part of 
their ancient heritage; and no one would abolish jury trials. 
But it is not treason to criticise or suggest changes in the jury. 
After a practice covering many years and practically the whole range 
of actions, I am convinced that in many respects the jury, as it 
functions in Texas, is chaotic, inert, unscientific and impractical. I 
would not abolish, but improve that institution. 
A jury of 12 of the chief justices of the supreme courts of this 
country, hand-picked, including the illustrious Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, as foreman, could not intelli­
gently try anc properly decide a complicated case, if treated as our 
juries are treated-locked up during the trial, and denied the use of 
pencil, paper, table, and access to the papers in the case of all docu­
mentary evidence, and not even permitted to talk about the case, 
among themselves, during a long and protracted trial. 
The jury should be selected from the most intelligent members of 
the community and compelled to serve, they should be taken into the 
confidence of the court, and impressed with their supreme burden of 
responsibility for a just finding of the facts. No one challenges a 
judge because he may read the newspapers or talk about a sensational 
case, or even though he happens to have some relative or friend 
interested in a similar case. If the jury may not be so treated, it 
argues the supremacy of the judge over the jury and goes far to 
discredit the jury as an institution. 
Give the judge the powers of a real judge, and not merely those of 
a moderator; make him independent as to the law of the case; and, 
conversely, make the jury independent of the court on the facts, and 
teach both that they are in fact coordinate functionaries in the trial­
each supreme in its own sphere and duties. Let the judge advise, but 
not coerce the jury. 
If all persons were perfectly honest, impartial and sufficiently in­
telligent and observant to know and correctly detail facts represent­
ing a transaction, the application of such facts to the controversy 
would be simple and easy, and could then be determined as a matter 
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of law. But persons who inhabit the Temples of Justice are not all 
honest, nor impartial, nor sufficiently intelligent and observant to 
meet this standard. 
These limitations of humanity have necessitated the building of a 
set of rules for the determination of truth before controversies can 
be settled. 
DEFECTS OF THE STATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
BY FREDERIC A. OGG and P. ORMAN RAY 
(From Introductwn to American G1>1Jernme11t, pp. 813-815. The Century Company, 
Publishers, New York, 1928) 
When eminent leaders of the bar, able and respected judges of both 
state and federal courts, deans and professors of the best law schools, 
and an ex-president and chief justice of the United States, concur in 
pronouncing the organization of our state courts and their methods 
of administering justice in both civil and criminal cases sadly de­
fective, if not in grave danger of breaking down, the average lay 
citizen may well become interested in the situation and in the remedies 
which are proposed. The criticisms most frequently directed against 
the state judicial system fall into three main groups. The first re­
lates to the structure or organization of the courts, including the 
term for which judges are chosen, their compensation, and especially 
the method of selecting and removing them; the failure to develop 
highly specialized courts for the exclusive handling of certain classes 
of cases; the overlapping jurisdiction of different courts, and the 
absence in most states of unity in judicial organization; a very gen­
eral failure to recognize that the efficiency with which justice is 
administerd depends largely upon proper provision for handling the 
administrative side of court work; and the equally general failure 
to ensure centralized supervision over the work of judges of the 
different courts throughout the state, who at present are legally 
independent of one another and usually quite uncontrolled by any 
central directing head. 
A second group of criticisms, although arising in part from the 
absence of a unified judicial system, relate chiefly to court procedure; 
protests (a) against the absence of rule-making power on the part 
of courts; (b) against the numerous petty limitations imposed upon 
the trial judge by legislative action; (c) against the frequent amend­
ment, in some states, of the rules of court procedure by the legisla­
ture, often at the behest of the litigants who hope thereby to gain 
some advantage in a particular case; (d) against the inability of the 
trial judge really to control the procedure in his court as an English 
judge is able to do; (e) against the unlimited right of appeal which, in 
civil cases, works against the interest of the poor litigant and, in 
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criminal cases, often defeats the ends of justice; (f) against the 
tendency of appellate courts to reverse decisions of lower courts upon 
purely technical grounds not affecting the merits of the case; (g) 
against long delays in bringing criminal cases to trial (partly due 
to the cumbersome grand jury system), with the result that criminals 
often go scot free because of the death or disappearance of important 
witnesses; (h) against the unrestricted admission to bail of old 
offenders; (i) against the poor pay and poor quality of jurymen gen­
erally, and the inordinate delays attending the selection or empanel­
ing of juries in criminal cases; (j) against the long-drawn-out ex­
amination of witnesses and the unlimited number of objections to 
testimony permitted to counsel; (k) against the rule that the failure 
of the accused to testify may not be commented upon before the jury 
by the prosecution; (I) against the requirement of unanimous ver­
dicts by juries; (m) against the rule in a few states permitting juries 
to be judges of the law as well as of the facts; and finally, (n) 
against the absence of unified control over the various prosecuting 
officers throughout the state, resulting in uneven enforcement of 
criminal laws and lowered efficiency in the conduct of criminal prose­
cutions. 
JUSTICE AND HORSE SENSE 
BY RICHARD WASHBURN CHILD 
(Extract: Saturda11 Evening Post, June 28, 1930, p. 29) 
Modern methods in England.-It is the key to flexibility of pro­
eedure and to short cuts of common sense which English justice has 
adopted; it is the key to the application of innovations against which 
foreign systems of law administration have never put up the asinine 
obstacles we have seen raised successfully by shyster lawyers and by 
the old, blinking owls of our own bench and bar. 
And how to organize? 
Already England, some of our own states and the Federal courts­
largely by the late Chief Justice Taft's sense-have begun to show 
the way to an organization of justice which changes the complexion 
of administration of justice from that of cobblers to that of a modern 
shoe factory, from the efforts of isolated alchemists to that of or­
ganized scientific institutions where specialists are in the laboratory, 
and, indeed, where there is a laboratory at all! 
There is no use in talking about this until we examine what some 
of the experiments in such organization have been. 
"The main thing to watch for in judiciary organization is to avoid 
the creation of a legal oligarchy," say many. "There must not be 
too great a separation of the judiciary from the control of the 
135Trial by Jury 
masses,'' say others. That is right, but the danger of this result is 
slight indeed compared with the danger of political-machine control 
of courts. 
Mr. Higgins sums up the result of the English reforms. Anyone 
can see that in large measure these results are the very ones we, 
the people of America in general, desire and need. Mr. Higgins pre­
sents better than I have, the faults in our courts by listing the 
virtues of the English system. He says: 
"The main features of the English administration of justice which 
speed causes and further the determination of the merits of claims are: 
"l. Certain inherent aids, including the absence of hindrances to 
the administration of justice, due to the habits and character of the 
people, such as regard for law and for the courts, the spirit of fair 
play, a lack of emotionalism. 
"2. Adherence to the precedent of decided cases. 
"3. The elasticity of the rules of procedure so as to meet the re­
quirements of individual cases. This is due to the great amount of 
'judicial discretion,' safeguarded from abuse by precedent, by pro­
visions for review by higher authority, and by regard for the good 
opinion of fellow judges, due to the organization of the court. 
"4. The means by which character and ability are secured for 
judicial service, such as appointments, high salaries, and security of 
tenure of office. 
"5. The absence of certain physical obstacles to a more speedy and 
certain determination to the ultimate facts, due to reasonable hours of 
trial and to comfortable quarters and to other accommodations for 
the judge, jury, witnesses and counsel. 
"6. The length of trial sessions. 
"7. The means by which, on the one hand, a determination of the 
merits may be secured in most cases in spite of procedural mistakes, 
and yet, on the other hand, obedience to procedural rules may be com­
pelled. The first is due to rules permitting amendments, to others 
authorizing the court or judge to disregard nonprejudicial errors, and 
to still others granting the court or judge power to enlarge the time 
for the performance of certain procedural acts; the second is due to 
the imposition of costs as a penalty upon the offending party or his 
attorney. 
"8. The scope of the action to permit the joinder of parties and of 
claims, subject to severance or dismissal for prejudicial inconvenience 
to the administration of justice or to the opposite party. 
"9. Efficiency due to the elimination of considerable waste of in­
dividuals, their time and effort. 
"10. The constant accessibility of someone in authority to pass upon 
interlocutory matters, particularly upon pleadings, and motions for 
directions as to the conduct of individual proceedings. 
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"11. The judicial power to make rules of procedure, thus furnish­
ing a ready and efficient means to procure speedy, timely, and well­
drafted rules to meet the demands of procedural justice, as revealed 
by the daily business of the courts. This is in contrast with the slow, 
unscientific and often unreliable method of code making by legislative 
action, and is safeguarded from abuse by limitations imposed by Acts 
of Parliament, and by sensitiveness to popular opinion. 
"12. The publicity of judicial business and accessibility to judicial 
statistics showing each year just how much business has been done 
by the courts in general and by the judges in particular, and account­
ing for the time and effort of the various judicial agencies. 
"13. The judicial control of procedural steps to suit the varying 
needs of a large class of cases. 
"14. The means by which dilatory attacks may be speedily de­
termined. 
"15. The simplicity and conciseness of the statements of pleadings 
and of other means by which claims are brought into court, due to 
the elimination of the necessity of pleading 'conditions precedent' and 
to the language and arrangement of official forms, drafted as models. 
"16. The elimination from issue, as a rule, of all ultimate facts 
not really in controversy, so as to avoid delay and effort required for 
the proof of a 'prima-facie case.' This elimination is secured, or at 
least furthered, by the requirement of specific denials, and by the 
machinery provided for Interrogatories, Demand for Admissions, and 
Discovery and Inspection of Documents, backed by the possibility of 
the imposition of heavy costs for unreasonable refusals to give the 
information or admissions sought. 
"17. The express finding of each of the ultimate facts of a claim 
or defense, so as to avoid new trials of all the issues, or to permit the 
correction of an erroneous judgment. This is accomplished by 'find­
ings' and by special verdicts in the shape of 'answers to special 
questions.' 
"18. The absence of certain hindrances to the speedy selection of 
jurors. 
"19. The flexibility of the judgment, due to its severability. 
"20. The elimination of considerable delay in appellate practice. 
This is accomplished by the simplification of the means of appeal, 
the shortening of the time, and the method of presenting the questions 
and argument." 
In England, the costs of litigation and of each process and filing 
and judicial service are not fixed by any arbitrary legislative act. 
Instead, the judiciary organization establishes a flexible schedule; 
judges are relieved not of assessing costs but of the question of fixing 
costs, because they can turn the determination of costs over to a 
master or taxing officer who exercises discretion to punish frivolous 
and malicious actions and establish equitable assessments. 
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CRIMINAL LAW-WHAT'S WRONG WITH IT? 
BY CHARLES S. POTTS 
Dean of School of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. 
(From The Dallas Morning News Reprints, No. 1 of a series of fifteen articles on 
Texas Criminal Procedure, published in the Dallas Morning News, 
Dee. 26, 1928-Jan. 9, 1929, pp. 20-24; 26-28) 
Guidance of the jury by the judge.-Another American practice 
that does not prevail in any other common law country is that of 
forbidding the judge to analyze or to comment in any way on the 
testimony, or on the credibility of the witnesses. While this is an 
exclusively American practice, it has not been universally adopted 
here. There are eighteen states that still adhere to the older rule of 
allowing the judge to guide the jury in the performance of its im­
portant function. The same practice is also followed in all the Fed­
eral courts and in those of the District of Columbia. 
Practically all real students of judicial procedure are agreed that 
the prevailing practice in this country is bad, that it deprives the 
jury, in many cases floundering in a morass of complicated and con­
tradictory testimony, of the help and guidance of the one impartial 
and competent person connected with the trial, and that it results in 
many miscarriages of justice. 
This function of the trial judge has been admirably stated by the 
Supreme Court of the Unitd States as follows: 
"It is the right and duty of the court to aid them (the jury) by 
recalling the testimony to their recollection, by collating its details, 
by suggesting grounds of preference where there is contradiction, by 
directing their attention to the most important facts, by illuminating 
the true points of inquiry, by resolving the evidence, however com­
plicated, into its simplest elements, and by showing the bearing of 
its several parts and their combined effect, stripped of every consid­
eration which might otherwise mislead or confuse them. How this 
duty shall be performed depends in every case upon the discretion of 
the judge. There is none more important resting upon those who 
preside at jury trials. Constituted as juries are, it is frequently 
impossible for them to discharge their function wisely and well with­
out this aid. In such case, chance, mistake, or caprice may determine 
the result." 
The committe on jurisprudence and law reform of the American 
Bar Association, quoting Senator Sutherland of Utah, now a member 
of the United States Supreme Court, put the matter in this graphic 
fashion: 
"When we refuse to permit an experienced judge to comment on 
the testimony it is as though we should drive all the architects and 
builders into exile and construct wigwams for ourselves." 
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Chief Justice Taft has expressed himself vigorously in favor of the 
restoration to the judge of his true function as counselor and guide 
to the jury: 
"The chief antidote for the abuse of their office by lawyers for the 
defense is to give to the judge who tries the case greater power than 
he now has in many state courts to defeat the perversions of justice 
by unduly zealous methods of the criminal lawyers who seek to con­
found the jury and mislead it. He should be able to charge the jury 
freely, instruct them in the principles of the law and apply those 
principles in such a way that the jury will understand. He should 
be entitled to give them wise suggestions as to the way in which they 
should weigh the evidence. His comment on the evidence should not 
be made the basis for a reversal, even if, in pointing out how the jury 
should consider the evidence, he may indicate something favorable to 
the state and against the defendant, provided only that he makes the 
jury understand that theirs is the ultimate responsibility in respect t<> 
the facts and that he may not control their minds. The power I am 
describing, and whose existence I am advocating, the Federal judges 
have. All English judges have it, and they exercise it much more 
freely than our Federal judges do. It makes for a wise and effective 
administration of justice and does not result in the conviction of 
innocent men." 
Present practice the result of a petty squabble in North Carolina.­
It is of interest to note that the present practice had its origin in a 
bitter squabble between the bench and bar in North Carolina during 
the turbulent times just following the close of the American Revolu­
tion. The entire judiciary of the state consisted of three judges wh<> 
rode the circuits and then sat as an appellate court to review their 
own work as trial judges. The historian of the court says that one 
judge, before his selection, had been a lawyer without much practice, 
another had been the clerk of a court and had probably never studied 
law at all, and the third was a carpenter. The bar had no respect 
whatever for their legal ability. A bitter feud arose that resulted 
in an attempt on the part of the bar to impeach the judges. When 
this failed the bar struck at the judges in another way, by depriving 
them of as much power as possible, including the right, theretofore 
universally exercised by judges, of commenting on the evidence in 
criminal trials. 
From North Carolina, the doctrine spread to Tennessee, which be­
fore it became a State was a part of North Carolina, and largely 
peopled from that State. The restriction on the power of the judge 
was written into the Constitution of Tennessee when it entered the 
Union, and many states have copied the provision without mature 
consideration and often in ignorance of the fact that it was a serious 
departure from the principles upon which the jury system was 
founded. 
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Gen. Ben Butler, stigmatized after his plunder of New Orleans as 
"Spoons" Butler, originated the provision in the Massachusetts laws 
for limiting the power of judges to comment on the evidence, while 
Judge J. H. Hudson has recently declared that the provision to the 
same effect in the Constitution of South Carolina was the result of 
a "deliberate design on the part of two or three able criminal lawyers 
in the constitutional convention to prevent verdicts of guilty in crim­
inal cases." 
Ours not the historic jury system.-From the foregoing it is clear 
that the emasculated jury system that we now have is not the jury 
system for which patriots fought through centuries of English his­
tory, and for which our fathers fought in their struggle for inde­
pendence. This thought is forcibly stated by Professor Thayer, one 
of our most noted commentators on the law, as follows: 
"It is not too much to say of any period, in all English history, that 
it is impossible to conceive of trial by jury as existing there in a form 
which would withhold from the jury the assistance of the court in 
dealing with the facts. Trial by jury, in such a form as that, is not 
trial by jury in any historic sense of the words. It is not the vener­
ated institution which attracted the praise of Blackstone and of our 
ancestors, but something novel, modern, and much less to be re­
spected." 
Let us conclude thi~ article with the results reached by a group of 
America's greatest authorities on judicial procedure, headed by Dean 
John H. Wigmore of Northwestern University, Dean E. W. Hinton 
of Chicago University, Prof. Edmund M. Morgan of Harvard, and 
Prof. E. R. Sunderland of Michigan. This group of notables, in a 
joint volume issued in 1927, from the Yale University Press, after 
stating that in theory the case for allowing proper comment by the 
judge is "unanswerable," give a summary of the answers received 
from more than fifteen hundred experienced lawyers, who practice 
before some courts where the judge is permitted to comment on the 
evidence and before other courts where this privilege is denied to the 
judge. They summarize the results as follows: 
"From these statements the conclusion seems justified that in actual 
practice the privilege of proper comment has the following beneficial 
effects: (1) It saves time and expense by bringing quicker verdicts, 
reducing the number of disagreements and diminishing the number 
of new trials. (2) It has an appreciable effect upon a substantial 
percentage of attorneys in making them spend less time in examining 
prospective jurors. In this connection, it is interesting to note that 
in England there is practically no expenditure of time in selecting 
a jury, and to ponder whether the privilege of comment, so vigorously 
used there, is not a contributing cause to this desirable end. (3) It 
operates to a considerable degree to induce the trial judge to pay 
close attention to the conduct of the trial. It is true that many 
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judges · who do not comment have a proper appreciation of the ju­
dicial function and do not neglect the performance of their duties 
to litigants and to the jury. But certainly the privilege of comment 
is an added incentive to good work. Consequently, the reported ex­
perience of trial lawyers fortifies the theory that the return to the 
orthodox rule would greatly aid the administration of justice even 
without changes in the rules of evidence. It would strike a heavy 
blow against the 'sporting theory' of a lawsuit." 
The eight specialists in procedure just quoted recommend the 
adoption of the following statute: 
"The trial judge may express to the jury, after the close of the 
evidence and arguments, his opinion as to the weight and credibility 
of the evidence or any part thereof." 
Who should fix the penalty, judge or jury?-In another way, in 
Texas and in some other Stats, we have further weakened the posi­
tion of the trial judge with bad results. We have taken from him 
the important function that he possessed at common law of fixing 
the penalty after the jury had returned its verdict of guilty. In 
England, in Canada, in Australia, and in South Africa, the assessing 
of the penalty is committed to the judge, and always has been. The 
same is true in our Federal courts and in the courts of a large ma­
jority of the States of the Union. 
Different functions of judge and jury.-Our practice of placing on 
the jury the assessing of the penalty is the result of a failure to 
perceive clearly the difference between the true functions of judge 
and jury. The theory of jury trial is that the jury is the fact-finding 
body. The one function that the jury can perform, and possibly per­
form better than any other agency yet developed, is to weigh the 
evidence and to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of 
the offense charged. This question, and this alone, should go to the 
jury. To place upon them in addition the responsibility of assessing 
the punishment is to saddle them with a duty that they have neither 
the information, the training nor the experience to perform intelli­
gently. 
If penal codes consisted of a mere catalogue of crimes, with a 
definite penalty attached to each crime, it would matter very little 
whether the penalty were assessed by the judge or by the jury. And 
this was largely the case in the early history of this country when in 
a few states the practice grew up of requiring the jury to fix the 
penalty in cases where the statute provided for any discretion in the 
amount of the fine or the length of the term to be assessed. But 
times have changed, and with them our ideas of crime and punish­
ment. 
In recent decades the old idea that the punishment should fit the 
crime has largely given place to the belief that the punishment should 
fit the criminal, and that the old principle of retribution does not 
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reach the best social ends. As a result our penal codes provide 
widely different treatment for different classes of offenders, even 
when they have committed the same offense-probation and parole for 
juvenile offenders, confinement in reformatories and reform schools 
for young men and for women offenders, the suspended sentence and 
probation for first offenders and longer and still longer sentences for 
repeaters and hardened criminals. 
To apply these modern remedies wisely required a high order of 
intelligence and knowledge of human nature, combined with experi­
ence and training in the reclamation of human derelicts. Such knowl­
edge and experience, unfortunately, not many of our judges have, 
especially when they first go on the bench. But a judge who is intel­
ligent and consecrated to his task will acquire by experience much of 
what he may lack at the outset. With the jury, however, it is alto­
gether different. They have neither the knowledge nor the training, 
and cannot by any possibility gain the experience necessary for such 
a task. We are placing on twelve ordinary and relatively unlearned 
citizens, gathered from the highways and byways, a group very well 
qualified for finding the relatively simple fact of guilt or innocence, 
the very much more difficult problem of saying what the treatment 
should be in order to restore the socially unfit to their places in 
society. 
Two incompatible duties.-Not only is the average juror entirely 
unfit for this task, but we are placing on him two mutually incom­
patible duties to be performed at one and the same time. To per­
form the one task well, that of determining the guilt or innocence of 
the particular crime charged, it is necessary that the juror be not 
influenced by a recital of other crimes committed by the defendant; 
and so our rules of evidence rigorously exclude such facts, lest the 
mind of the juror become prejudiced against the accused. But to 
perform the other task well, that of adjusting the punishment to the 
needs of the defendant, the jury needs and must have full knowledge 
of the defendant's past record of crime. 
Let us take for example the administration of our suspended 
sentence law. A defendant is not entitled to have his sentence sus­
pended if he has previously been convicted of a felony. So, an ap­
plication by defendant for a suspended sentence opens the door for 
the prosecution to prove past offenses, which, if proven, may seriously 
prejudice the jurors against the defendant in the pending trial. 
These considerations apply with even greater force in cases where 
the state is prosecuting under a statute that provides longer 
sentences for second, third, and fourth offenders. We have such a 
statute in Texas and the efficient District Attorney of Dallas County 
has recently successfully prosecuted under it. The celebrated Baumes. 
law in New York, which many think should be adopted in this state, 
provides for marked increases in the penalty for persons convicted of 
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a felony a second or a third time and for a fourth conviction requires 
the assessment of life imprisonment in all noncapital offenses. The 
administration of such laws is practically impossible in a state where 
the duty of fixing the penalty is placed on the jury, unless we throw 
to the winds the time-honored doctrine that the minds of the jurors 
should not be prejudiced against the defendant by a recital of his 
former delinquencies. 
Still another reason for relieving the jury of the task of assessing 
the penalty is that the present arrangement hampers the work of the 
district attorney. He has enough to do to gather the evidence in 
the pending case, without having to search the records of this and 
other states for evidence of defendant's former crimes. We have 
had cases here in Dallas County where a person was convicted of a 
felony and given a suspended sentence and later, after a change of 
name and disguise, committed a second felony and secured a second 
suspension of sentence at the hands of the jury. Such a mistake can 
not be rectified where the jury fixes the penalty, but defendant can 
easily be resentenced where the penalty is fixed by the judge. 
Then, too, if the penalty is to be fixed by the jury, the rigid rules 
of evidence must be observed in proving defendant's former crimes, 
whereas, if the penalty is to be fixed by the judge, he can take his 
time after the end of the trial and have the defendant's record looked 
up by probation officers, and local, state, and national bureaus of 
identification. The collection of this evidence need not take the time 
of the judge himself and other cases can go on trial without delay. 
When the necessary data is all in hand the judge can then have the 
defendant brought into court and enter judgment and pronounce 
sentence upon him. 
What is here proposed is that the two functions now performed by 
the jury in Texas be separated, that the fact-finding duty of saying 
whether the defendant is guilty in the particular case be left with 
the jury, and that the duty of fixing the penalty be restored to the 
judge, where it has always been in most English-speaking countries. 
The Constitution of the United States certainly is not in the way and 
there seems to be nothing in the Constitution of Texas that would 
prevent the change from being made by a simple legislative enactment. 
Summary.-It is believed that the change here suggested would 
bring about the following desirable results: 
1. It would relieve the jury of a task that they are not qualified 
to perform and place it in the hands of the judge who by reason of 
his training and his experience is better prepared to handle it. 
2. It would relieve the jury of the responsibility of performing 
two incompatible duties at the same time, leaving their minds free 
to determine the fact of guilt or innocence, uninfluenced by proof of 
prior convictions. After the jury has finished its task and been dis­
charged the judge, through various agencies accessible to him, can 
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secure the facts of defendant's previous crime record on which to 
determine the penalty to be assessed. 
3. It is fairer to the defendant, since it does not permit any in­
vestigation of his criminal record until after his guilt in the pending 
case has been definitely determined. 
4. It would tend to speed up trials and would lighten the load on 
the district attorney's office. 
5. It would make for uniformity in the treatment of offenders of 
a given class, since the judge accumulates a body of experience, 
which the jury, changing its personnel from case to case, cannot 
acquire. 
SUBSTITUTE FOR JURY TRIAL PROPOSED 
(From Journal of the American Judicature Societ11, Vo. 10, No. 6, February, 1927. 
pp. 167-169. Published bi-monthly from 81 West Lake St., Chicago) 
Judge Bird of Oklahoma says trial by three judges would effect 
much needed reform. Other substitutes for def ective system gaining 
ground.-One of the most simple and direct proposals for avoiding 
the many evils ascribed to jury trial in civil cases is that trial by 
three judges be substituted for trial by a judge and twelve laymen. 
The idea makes a strong appeal to the mind of Judge J. W. Bird, of 
Enid, Oklahoma, who recently published an article, from which the 
following excerpt is taken, in Harlow's Weekly. 
"In place of a jury I suggest a hearing by three district judges, a 
majority of whom could render judgment. Two judges from neigh­
boring districts would sit as associate judges. The question and dan­
ger of allowing incompetent testimony, errors in giving or refusing 
instructions and the various errors common in jury trials would be a 
thing of the past. A mistrial would seldom, if ever, occur. Cases 
could be tried in one-half the time, to say nothing about the time 
taken in selecting an'd impaneling a jury. The probability of an 
appeal to the supreme court would be practically eliminated. 
"We have reached the time in our civilization when as soon as a 
man is elected to office his political enemies are ready to charge him 
with dishonest designs. The danger of these charges would be les­
sened, for two of the judges would be non-residents of the district 
and it could not be said that they were under obligations to the voters 
for their election. 
"I believe with this plan the court business of our state could be 
done and the dockets of the districts kept up, with the same number 
of judges we now have, with less expense to litigants and taxpayers 
and with less time wasted by courts and lawyers. The business of 
the supreme court could be kept up with one-third the number of 
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justices we now have, for there would be few appeals to the supreme 
court after a trial before three comptent judges." 
Judge Bird's proposal is no novel one, for it has been advanced by 
other lawyers who have given it emphatic endorsement. But we do 
not know that it has ever been put fairly to the test of use. If any 
reader knows of experience of this sort we would like to hear of it. 
It is not hard to make a priori claims for the plan. Probably there 
would be a saving in money to the courts under this mode of trial and 
there would surely be a saving to the public and to litigants through 
a lessening of appeals. Far more important than the economical 
aspect, however, would be the reaction of litigants to the plan and 
on this score it seems highly probable that in most cases the parties 
would be better satisfied with a decision of three judges, passing upon 
both facts and law, than they are under the accustomed procedure. 
If this is true, then there would be a decrease in appeals not only 
through abolishing the need for correcting errors but also through 
the acceptance of the decision because of the high authority of the 
judges who concur in it. 
Experiment is needed.-The right place for a test of the plan would 
appear to be in city courts, and especially in those which have the 
assignment of judges by an administrative head. But there may be 
no state where, without constitutional amendment, the substitution 
could be effected by compulsion. Assuming that it is hardly conceiv­
able that a constitution could be amended so as to abolish the absolute 
right to jury trial in favor of an untried expedient, it seems that 
the only way to make a test is by offering the proposed plan as an 
option. If the opportunity were offered there would be instances of 
acceptance and if the results were satisfactory the customary trial 
by jury in civil cases might have a formidable competitor. If finally, 
after due trial, the new plan afforded the benefits expected and claimed 
for it, it would not be impossible to modify the constitutional protec­
tion thrown around jury trial. 
In this connection it may be pointed out that the staunchest friends 
of things as they are, and the most stubborn opponents of experiment, 
are not the litigants, but the lawyers. There are several reasons for 
this attitude. Nearly every lawyer holds himself out as a competent 
jury trial lawyer, just as, until recently, most doctors assumed to 
perform operations as well as prescribe remedies. As long as the 
specialization between trial lawyers and counselors is not fully ma­
tured the young lawyer will welcome jury trial for the practice it 
affords him and even the older lawyer, who has demonstrated his 
unfitness, will cling to it because he dare not admit his weakness. 
Another reason for the lawyer's fondness for the jury is that it makes 
him a star actor in a showy drama. There would be less of this, we 
might say parenthetically, if the trial judge possessed his common 
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law prerogatives. Another prop for jury trial lies in the advantage 
which it undoubtedly possesses for the litigant whose case makes a 
sentimental appeal. Closely allied to this is the final ground, and 
possibly the most conclusive, that lawyers welcome the element of 
luck, the purely gambling chance, afforded by the jury. Not that 
every lawyer always prefers a chance arbitrament, but that in most 
cases one of them does, and if one side demands jury trial the other 
side has no recourse. Adding finally the factor of delay commonly 
incident to cases on the jury calendar, so seductive to the reluctant 
defendant, we see how powerful are the inducements to keep trial 
procedure where it is, uncertain, inexpert, slow, costly and often 
subject to appeals which in themselves condemn the system. 
All these difficulties must be considered in relation to any consider­
able reform of the system, be it one of improving the mode of jury 
trial, or of effecting a substitution through conciliation, arbitration 
or trial by one or three judges. 
Substitutes /or jury trial.-Arbitration is now one of the most 
dangerous competitors for jury trial, resting as it does on mere 
agreement of the parties. In four states such agreements made 
before any controversy has arisen will be enforced by the courts and 
it is likely that the leading commercial states will before long achieve 
the same freedom of contract. It it timely, therefore, for lawyers to 
consider very seriously the proposal of Mr. Percy Werner, of St. 
Louis, who urges lawyers to try their cases before another lawyer of 
their own choice. 
Conciliation too is likely to afford relief where it is most needed. 
Mr. Justice Lauer of New York City has shown how courts can save 
a great deal of time by affording a proper medium for bringing about 
settlements through judicial advice. 
Finally, we should, whether a large measure of relief is afforded 
through arbitration, conciliation or another substitute mode of trial, 
nevertheless take steps to improve jury trial. There will always be 
many cases in which jury trial is presumably the best mode, if only 
in tort cases, as in England. Restoration of jury trial to the economy 
of time and effort and to the dignity and certainty which it should 
have, should not be impossible in view of the fact that it exists in 
Canada. Enough has been observed and said of late concerning 
English courts to convince the most skeptical that our jury trial 
methods are at every point inferior to those current in England. The 
objectors to reform are forced to various explanations largely summed 
up in the frequently heard statement that "England is not the United 
States." What we need now is more attention to the Canadian sys­
tem of administering justice, which is quite as admirable as the 
English. It cannot be urged in this comparison that Canadians are 
essentially different from our people. In the western provinces are 
a hundred thousand or more settlers from the States. Except fol'. 
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more efficient government, and especially in judicial administration, 
the people of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta are virtually the 
same as the people of the states which border on these provinces. 
Canadian courts are easily visited by American lawyers. There is 
a present need for drawing comparisons. In fact some influence is 
already observable among the bars of our northwestern states. It 
accounts in some degree doubtless for the growing desire among such 
lawyers to put their profession on the same plane which it has at­
tained across the border. 
MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY 
(From JC>Urnal of the Americcin Judicciture SocietiJ, VoL 10, No. 6, February, 1927, 
p. 162. Published bi-monthly from 81 West Lake St., Chicago) 
The statistical conclusions reached by this survey have shown that 
from the year from October 1, 1923, to October 1, 1924, there were ap­
proximately 13,000 serious major crimes reported to the police of 
St. Louis. Of these 13,000 offenses only 964 resulted in prosecutions. 
Of those prosecuted 55 were acquitted after trial by juries and 489 
were released by action of the court or prosecutor, and 420 sentenced, 
and of those sentenced only 374 were punished. For the same offenses 
in Kansas City for the same year, the following results were shown. 
Of 5,261 offenses reported to the police department there were 276 
criminal prosecutions; of those prosecuted ·11 were acquitted after 
trial by juries and 17 4 were released by action of the court or prosecu­
tor and 91 sentenced a.nd of these sentenced only 76 were punished. 
The number of offenses reported to the police department comprised 
only about 40 per cent of all felonies committed, the remaining 60 
per cent being reported to the prosecutor who keeps no records of 
the number of complaints filed. For that portion of the state from 
which information was secured, 7,032 warrants for offenses other 
than violations of the prohibition laws were issued, which resulted in 
2,680 convictions or pleas of guilty, of which number 2,232 served 
some portion of the sentence imposed. 
Stated in terms of percentages, the result is that our system of 
apprehending and prosecuting those guilty of criminal offenses is 
only from five per cent to ten per cent efficient; considering those ap­
prehended and indicted for major offenses it is only from twenty-five 
per cent to thirty per cent efficient, and including those actually tried 
for major offenses about fifty per cent efficient. 
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SHOULD TRIAL BY JURY BE ABOLISHED?* 
BY ARTHUR PENDLETON BAGBY, JR.t 
It would serve no purpose, in the discussion of the jury question 
to trace this bulwark of personal freedom and security from its be­
ginnings in a German forest over two thousand years ago under 
Tacitus. Suffice it to say that its operations since the beginning have 
been highly satisfactory. H. G. Wells in his "Outline of History" 
remarks that England owes more of her freedom, her grandeur, and 
her prosperity to that than to all other causes. Within the past 
century, the most enlightened states of continental Europe have 
transplanted it into their own countries; and no people ever adopted 
it once were afterwards willing to part with it. 
Trial by jury has had the approbation not only of those who have 
lived under it, but of great thinkers who have looked at it calmly from 
a distance and judged it impartially: Montesquie and de Tocqueville 
speak of it with admiration as rapturous as Coke and Blackstone. It 
has borne the test of a longer experience and borne it better than any 
other legal institution that ever existed among men. It is the institu­
tion, gained after centuries of struggle upward, wrested from King 
John at the point of the sword at Runnymede, placed in the Petition 
of Rights and Bill of Rights, transplanted into this continent and 
written into the organic law of both this state and this nation. 
Thus, it becomes obvious at the very outset that the abolotion of 
trial by jury would deal a crushing blow to personal liberty. As 
Justice Davis said in rendering the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the celebrated case of Ex Parte Milligan: "This 
security of personal liberty embodied in our Constitution was such 
as wisdom and experience had demonstrated to be necessary for the 
protection of those accused of crime. All persons are guaranteed the 
inestimable privilege of trial by jury. This privilege is the vital 
principle underlying the whole administration of criminal justice. 
By protection of this principle and in no other way can we transmit 
to posterity unimpaired the blessings of liberty consecrated by the 
sacrifices of the revolution." As long as individual liberty is to be 
preFP-rved as a part of the framework of human government, trial by 
jury will be maintained. It is the best protection of the innocent and 
the surest mode of punishing the guilty that has yet been discovered. 
If trial by jury were to be abolished, what guarantee would we 
have that the judicial tyranny of the old Star Chamber could not be 
reestablished? As Lord Camden, one of England's greatest consti­
tutional lawyers, said: "The discretion of the judge is the law of 
tyrants; it is always unknown; it is casual and depends upon temper 
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and passion. In the best it is oftentimes caprice; in the worst it is 
every crime, folly and passion to which human nature is liable." The 
rights and liberties of the people cannot long survive in any country 
where the administration of j ustice is committed exclusively to a 
single caste. 
In the words of Judge H. C. Caldwell of the United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals: "For a free people, trial by jury is immensely 
superior to any other mode of trial that the wit of man has ever 
devised, or is capable of devising; and evil will be the hour for the 
people of this country when, seduced by a theory, however plausible, 
or deluded by any consideration of fancied emergency or expediency, 
they supinely acquiesce in its invasion or consent to its abolition." 
The argument is made that the jury system is inherently defective; 
that it has not kept step with the progress; that it is a slow and 
cumbersome process; that jurors are dull and illiterate; that the 
process of selection of jurors is slow and wasteful and innumerable 
other contentions are set forth as an excuse for the abolition of the 
jury. The proponents of such arguments, however, fail to realize 
that they fall into the grave error of mistaking some of the super­
ficial defects of the present-day jury that can be easily remedied for 
something fundamental. For example, the quality of the jurors could 
easily be improved by providing educational tests ; the number of 
challenges permitted could easily be reduced by law; because these 
requirements are not fixed and one state differs from the other in set­
ting forth these rules of procedure. None are essential to the 
primary workings of the jury system itself. 
Again, when the jury system is compared to an ox-cart in this day 
of rapid transportation, the objectionist fails to realize and is happily 
unaware of the fact that trial by jury is a fundamental principle and 
not a fit subject to any such analogy. Centuries ago, Pythagoras 
laid down the unquestionable principle that in a right triangle, 
the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of 
the other two sides; yet the opponents of jury trial, with all their 
radicalism, would not endeavor to argue that in this modern airplane 
age of science such a rule is no longer true! Just so is trial by jury 
a fundamental axiom of a free people proven by years of trials and 
experiences and not capable of inherent change. 
Those who would abolish trial by jury further contend to the 
effect that: When I am sick I call a doctor; when my auto is out of 
repair I employ an expert mechanic; when I want a house built, I 
seek a carpenter, and from these facts draw the absurd conclusion 
that, when I want justice I should go away from the doctor, the car­
penter, and the mechanic to the hands of a judge. The fallacy of the 
entire argument is that while experts are necessary in certain trades 
and callings, the entire mass of the people have a sense of real justice 
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not exclusive to any one profession. It is our contention that the 
carpenter, the doctor, and the mechanic have a sense of justice as 
deep-seated and as real as any case-hardened, tyrannical judge who 
has spent most of his hours on the bench and is removed from the 
ordinary affairs of life of which he is to judge. 
Furthermore, consider the fact that when a judge makes an er­
roneous decision, the law of precedent compels other judges to adhere 
to this error. But, with the jury, no such injustice prevails. As 
Lord Hobhouse says, "Juries are passing every day innumerable 
decisions, and tend to carry superfine laws down to practical life so 
:as to make them fit for human nature's daily food." Confronted with 
these facts, it is obvious that justice administered by the great com­
mon people for which government has been instituted is more even­
handed justice than can be expected from any expert no matter how 
experienced or qualified. 
The contention is not made that trial by jury is perfect. No human 
instrument for the administration of justice can be perfect, but it is 
submitted that it is far better to retain a system that has withstood 
the tests of centuries than to experiment with one that has possibil­
ities of evil beyond conception. As we grow in age and grace, juries 
like other public officers will perform their duties with unerring 
accuracy; they will be perfect examples of a perfect system of gov­
ernment; then there will be no need of juries, for then, of course, 
there will be no civil cases and no criminals. 
Finally, it should be noted that the failure of our judicial system 
lies in other causes than trial by jury. The administration of 
justice has been inefficient not because of trial by jury but because of 
<ither factors, among these being, first, an inefficient and corrupt 
police system; second, the innumerable needless appeals; and, third, 
needless delay not caused by the jury system. Time and space does 
not permit a thorough discussion of each of these points, but to 
summarize briefly: Thos. A. Bingham, former police commissioner of 
New York City, says that the plunder of New York police alone totals 
more than $100,000,000 annually. The inefficiency and corruption of 
the Chicago police force is an old story of gang warfare and bribed 
<>fficials. As one would-be poet has said: 
"The pistol's red flare, 
Bombs bursting in air, 
Gave proof thru the night 
That Chicago's still there." 
And what is true of Chicago and New York is equally true of the 
other large cities of our nation on a more moderate scale. There, 
and there alone, lies one of the most fundamental reasons for the 
inefficient administration of justice in these United States! 
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Inefficiency is also caused by the innumerable needless appeals. In 
the past year, new trials were granted to 46 per cent of the cases 
brought before the Court of Criminal Appeals of our own State 
(Texas). Of this number, 60 per cent were granted on technicalities. 
In 1912, this same court reversed 56 per cent of its appealed cases. 
Furthermore, the delay that is charged against the jury system is 
even more apparent in the system which they themselves advocate. 
For example, the United States Supreme Court composed entirely of 
judges, is five years behind its docket. The Supreme Court of Texas, 
even with the commission established to assist them are more than 
three years behind with their work. 
Calm analysis of our judiciary, it is submitted, would lead one to 
the conclusion that the abolition of trial by jury is not necessary; 
that this institution has rendered good service in the past and will 
render better service in the future, with slight modifications of its 
procedural laws; that the proposed change of trial by a tribunal of 
judges will augment rather than diminish or remedy the present 
situation; and finally, that the failure of our judicial system lies in 
causes n<it directly connected with trial by jury. 

